with whom ALMA WILSON, J., joins, concurring in result.
¶ 1 The court reverses today the district court’s decision — entered on review of an administrative ruling — which affirmed the agency’s denial of Warren’s application for a concealed weapons’ license authorized by the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act [OSDA].1 According to today’s pronouncement, (1) there is no rational basis for withholding a concealed weapons license from a person whose felony arrest (or “final determination”) occurred within the last three years of applying, where no nexus was shown between the critical arrest and some element of improper use (or possession) of a handgun (or of a concealed weapon) and (2) as applied to Warren, the bar erected against his license eligibility by the provisions of 21 O.S.Supp.1997 § 1290.112 of OSDA is unconstitutional.
¶ 2 I write separately to provide the analytical framework for concluding that the provision in contest here, § 1290.11, facially offends the Oklahoma Constitution’s prohibition against bills of attainder. Art. 2, § 15, Okl. Const.3
I
BILL OF ATTAINDER
¶ 3 Because of a prior disqualifying felony arrest, the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation [OSBI or agency] found Warren ineligible for a concealed weapons license. Its ruling plainly rests on § 1290.11(A)’s4 disqualification of any person who had a felony arrest (with a “final determination” occurring) within the last three years of applying for a license.5
¶ 4 The question dispositive of this case is whether the statutory felony-arrest disqualification constitutes a bill of attainder6 *906interdicted by Art. 2, § 15, Okl. Const.7 A bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment -without a judicial trial.8 The provisions of this State’s constitution, which prohibit the legislature from passing a bill of attainder, encompass within their terms a like proscription of bills of pains and penalties.9 In the attainder context “punishment” means more than imprisonment, fine or a death sentence.10 It comprehends “a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion from a chosen vocation” or from some other government-conferred advantage.11
¶ 5 Any legislative act disqualifying a person from holding a government job or a license based on a law-making body’s declaration of unfitness meted out without reliance on a concluded judicial proceeding is nothing short of a bill of attainder that is clad in a more modern attire.12 Licenses, which *907create property interests conferred by the government, cannot be withheld by a process that plainly offends the constitution.13
¶ 6 Warren’s unfitness is rested on no more than summary police action. His legislatively declared disqualification from holding a gun license extends to every person who, like him, stood subjected to “felony arrest”14 — a term that invites agency speculation because it has no measurable parameters except within the framework of forensic standards invocable only in an adversarial proceeding pressed for judicial testing of law enforcement’s conduct. Warren’s arrest apparently failed to pass judicial muster. He was acquitted of the offense for the commission of which he had been apprehended. In short, his police restraint had been finally adjudged as unassociated with the commission of a felony.
¶ 7 I would hence hold that the statute in contest is facially violative of the fundamental law’s prohibition against bills of attainder15 and would reverse the district court’s decision (entered on review of the agency’s order) with directions (a) to set aside the flawed administrative determination of Warren’s ineligibility for the license he sought and (b) to direct that the agency proceed in a manner not inconsistent with today’s pronouncement.
. 21 O.S.Supp. 1997 §§ 1290 etseq.
. The pertinent terms of 21 O.S.Supp. 1997 § 1290.11(A) are:
"A. The following conditions shall preclude a person from being eligible for a concealed handgun license pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act, Section 1290.1 et seq. of this title for a period of time as prescribed in each of the following paragraphs.
1. An arrest for an alleged commission of a felony charge pending in this state, another state or pursuant to the United States Code. The preclusive period shall be three (3) years and shall begin upon the final determination of the matter.” (Emphasis supplied.)
. The terms of Art. 2, § 15, Okl. Const., are:
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed. No conviction shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate: Provided, that this provision shall not prohibit the imposition of pecuniary penalties.” (Emphasis supplied.)
. For the pertinent terms of 21 O.S.Supp. 1997 § 1290.11(A), see supra note 2.
. A ‘‘disqualifying felony arrest ” is one whose final determination occurs within three years of applying for a license. See supra note 2.
. Bills of attainder were commonly used against political groups that the English Parliament found treasonous. Parliament adjudicated activities deemed treasonous and punished them by death. The framers — to whom a bill of attainder doubtless meant an act of the legislature that sentenced a person to death and prevented his heirs from inheriting property — deemed the bill of attainder to be a necessary constitutional guard against legislative encroachment on the judiciary. Jane Welsh, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of Process, 50 Brook. L.Rev. 77, 83 (1983). In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the prohibition (against bills of attainder) to all legislative acts that punish, without a trial, either named individuals or easily ascertainable class members. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 106 Ct.Cl. 856, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946); see also Welsh, supra at 90-93 (discussing the Court’s broadened interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause).
