dissenting:
Because I do not believe that the common carrier standard of care enunciated in Summit County Development Corp. v. Bagnoli, 166 Colo. 27, 33, 441 P.2d 658, 661 (1968), survives the General Assembly’s express pronouncements in the Colorado Passenger Tramway Safety Act (Tramway Act) and the Colorado Ski Safety and Liability Act (Ski Safety Act), I respectfully dissent.
I.
The issues certified to this court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit are:' (1) what standard of care governs the duty owed by ski lift operators in Colorado to winter season lift users; and (2) does the Tramway Act and/or the Ski [Safety] Act preempt or otherwise supersede the preexisting Colorado common law standard of care governing the duty owed by ski lift operators to users of those lifts in the winter season? I would answer the second question affirmatively, and'clarify that the standard of care applicable to ski lift operators is one of ordinary negligence, as provided in the two Acts.
II.
The plaintiff in this case, Eric Bayer, asks Crested Butte to insure him from injury while riding a ski lift, whether or not such *81injury was occasioned by negligence through mechanical, design or, operational failure of the ski lift. Eric Bayer became unconscious and fell from the lift he was riding at Crested Butte ski area incurring severe injury. Bayer claims that Crested Butte had a duty to exercise “the highest degree of care,” and that such level of care would have required the installation of a restraining device on the lift from which he fell. He asserts no other wrongful action or omission by Crested Butte. Bayer concedes that the majority of ski lifts in Colorado do not have restraining devices and are certified for operation without them by the Colorado Passenger Tramway Safety Board (Safety Board). He also concedes that no statute, rule or regulation requires lifts to be equipped with such devices for winter operation. The federal district court granted summary judgment to Crested Butte, ruling that .the applicable standard of care was reasonable care and that Crested Butte had exercised such reasonable care in the installation of the lift. On appeal, Bayer continues to argue that under Bagnoli, Crested Butte should be held to a higher standard of care than ordinary negligence. In my view, Bagnoli has no continuing life in light of intervening legislation; and the appropriate standard of care is ordinary and reasonable care.
III.
In Bagnoli, this court determined that a lift operator was a “common carrier” with respect to the plaintiff and therefore owed the plaintiff “the highest degree of care commensurate with the practical operation of the chairlift.” Id. at 33, 441 P.2d at 661.
The higher standard of care imposed in Bagnoli has traditionally been reserved for inherently dangerous activities. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 194 Colo. 107, 111-12, 570 P.2d 239, 241-42 (1977). Ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activities warrant a rule of strict liability. See Western Stock Ctr., Inc. v. Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 379, 578 P.2d 1045, 1050 (1978).
The law has held common carriers to the higher standard of care, even though their activities are not necessarily inherently dangerous. The rationale for that higher standard arose out of their acceptance of an unusual responsibility to the public. See William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts 184 (3d ed.1964). Additionally, burden of proof considerations played a role in the analysis, based upon the fact that a passenger on a mode of transport for hire is not familiar with the instrumentalities and appliances used for transportation and would be disadvantaged if required to prove the specific cause of the accident. See Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Fotheringham, 17 Colo.App. 410, 68 P. 978 (1902).
The common carrier standard of care was initially rejected by this court in Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261 (1960), as applied to amusement park devices on the theory that the “presumptions or inferences available to a passenger in an action against a carrier are not available” in an amusement park setting. Hook, 142 Colo. at 282, 351 P.2d at 265.
The court revisited the issue in Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 396 P.2d 933 (1964), and concluded that amusement park devices should be treated as common carriers1 because “the plaintiff? had surrendered themselves to the care and custody of the defendants; they had given up their freedom of movement and actions; there was nothing they could do to cause or prevent the accident. Under the circumstances of the case, the defendants had exclusive possession and control of the facilities used in the conduct of their business.” Id. at 56-57, 396 P.2d at 939. Three members of the Lewis court dissented , on that point, distinguishing common carriers from recreational providers.
