dissenting.
I disagree .with the majority’s holding that CRE 407 does not exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in design defect cases premised on strict liability. In my view, the policies underlying CRE 407 apply with equal force in such cases. In addition, I believe petitioner Forma Scientific, Inc. (For-ma), did not contest the feasibility of pre-accident design changes. Therefore, I would conclude that evidence of such changes is prohibited by CRE 407.
I.
Respondent BioSera, Inc. (BioSera), collects and sells two major types of human blood products: white and red blood cell antibodies. Because some of these red cell antibodies are rare, BioSera stimulates their production by injecting donors with immunizations known as “stim cells.” These cells must be stored at minus sixty-five degrees Celsius or colder. To accomplish this, Bio-Sera purchased a used ultracold freezer manufactured by Forma. The freezer was equipped with an unguarded rocker-type power switch on the back of the freezer.1
On the evening of April 9,1992, a janitorial service was cleaning in BioSera’s lab when one of the workers inadvertently tripped the power switch and shut off the freezer. Although a beeping sound and flashing yellow light signaled that the freezer had been turned off, no BioSera employees were in the lab to respond to the alarm. This incident occurred on a Thursday evening before a long weekend. When BioSera employees returned on Monday morning, they discovered that the cells in the freezer had thawed and were ruined.
BioSera filed a products liability suit against Forma in Denver District Court (trial court), alleging negligence and strict liability. Prior to trial, Forma filed a motion in li-mine, seeking to-exclude evidence of post-accident design changes to the power switch. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that such evidence was admissible with regard to BioSera’s strict liability claim. At trial, one of BioSera’s experts testified"‘that Forma had recently changed the design of the power switch. When asked to comment on the change, the expert explained that Forma had recognized a problem with the switch and had taken steps to reduce the hazard of inadvertent deactivation. Counsel for Bio-Sera reiterated during cross-examination that Forma implemented a new switch design after BioSera’s products had been destroyed and that the ultracold freezers were currently being sold with guarded power switches.
The jury rejected the negligence claim but found Forma hable under the theory of strict liability.2 Both parties appealed, and the court of appeals affiimed. •, Regarding the evidence of subsequent design changes, the court of appeals held that such evidence was admissible under CRE 407 because Forma had contested the feasibility of an alternative design. , ■
II.
A.
CRE 407 governs the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if. controverted, or impeachment.
*120(Emphasis added.) There are two policies underlying CRE 407 and its federal counterpart, Fed.R.Evid. 407 (Rule 407):3 (1) excluding evidence that does not show negligence or culpable conduct yet is likely to be misused as such, and (2) encouraging potential defendants to take post-accident corrective measures without fear that such measures will be used against them in court. See 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 407.03 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1998); see also Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Colo.1986).
Based on these policies, the vast majority of the federal circuits have recognized that Rule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522-23 (1st Cir.1991); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir.1981); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1276 (3d Cir.1992); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir.1980); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc., v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir.1983); Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (6th Cir.1982); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468-72 (7th Cir.1984); DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1983) (applying Rule 407 in a strict liability case involving a failure to warn); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636-37 (9th Cir.1986); Wood v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 1995).
By contrast, only the Tenth Circuit has consistently held that Rule 407 does not apply in cases involving strict liability. See Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1326, 1331-32 (10th Cir.1983).4 In line with the Tenth Circuit, the committee comment to CRE 407 (Colorado Committee Comment) indicates that Colorado’s rule does not apply to strict liability cases involving a defective product. See CRE 407, committee cmt.5 However, the United States Supreme Court rejected this approach in the federal courts when it recently revised Rule 407. As revised, Rule 407 expressly excludes evidence of subsequent repairs in strict products liability cases involving a design defect:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove -negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
(Emphasis added.)6
Contrary to the clear weight of authority in the federal courts, the majority holds that evidence of subsequent repairs should not be excluded in strict products liability eases based on design defect.7 I disagree. In my view, both policies underlying CRE 407 are furthered by applying the rule in such cases.
First, CRE 407 excludes evidence of subsequent repairs because such evidence may *121be unreliable and confusing to the jury. In a negligence case, for example, a jury might wrongly assume that a defendant undertook post-accident repairs to compensate for past negligence. However, such repairs might just as well have been additional safety measures implemented by a defendant who was thoroughly careful. Thus, post-accident repairs do not aid in establishing whether a defendant behaved negligently or exercised proper care. For this reason, CRE 407 recognizes that post-accident repairs do not constitute an admission of liability.
