(dissenting): I agree G. S. 1949, 8-222 and 8-122b, the latter being the guest statute, were enacted at the same time. This fact makes it all the more imperative that both statutes be construed together in order to ascertain the legislative intent with respect to the field in which each should operate. Manifestly it must be presumed the legislature intended each of these statutes should serve a particular purpose within its own field of operation. The first mentioned statute involves only liability of a parent for the minor’s mere negligence. The other pertains to the liability of an owner-operator or some other operator of a vehicle where the host-guest relationship obtains. The instant petition was clearly framed on the basis of a guest relationship. It expressly alleged the guest was riding in the car driven by Clayton D. Carlson (the son) “with the permission of the defendant, A. J. Carlson.” .
It will be observed the guest statute makes no exception where the vehicle is being operated by a minor. In order for the guest to recover he must allege and prove gross and wanton negligence and that is required irrespective of whether the owner or his son operated the car. Of course, if this were the ordinary type of case in which the son, for example, had negligently struck a person on a highway or elsewhere the father clearly would be liable under the provisions of G. S. 1949, 8-222. That, however, is not this case. Here the pleader has expressly brought the case within the purview of the guest statute.
It is a rule of universal application which requires no citation of authorities that a special statute applicable to a particular situation governs those particular facts rather than a general statute. G. S. 1949, 8-222 does not make the remotest attempt to cover a host-guest relationship.
Our law expressly authorizes the granting of an operator’s license to a minor under the age of sixteen who is at least fourteen years of age. (G. S. 1949, 8-237.) Such a license was also authorized under the former law. (G. S. 1935, 8-209.) The petition does not allege such a license had not been granted to the instant minor. It seems to me it is, therefore, inaccurate to say the father committed a wrong when he permitted the son to use the car.
I doubt it has ever occurred to a lawyer-parent that if he permitted his son or daughter, with an operator’s license, to take a neighborhood child to school with him that he would be liable to such guest absent gross and wanton negligence on the part of the minor. Nor do I believe the legislature ever intended such lia*638bility should attach to the parent for the child’s mere negligence under a host-guest relationship. As already stated the guest statute makes no exception when the operator is a minor and courts are without power or authority to read an exception into the statute.
The primary question, therefore, is whether this petition states a cause of action for gross and wanton negligence. Time prevents a review of our numerous cases on this subject nor do I deem that necessary. It will be sufficient to refer to the various cases collected under the guest statute. In my opinion they clearly disclose the instant petition does not state a cause of action under that statute. I direct particular attention to those cases in which the guest remonstrated against the driver’s conduct. Surely merely remonstrances of a guest concerning the manner in which a vehicle is operated by the host and his failure to heed them are not sufficient alone to establish gross and wanton negligence. If this were not the rule it indeed would be easy for a free, gratuitous traveler to establish such negligence. Of course, reasonable remonstrances and the failure of the host to heed them constitute a factor or element which may be considered together with allegations of speed and other acts complained of in determining the state of mind of the host, but they cannot in themselves constitute sufficient allegations or proof of wantonness. (Titus v. Lonergan, 322 Mich. 112, 120, 33 N. W. 2d 685.) In that case it was held:
“The mere fact that a guest passenger warned the host motorist and expostulated with him concerning tire manner in which latter was operating the car and that such warnings and expostulations were disregarded, is not sufficient to establish wilful and wanton misconduct under the guest passenger act. . . .” (Syl. ¶ 5.)
I have no trouble whatever in distinguishing the instant petition from the petition in the recent drunken driver case where the driver had completely lost control of the vehicle, was admonished by the guest, refused to heed the warning and, on the contrary, increased the speed of the car to its maximum capacity. In due deference to the views of the minority in that case I am convinced that petition stated a cause of action for gross and wanton negligence. (Fyne v. Emmett, 171 Kan. 383, 233 P. 2d 496.) A person who voluntarily becomes so intoxicated that he cannot control a car by his very act indicates a total disregard for the safety of others. In fact our law makes it a criminal offense for such a person to drive on the public highway.
Although the particular question presented here appears to be a *639new one in this state it frequently has had the attention of able courts in other jurisdictions. In some of them no statute similar to our G. S. 1949, 8-222 exists but those courts have nevertheless held a parent liable for negligent acts of a minor in driving a vehicle with a parent’s consent. Such states, however, as well as states having a statute similar to the one just mentioned, hold that the parent, under guest statutes, substantially the same or similar to our own. is liable only in the event the minor is guilty of gross and wanton negligence. Some of them are: White v. Center, 218 Ia. 1027, 1035-1037, 254 N. W. 90; Bushie v. Johnson, 296 Mich. 8, 295 N. W. 538; Titus v. Lonergan, 322 Mich. 112, 120, 33 N. W. 2d 685; Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 526, 80 N. E. 2d 122; Dyreson v. Sharp, 333 Ill. App. 198, 76 N. E. 2d 809; Randall et vir, Aplnts., v. Stager et al., 355 Pa. 352, 49 A. 2d 689; Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685. See, also, 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, § 363, p. 704, and Vogrin v. Bigger, 159 Kan. 271, 154 P. 2d 111, which is a guest case and is highly instructive on the question of gross and wanton negligence under an agency relationship.
Although in some of the cases last cited there is a slight difference in the exact wording of the statutes the substance of the question presented in the instant case is well treated and need not be repeated here.
Appellees further contend the petition discloses on its face the guest was guilty of contributory negligence in accepting an invitation to ride with the instant host and that the demurrer also was properly sustained on that ground. Our attention is directed to the admission in the petition that the driver ‘liad the general reputation in the community of his residence of Morris County, Kansas, of being an incompetent, careless and reckless automobile driver.” Appellees, therefore, argue the guest, notwithstanding such general reputation of the driver, accepted the invitation to ride with him. I shall not pursue appellees’ contention on the subject of contributory negligence. In my opinion the petition did not allege gross and wanton negligence under our decisions. I am, therefore, of the opinion the district court properly sustained the demurrer.
Price, J., concurs in this dissent.