If, indeed, a higher standard of care evolves primarily out of either an inherently dangerous activity or out of a common carrier status, clearly the court in Lewis was *82relying upon the common carrier analysis, not a conclusion that amusement park devices are inherently dangerous.
And thus, the court came to Bagnoli In Bagnoli, the court noted that not all of the factors present in Lewis similarly applied to Bagnoli, but concluded nonetheless that Summit County Development Corporation was a common carrier and, as such, owed the plaintiff the highest degree of care. The court cited various other' states that had similarly imposed a common carrier status on ski lift operators.
The Bagnoli rationale turned on the common carrier status of the defendant. The court declared that a “ski lift facility, like other transportation facilities, and like the stagecoach amusement ride in Lewis, requires the operator to exercise the highest degree of care commensurate with its practical operation.” Bagnoli 166 Colo. at 40, 441 P.2d at 664.
However, after we decided Bagnoli, the legislative landscape changed around the nation, including in Colorado. The chronology reflects that courts initially defined ski lifts as common carriers, and thereby activated a higher standard of care. Many legislatures, like Colorado’s General Assembly, then chose to act and declared that passenger tramways are not common carriers. Following legislative pronouncements that ski lifts were not to be treated as common carriers, other states have retreated from a determination that a higher standard of care applies.
For example, in Pessl v. Bridger Bowl, 164 Mont. 389, 524 P.2d 1101 (1974), the Montana Supreme Court concluded that the duty of care owed by ski lift operators in Montana was one of reasonable and ordinary care because of the enactment of Montana’s Passenger Tramway Act which, in pertinent part, parallels the Tramway Act before us today.2 See Pessl, 524 P.2d at 1107. See also Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977)(holding same as Pessl, and recognizing that states adopting such statutes typically did so in response to court decisions which imposed a higher degree of care); D’Amico v. Great American Recreation, Inc., 265 N.J.Super. 496, 627 A.2d 1164 (1992)(applying highest degree of care because New Jersey’s ski safety act did not include language exempting operators from common carrier status); Albert v. State, 80 Misc.2d 105, 362 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y.Ct.Cl.1974)(finding that chairlift operators are not common carriers under similarly worded N.Y. statute); Friedman v. State, 54 Misc.2d 448, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y.Ct.Cl.1967)(same as Albert); Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death from Ski Lift, Ski Tow, or Similar Device, 95 A.L.R.3d 203 (1979). The New Hampshire Supreme Court specifically recognized in Bolduc that the legislative decision to remove passenger tramways from common carrier status was in response to' court eases like Bagnoli. See Bolduc, 374 A.2d at 1189.
Hence, other courts around the nation have specifically deferred to the legislative determination that passenger tramways may no longer be treated as common carriers. Bagnoli.explicitly concludes that lift operators should be treated as common earners, and such a conclusion is no longer valid. Additionally, the Lewis factors relied upon in Bagnoli cannot stand as an independent basis for the imposition of a higher standard of care unrelated to common carrier status, because they are merely an articulation of the reasons why common carriers are held to a different standard.. Those factors cannot stand alone.3 Hence, in my view, the legislature has removed the cornerstone of the foundation upon which Bagnoli rested. As the California Court of Appeal stated in McDaniel v. Dowell, 210 Cal.App.2d 26, 26 Cal.Rptr. 140, 143 (1962), absent classification of a ski lift operation as a common *83carrier, “[t]here is no other basis for the imposition upon the defendant [ ] of a duty to exercise the utmost care and diligence for the safety of the plaintiff.” 4
IV.
The accident in Bagnoli occurred on April 21, 1962, three years prior to the effective date of the Tramway Act. The court in Bag-noli thus did not apply the Tramway Act even though the actual decision was handed down in 1968, after the Act’s passage.
On July 1, 1965, the following provision of the Tramway Act went' into effect:
The provisions for regulations, registration and licensing of passenger tramways and the operators thereof under this Part 7 shall be in lieu of all other regulations or registration, or licensing requirements, and passenger tramways5 shall not be construed to be common carriers within the meaning of the laws of this state.