This principle applies with equal force in strict products liability cases involving a design defect. In such cases, the central question is whether a manufacturer’s product contained an unreasonably dangerous defect. See Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 888. However, post-accident changes to a product do not necessarily indicate that the product contained such a defect. Manufacturers may redesign their products for.reasons wholly unrelated to dangerous defects: they may be responding to increased competition in the marketplace, implementing new technology, or making an already safe product even safer. See Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 887-88. Nevertheless, a jury might improperly view design changes as an admission of error by the manufacturer. This is precisely the kind of prejudice that CRE 407 is designed to prevent.
Second, CRE 407 excludes evidence of subsequent repairs to promote the safety of persons and property. This policy flows from the belief that potential defendants will be discouraged from making repairs if they fear the injured party will use such evidence advantageously at trial. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 283(4) (Chadbourne rev.1979). In my view, this policy should be given effect regardless of whether a lawsuit happens to be pled in negligence or strict liability.8 In either case, evidence of' subsequent repairs has the same effect: it reduces the defendant’s incentive to perform repairs that would prevent similar injuries from occurring in the future. See Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469 (observing that Rule 407’s policy of promoting repairs “is not fundamentally affected by whether the basis of liability is the defendant’s negligence or his product’s defectiveness”); Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 637 (“[Tjhere is no practical difference between strict liability and negligence in defective design cases and the public policy rationale to encourage remedial' measures remains the same.”).
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that CRE 407 does not apply in strict liability design defect cases because the rule excludes only evidence of “negligence or culpable conduct.” See maj. op at 115. The majority reasons that in such actions, the manufacturer’s conduct is not relevant because the focus is on the product and whether it contains a defect. However, this distinction is often artificial. We have recognized that instead of focusing solely on the nature of the product, such cases frequently turn on whether the manufacturer of the product is at “fault.” See Uptain, 723 P.2d at 1327-28.9 Thus, strict products liability cases may require a determination of whether a manufacturer engaged in “culpable conduct.”
In design defect cases, for example, the key issue is whether the product was sold “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, *122§ 402A(1) (1965); see also Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc., 938 P.2d 532, 536 (Colo.1997). As the Seventh Circuit noted, this test involves more than an examination of the product in isolation; it ultimately requires an investigation of the manufacturer’s behavior that caused the defect:
There is liability only if a product is defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the concepts of “defect” and “unreasonableness” bring into play factors of cost and risk similar to those that determine negli-gence_ In defining unreasonably dangerous, a balancing test is mandated: if the likelihood and gravity of harm outweigh the benefits and utility of the product, the product is unreasonably dangerous. A similar balancing test is used in negligence cases.
Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 467 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Birchfield v. International Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir.1984) (“[I]n a defective design ease_[t]he test for an ‘unreasonably dangerous’ condition is equivalent to a negligence standard of reasonableness....”); Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 637 (“[M]ost Circuits have come to the opposite conclusion ánd held that there is no practical difference between strict liability and negligence in defective design cases-”).
Given that design defect and negligence cases are analytically similar, I see no basis for applying the policies of CRE 407 in one instance but not the other. In my view, determining whether a product is “defective” and “unreasonably dangerous” involves a determination of whether the manufacturer engaged in culpable behavior. Consequently, evidence of a defective design is essentially the same as - evidence of “culpable conduct” for purposes of CRE 407. See Mareie J. Freeman, Comment, Spanning the Spectrum: Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 107, 28 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 1175, 1181 (1997) (noting that unless “culpable conduct” includes some forms of strict liability, the phrase is “mere surplusage”). Thus, I would follow federal law and hold that CRE 407 excludes evidence of subsequent repairs in design defect cases premised on strict liability.
B.
Because the majority concludes that CRE 407 does not apply, it does not discuss the rule’s feasibility exception. However, the court of appeals concluded that the exception allowed evidence of post-accident design changes in this case because Forma contested the feasibility of such changes. In my view, feasibility was not controverted. Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals.
