dissenting, with whom TAYLOR, Justice, Retired, joins.
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority of the Court in this ease. One method of amending a statute is to strike a word or phrase, and then insert a different word or phrase. After the majority opinion in this case, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14 — 405(h)(i) (Michie 1997) is amended in this way:
(i) The injured employee is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a comparable an equivalent or substantially equal or higher wage than the wage the employee was earning at the time of injury!.]
Can there be any wonder that I believe the majority of the Court is engaged in judicial legislation in this case? Even though I might feel some sympathy for the result, I am satisfied that the majority approach displays an alarming lack of jurisprudential discipline.
The majority opinion acknowledges that a statute is to be interpreted according to its plain meaning, unless it is determined to be ambiguous, but there is no indication in the majority opinion of any ambiguity that justifies construction of this statute. We summarized the applicable rule of statutory construction in State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div. v. Bergeron, 948 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Wyo.1997) (quoting City of Cheyenne v. Reiman Corp., 869 P.2d 125, 127-28 (Wyo.1994)):
“For some forty years, this court has espoused and followed, frequently, the rule that we do not resort to rules of statutory construction and interpretation when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous. E.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Study, No.. 93-45, 1994 WL 2811 (Wyo.Jan. 7, 1994) [866 P.2d 1288 (Wyo.1994) ]; Wyoming State Tax Comm’n v. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc., 856 P.2d 428 (Wyo.1993); Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093 (Wyo.1993); Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94 (Wyo.1992); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo.1991); Vandehei Developers v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282 (Wyo.1990); Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux & Assoc., 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo.1989); NL Industries, Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920 (Wyo.1989); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State of Wyoming, Envtl. Quality Council, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988); Wyoming Ins. Dept. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 507 (Wyo.1986); Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo.1982); State, ex rel. Fawcett v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Albany County, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188 (1954). An *21unequivocal corollary of that rule is, if the statute is determined to be plain and unambiguous, the words used are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc.; Wyoming Game and Fish Comm’n v. Thornock, 851 P.2d 1300 (Wyo.1993); Vandehei.”
“Comparable” is defined in a plain and unambiguous way in WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 461 (1993):
1 : capable of being compared: a: having enough like characteristics or qualities to make comparison appropriate — usu. used with with < differing from steel in some of the circumstances ... but ~ with steel in respect of the necessity for a centralized control — Thorstein Veblen> b : permitting or inviting comparison often in one or two salient points only — usu. used with to <not too far below Johnsonto be ~ to that master’s work — T. S. Eliot> < hot cornbread baked with squash seeds — an Indian delicacy— to raisin bread — Willa Cather> 2: suitable for matching, coordinating, or contrasting: EQUIVALENT, SIMILAR < samples of subtlety ... which made most of the — performances of the season sound clumsy — Irving Kolo-din> <we have information about Arctic regions but lack — data for the Antarctic > syn see LIKE
The use of “to” in the statute suggests that the applicable definition is that found in the b part of the first meaning assigned. Permitting or inviting comparison clearly contemplates a factual approach.
The only synonym for “comparable” suggested by Webster is “like,” which is defined at WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1310 (1993). “Like” would fit the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, but in the discussions of the various synonyms for “like” we find the following:
COMPARABLE indicates a likeness on one point or a limited number of points which permits a limited or casual comparison or matching together < the Syrians ... with Arabian coffee, served thick and strong in tiny cups, as a national drink comparable to the Englishman’s tea— American Guide Series: R.I.> COMPARABLE is esp. likely to be used in connection with considerations of merit, standing, rank, or power < neither in military nor industrial terms is China comparable to the other three great powers — Vera M. Dean>
The word “comparable” is peculiarly inappropriate to articulate “substantially equal” or “equivalent.” The essence of comparable is found in its nuance that suggests the points of comparison will be identified as facts, and it is that very essence that makes the issue of comparability one of fact rather than one of law. By its holding, the majority opinion robs the word of its lexigraphic function. Instead “comparable” now becomes a legal word of art.1 Even the suggestion that wages are only “comparable” if the difference between them is insignificant is of little utility to the arbiter, who will inevitably conclude that any departure from equality is significant.
In a sophisticated way, the majority opinion invokes persuasive authority to support its holding, but in the process it ignores that cardinal rule of statutory construction that words should be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning. I agree with the contention of the Division that the legislature certainly could, and would, have used the words “substantially equal” or the word “equivalent” if that had been what it intended.
In analyzing what the legislature intended, I must assay a response to the rhetorical question, found on page four of the majority slip opinion, “What other evidence would he [Adams] have shown?” There is a recognized labor market, as demonstrated by this record. A participant in a market is presumed to be a reflective, evaluative person interested in maximizing his demands. Obviously, not all jobs in the labor market are identical, and the economist assumes that an individual will move from one job to another *22whenever the benefits exceed the costs at the margin. Costs and benefits in the market consist of both tangible and intangible factors, and are essentially influenced by the demands that are significant to the individual. In my opinion, the legislature intended that wages would be comparable so long as the differential did not influence the reflective, evaluative person interested in maximizing his demands to move from one position to another. For example, one might prefer to work for some lesser wage as a hotel clerk because the job was less dangerous than, or the working conditions were preferable to, those associated with work as a cook. In any event, I am satisfied that expert opinion evidence could be obtained to assist the finder of fact in making the factual determination as to whether the wages of different jobs are comparable.
While the majority is enamored of the approach taken in New Mexico with respect to application of the word “comparable” in cases such as this, it has ignored a very salient aspect of the decision of the New Mexico court. Carpenter, like Adams, had received an award for permanent partial disability. Carpenter v. Arkansas Best Corp., 112 N.M. 22, 810 P.2d 1242, 1243 (1990), rev’d, 112 N.M. 1, 810 P.2d 1221 (1991). The Supreme Court of New Mexico did not compare the pre-injury and post-injury wages, as the majority in this case has done. That court said:
The post-injury wage was $548.07 per week, to which must be added the partial disability (75%) benefit of $223.97 per week, for a total of $772.04 per week.
Carpenter v. Arkansas Best Corp., 112 N.M. 1, 810 P.2d 1221, 1223 (1991). While the majority opinion reports that Adams received a permanent partial disability benefit of five percent, that money is not accounted for in the comparison of pre-injury wages with post-injury wages. If it were, the two figures undoubtedly would be more comparable, probably falling well within the permissible range of statistical deviation.
Counsel for the Division advises the Court that the Division has adopted an interpretive rule defining “comparable wage” as being at least 80% of the wages paid for the worker’s regular employment at the time of injury, but that interpretive rule inevitably must be struck down in light of a rule that, as a matter of law, a post-injury wage of 89% is not comparable. The only permissible way for the definition to be adjusted now is for the legislature to craft its own statute, specifically defining the differential that will be acceptable and not trigger the claim for additional benefits for vocational disability.
Until that should occur, however, I am satisfied that the question of a comparable wage should be treated as one of fact in each case with the burden of proof assigned to the claimant to persuade the finder of fact that the wages are not comparable. I do not see that as an insurmountable burden, but it must address more than the simple monetary wage for the two different jobs. For those reasons, I would affirm the Office of Administrative Hearings in this case.
. Words of art. The vocabulary or terminology of a particular art, science, or profession, and especially those expressions which are idiomatic or peculiar to it. For example, in law "Taking the Fifth” means that a person is asserting his or her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1605 (6th ed.1990).