§ 25-5-717, 11A C.R.S. (1989)(emphasis supplied).
In answering the questions before us today, the Majority observes that we infer no abrogation of a common law right of action absent clear legislative intent. Maj. op. at 74. I find just such clear legislative intent apparent in the unambiguous language of the Tramway Act. Crested Butte operates ski lifts. Ski lifts 'are passenger tramways, and under the Tramway Act passenger tramways “shall not be construed to be common carriers.” § 25-5-717, 11A C.R.S. (1989).
The legislature expressly decided that ski lifts were not to be treated as common carriers in Colorado. In addition, the legislature implicitly occupied the field by enacting pervasive and comprehensive legislation for safety requirements regarding ski lifts. See Lunsford v. Western States Life Ins., 908 P.2d 79, 87 (Colo.1995)(noting that statutory preemption of areas of the common law may arise expressly or by clear implication).
The Tramway Act is comprehensive in its scope of regulation of Colorado ski lifts:
In order to assist in safeguarding life, health, property and the welfare of this state, it is the policy of the State of Colorado to establish a board empowered to prevent unnecessary mechanical hazards in the operation of ski tows, lifts and tramways and to assure that reasonable design and construction are used for, that accepted safety devices and sufficient personnel are provided for, and that periodic inspections and adjustments are made which are deemed essential to the safe operations of ski tows, ski lifts and passenger tramways.
§ 25-5-701, 11A C.R.S. (1989).6
The Tramway Act further authorizes the Safety Board to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations relating to public safety in the design standards, construction, operation and maintenance of passenger tramways.” § 25-5-710(a), 11A C.R.S. (1989). The Tramway Act directs the Safety Board to use general guidelines and standards adopted by the American Standards Association, Inc., see id.; and the Act makes the Safety Board responsible for establishing “reasonable standards of design and operational practices.” § 25-5-710.1, 11A C.R.S. (1989).
In 1979, the legislature expanded the scope of its pronouncements when it enacted the Ski Safety Act.7 The express purpose of that *84Act was “to establish reasonable safety standards for the operation of ski areas and for skiers using them.” § 33-44-102, 14 C.R.S. (1995).
For purposes of the issue before the court, the Ski Safety Act achieves four' results. First, it supplements the Tramway Act and further defines the relative rights and responsibilities of ski area operators and skiers. See § 33-44-102. Second, it clarifies that negligent operation of a ski lift is not an “inherent risk of skiing.” Id. Third, it provides that a violation by a ski area operator of any portion of the Ski Safety Act or of any rule or regulation promulgated by the Safety Board shall constitute negligence. See § 33-44-104(2). Lastly, it includes preemptive language as follows: “Insofar as any provision of law or statute is inconsistent with the provisions of this article, this article controls.” § 33-44-114 (emphasis added).
The cumulative effect of those provisions leaves no doubt as to the legislative intent to set forth the governing law concerning ski area liability: both with respect to operation of ski slopes and ski lifts. The Tramway Act removes ski lifts from common carrier status. The Ski Safety Act incorporates the requirements of the Tramway Act and the Safety Board's regulations and further mandates that inconsistent provisions of the common law are abrogated.
Since the Tramway Act eliminates the elevated common carrier status of ski lift operators as a basis for a higher standard of care, the applicable standard reverts to that of ordinary care. The Tramway Act delegates to the Safety Board the task of establishing reasonable standards of design for ski lifts. The Ski Safety Act warns that failure to comply with any rule or regulation promulgated by the Safety Board shall constitute negligence on the part of the operator. The standard of care owed by ski lift operators to users of those lifts in the winter season is, therefore, ordinary and reasonable care consistent with the rules and regulations of the Safety Board.8
Indeed, not only should this court accede to legislative mandate, but additionally the fixing of an elevated standard of care is without basis in fact or law once the common carrier status rationale is eliminated.
V.