While CRE 407 excludes evidence of subsequent repairs if offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct, it allows such evidence to prove “feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted.” CRE 407. However, the feasibility exception is not an “open sesame.” See McPadden v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc. (In re Joint E. Dist. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir.1993). Evidence should not be admitted pursuant to the exception unless there is a genuine issue of feasibility. See Fed. R.Evid. 407, committee cmt. Feasibility is not controverted merely because the manufacturer contends that its design was acceptable or explains that pre-accident precautions were not taken because of certain design tradeoffs. See Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 888; Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 638.10
To show its product was not defective, Forma explained why it rejected certain power switch designs. In particular, Forma claimed that it designed the switch without a protective cover to make it visible and readily accessible. According to Forma, these traits helped to ensure that the freezer would be turned off before it was unplugged, thereby reducing the risk of electrical arcing. Forma stated that because the freezer operated at a current above 7.2 amps, any arcing between the outlet and the plug posed a high danger of fire or electrocution.
In my view, Forma did not argue that an alternative switch design was not feasible. *123Forma simply explained that the pre-acci-dent design was implemented to avoid the hazards of electrical arcing. Such an explanation does not place the issue of feasibility in dispute. See Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 468 (a design tradeoff involving competing safety concerns does not raise an issue of feasibility); Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 764 (5th CirJ989) (by arguing that instructions in a product handbook are acceptable, a defendant does not contest the feasibility of better instructions); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir.1980) (by claiming that a design was changed to comply with government regulations, a defendant does not raise a controversy on the question of feasibility). Furthermore, Forma’s expert testified that a different switch design was feasible prior to the accident:
COUNSEL: [B]ack in 1990, could For-ma have put some guarding or additional protection on its on/off switch?
WITNESS: I am quite confident that they could have.
III.
Because I believe that CRE 407 applies and that feasibility is not a genuine issue in this case, I would exclude evidence of For-ma’s post-accident design changes. Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals and remand for a new trial.
. BioSera purchased the freezer for $3,800. At the time of the purchase, Forma offered several accessories to protect the contents of the freezer in case of a power failure. The accessories included a liquid carbon dioxide backup system and a remote alarm system with telephone dialing capabilities, each costing less than $1,000. BioSera declined to purchase either accessory.
. Pursuant to Colorado’s comparative fault statute, section 13-21-406, 5 C.R.S. (1997), the jury found Forma responsible for 60% and BioSera responsible for 40% of the total property loss, which the trial court determined to be $249,198.
. Prior to its recent revision, Rule 407 was identical to CRE 407.
. However, the Tenth Circuit has ruled that in federal diversity cases, the admission of subsequent repairs evidence is governed by CRE 407, as interpreted by this court. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir.1984).
. The Colorado Committee Comment provides as follows: "The phrase ‘culpable conduct’ is not deemed to include proof of liability in a 'strict liability' case based on defect, where the subsequent measures are properly admitted as evidence of the original defect.”
. The revisions to Rule 407 were adopted by the United States Supreme Court and approved by Congress. See Marcie J. Freeman, Comment, Spanning the Spectrum: Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 28 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 1175, 1176 (1997).
. Instead of following the established federal rule, the majority relies on the Colorado Committee Comment and the position taken by the Supreme Court of California in Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.3d 113, 117 Cal.Rptr. 812, 528 P.2d 1148 (1974). However, the Colorado Committee Comment has not been approved by our General Assembly, and Ault predates the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 886.
. The majority contends that the policy does not hold water in the context of modem products liability cases: "It is unreasonable to presume that a mass manufacturer of goods takes its cue from evidentiary rules rather than considerations of consumer safety....” Maj. op. at 115-116. I disagree. Of all potential defendants, mass manufacturers are the most likely to know about rules such as CRE 407 and be affected by them. See Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 637; Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 470. Furthermore, the majority's argument fails to acknowledge that CRE 407 clearly applies in negligence cases involving mass manufacturers. Thus, I see no basis for rejecting CRE 407 in strict liability cases on the grounds that such cases may involve mass manufacturers.
. In Uptain, the plaintiff brought a strict liability claim, alleging that a bottle of cleaning solution was defective because its warning label was inadequate. In those circumstances, we concluded that CRE 407 was applicable because "the concepts of strict liability and negligence liability are often intertwined in failure to warn cases.” Uptain, 723 P.2d at 1327. However, we ultimately decided that evidence of subsequent remedial measures was admissible in Uptain for other reasons. See id. at 1328-29.
. In some circumstances, courts have concluded that unless the defendant makes an unequivocal admission, the feasibility of an alternative design is deemed controverted. See Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297, 1300 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1984). However, the feasibility exception should not be read so broadly that it engulfs the primary rule. See McPadden, 995 F.2d at 345.