The modem definition of a bill of attainder recognizes four distinct components, which are: (1) *906a legislative act (2) imposing punishment (3) upon a designated person or class of persons (4) without benefit of judicial trial. Michael P. Leh-mann, The Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Survey of the Decisional Law, 5 Hastings Const. L.Q. 767, 790-91 (1978)
. The federal equivalent of this State’s prohibition against bills of attainder appears in Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, U.S. Const. Its terms are:
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”
The U.S. Constitution’s counterpart targets not only the Congress but also state legislatures. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1, U.S. Const. Its terms are:
"No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but- gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." (Emphasis supplied.)
. As a general rule, bills of attainder specifically identify persons or classes of persons who are to be deprived of a right as a kind of punishment. Cummings v. State of Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867) (a priest was barred from practising his profession); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1867) (a lawyer was barred from federal-court practice); Lovett, supra note 6, 328 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 1079 (the Court struck down a legislative determination of guilt that resulted in the loss of wages); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1715, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965) (the Court struck down an act that focused upon easily identifiable members of a class (the Communist Party) and imposed on them the sanction of mandatory forfeiture of a job or office). See also recent Oklahoma jurisprudence in Golden v. Okfuskee County Election Bd., 1986 OK 57, 723 P.2d 982, 983 (Opala, J., dissenting); Haley v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 1984 OK CIV APP 58, 696 P.2d 1046, 1050; Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Seely, 1980 OK 1989, 621 P.2d 534, 538-39 (Opala, J., concurring in result).
. If the legislatively inflicted punishment be less than death, the enactment is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Cummings, supra note 8, 71 U.S. at 323; Welsh, supra note 6 at 83.
. See for instance Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 628, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1382, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (a Bulgarian immigrant's social security benefits were forfeited because he had been a member of the communist party). The dissent by Douglas, J., quotes from Irving Brant, 363 U.S. at 629, 80 S.Ct. at 1382:
"Address entitled Bills of Attainder in 1787 and Today. Columbia Law Review dinner 1954, published in 1959 by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, under the title Congressional Investigations and Bills of Attainder. ■ * * * By smiting a man day after day with slanderous words, by taking away his opportunity to earn a living, you can drain the blood from his veins without even scratching his skin.
‘Today's bill of attainder is broader than the classic form, and not so tall and sharp. There is mental in place of physical torture, and confiscation of tomorrow's bread and butter instead of yesterday's land and gold. What is perfectly clear is that hate, fear and prejudice play the same role today, in the destruction of human rights in America that they did in England when a frenzied mob of lords, judges, bishops and shoemakers turned the Titus Oates blacklist into a hangman’s record. Hate, jealousy and spite continue to fill the legislative attainder lists just as they did in the Irish Parliament of ex-King James.’ ”
. Lovett, supra note 6, 328 U.S. at 315, 66 S.Ct. at 1079; Brown, supra note 8, 381 U.S. at 447, 85 S.Ct. at 1715; Cooper v. Henslee, 257 Ark. 963, 522 S.W.2d 391, 400 (1975).
. Congress (or a state legislature) may indeed validly pass a law decreeing that persons with certain qualities may not hold positions of authority because those qualities would impede governmental purpose or action, but the Bill of Attainder Clause forbids any legislative assembly from specifying who has those qualities. In short, the Bill of Attainder Clause prevents all law-making bodies from inflicting punishment on specific persons and, in so doing, guarantees the procedural safeguards of an impartial hearing or judicial trial. Brown, supra note 8, 381 U.S. at 445, 85 S.Ct. at 1713 (there the Court concluded that the Bill of Attainder Clause prevents the legislature from acting itself as the judge and *907jury by passing on the blameworthiness of specific individuals).
.Extant jurisprudence, federal and Oklahoma’s, protects holders of various professional licenses and their personal-status credentials whenever the individual's interest at stake in that form of property represents something more substantial than mere loss of (or risk of losing) money. Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, 1996 OK 41, 913 P.2d 1339, 1350 (Opala, J., concurring); Ross v. Peters, 1993 OK 8, 846 P.2d 1107, 1118-19; Seely, supra note 8 at 538-39 (Opala, J., concurring in result); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424-425, 431-432, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808-1809, 1812-1813, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); Seely, supra note 8 at 538-399.
. A "felony arrest” has neither independent nor precise meaning in law. Its legitimacy is neither ascertainable nor definable apart from judicial testing accomplished in the course of an adversarial setting in which the challenged police action undergoes forensic scrutiny. Here, a large class of persons is excluded from access to a government-conferred license by legislative declaration of its unfitness that rests upon an utterly amorphous gauge.
. For a comparative evaluation of characteristics that make legislation appropriate for condemnation as an attainder and of those that may subject an enactment to judicial invalidation as offensive to due process, see Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, pgs. 163-165.