In the absence of statutory edict, the courts must develop the common law. However, the General Assembly retains the authority to repeal common law rights or duties. See § 2-4-211, 1 C.R.S (1997). In determining whether a legislative enactment serves to supplement the common law, or to repeal it, the courts have rightfully proceeded with caution. However, the principle of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law must be narrowly construed should never be invoked to defeat the plain and clear intent of the legislature. See Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237, 251-52 (Colo.1992). Legislative intent that is clearly expressed must be given effect. See Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1076 (Colo.1992)(finding a clear intent by the General Assembly to change the common law rule and require damages to be set off by certain non-exempt collateral source contributions); Pigford v. People, 197 Colo. 358, 360, 593 P.2d 354, 356 (1979)(noting a clear statement of legislative intent to change the common law in order to permit admissibility of certain prior offenses in criminal prosecutions for unlawful sexual behavior). -
When the legislature overrules a court decision that does not involve a constitutional issue, the court must comply with the legisla*85tive direction. “It is not within the purview of this court to question the legislature’s choice of policy.” City of Montrose v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 732 P.2d 1181, 1193 (Colo.1987) (recognizing that legislature effectively overruled City of Montrose v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 197 Colo. 119, 590 P.2d 502 (1979), with respect to the means by which a utility was permitted to surcharge municipal fees).
It is my view that the Majority is, indeed, declining to recognize the appropriate exercise of legislative authority and policy-making in defining the standard of care applicable to ski lift operators. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that VOLLACK, C.J., joins in this dissent.
. At pages 75-76, the Majority includes a reference from Bagnoli, citing Lewis, to the effect that the actual common carrier status was not important. In fact, the Lewis language was merely clarifying that it was not important to distinguish between a stagecoach "prepared and maintained by the defendant for the carriage or amusement of those who pay the required fee.” Lewis, 156 Colo. at 56, 396 P.2d at 939 (emphasis in original).
. The Montana court also noted that Montana cases had rejected the analogy between a passenger of a common carrier for hire and a patron of an amusement place. See Pessl, 524 P.2d at 1106.
. There is an inference in some of the cases, including Hook, that amusement park devices are inherently dangerous and, thus, possibly deserving of a higher- standard of care on that basis. This court has expressly rejected this rationale for ski area operators. See Pizza v. Wolf Creek, 711 P.2d 671, 683 (Colo.1985)(expressly rejecting analogy comparing operating a ski area to inherently dangerous activities).
. The California court was -concerned with whether a rope tow should be classified as a common carrier, and concluded that it should not. The court was not addressing the import of a statute, because at that time, California had no passenger tramway act.
. A "passenger tramway" is defined as "a device used to transport passengers uphill on skis or in cars on tracks, or suspended in the air by the use of steel cables, chains, or belts, or by ropes, and usually supported by trestles or towers with one or more spans." § 25-5-702(4), 11A C.R.S. (1989).
. I also note that emergency shutdown of a passenger tramway is justified only if the lift is shown to be an "unreasonable” hazard, § 25-5-716, 11A C.R.S. (1989), lending further credence to the conclusion that the Tramway Act supplants any elevated standard of care and reestablishes an ordinary standard of reasonable care.
. In 1990, the legislature amended the Ski Safety Act to clarify the law regarding the duties and responsibilities of skiers and ski area operators and to provide additional protection for ski area operators. See Graven v. Vail Assocs., 909 P.2d 514, 517, 517 n. 3, 524 n. 4 (Colo.1995). None *84of the 1990 amendments impact upon the question before us today, although they do further display the legislative intent to limit the causes of action available to skiers against ski areas.
. I do not believe that the "highest standard of care" is applicable to ski lift operators in the wake of the Tramway Act and the Ski Safety Act. Therefore, I ‘do not reach the question of the interrelationship between compliance with the statutory and regulatory standards and that elevated standard of care. (Maj. op at 78-79). Further, I do not believe the question is before us as to whether evidence in addition to compliance with applicable standards and regulations should be adduced oil the issue of negligence. In answering certified questions, the court should be brief and confine itself to the precise questions propounded. See In re Interrogatories of the U.S. District Court, 642 P.2d 496, 497 (Colo.1982).