(dissenting):
¶ 38 I dissent from the majority opinion. It is my view that based on the plain language of section 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) of the Utah Code and the facts before us, defendants cannot be found to have caused the minors here to “become or remain delinquent.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) (1996). Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Information.
¶ 39 Section 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) provides that an adult may not engage in any conduct that “tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent.” Id. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii). In this case, the information identifies the delinquent act as “us[ing] or possessing] tobacco or ... us[ing] tobacco on school property.”1 As the majority readily concedes, the State
does not suggest that the reporters provided the tobacco or encouraged t[he] students not already in possession of tobacco that they also chew. The record reveals that the reporters simply asked students who were under the age at which it is legal to possess tobacco, and who already had chewing tobacco in their individual possession, to chew the tobacco so that the reporters could videotape the students chewing for inclusion in the news account of the anti-chewing assembly.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, because it is undisputed that the students already possessed the chewing tobacco, it is accordingly undisputed that defendants did not do anything to cause the students to “become ... delinquent.” See id. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii).
¶ 40 At issue, therefore, is whether by asking the students to chew the tobacco already in their possession, defendants caused the students to “remain delinquent.” See id. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). When interpreting statutory language, “[w]e presume that the Legislature used each word advisedly, and we give effect to each term *499according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah. 1995). “Remain” is defined as “to stay in the same place” or “to continue unchanged in form, condition, status, or quantity.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1919 (1986).
¶41 Applying this definition to the case before us, to provide a basis for charges under section 78 — 3a—801(l)(a)(ii), defendants’ behavior must have caused the students to continue or remain in possession of the chewing tobacco. However, conspicuously absent from the State’s allegations is an assertion that the students “who already had chewing tobacco in their individual possession” were in the process of dispossessing themselves of the same, but were encouraged by defendants to keep the tobacco. Regardless of whether the students were merely possessing the tobacco by having it on their person, or were possessing the tobacco by chewing it, the fact remains that the students were “remaining delinquent” without the help of defendants. Accordingly, there was no action by defendants that “tend[ed] to cause [the students] to ... remain delinquent.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) (1996).
¶ 42 The majority illogically expands the plain language of section 78 — 3a—801(l)(a)(ii) by stating (1) that the defendants’ encouragement to chew the tobacco already possessed by the students caused the students to remain delinquent; and (2) that defendants’ encouragement to chew the tobacco, as opposed to merely possessing it on their person, “prolonged the time in which the students were committing the violation, again causing the minors to ‘remain delinquent.’ ” This analysis lacks support in both section 78 — 3a—801(l)(a)(ii) and in the record. The State has not alleged that any of the students already possessing the tobacco were in the process of disposing it, but retained the tobacco as a result of defendants’ encouragement. Similarly, there are no allegations that any conduct by defendants prolonged the time in which the students were planning on possessing the tobacco. In fact, most of the students stated that, but for defendants, they would not have chewed the tobacco at that time but would have waited until they were off school property. Accordingly, the students were in no way encouraged by defendants to prolong their delinquency, but were already determined to remain delinquent.
¶43 Because it is logically impossible to pursue these charges under the facts of this case, the majority suggests that since everybody knows the meaning of “contributing,” “delinquency,” “decency,” “morality,” and what is harmful to the “mental, moral or physical well-being of [a] child,” it is acceptable to hold criminally responsible those who cause these statutorily undefined events to occur. Even if the majority did not go so far as to eliminate the need to allege a delinquent act, absent a statutory definition, one so charged would discover whether he or she actually contributed to another’s delinquency only when the finder of fact makes that determination in any given case. Here, notwithstanding the allegation of a specific, ongoing delinquent act that was not caused or continued by the acts of defendants, the majority nonetheless concludes defendants could cause the juveniles to become or remain delinquent.
¶ 44 In support of its analysis, the majority relies almost exclusively on State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (Utah 1970). Arguably, Tritt stands as authority for nothing, let alone the proposition urged by the majority because the “main” opinion was, at best, merely a plurality, which does not amount to a binding decision. A plurality opinion is “not the law of this state.” State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1234-35 n. 5 (Utah 1996) (plurality opinion) (“The plurality opinion ... represents the views of only two justices of this court and is therefore not the law of this state.”); see also State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114,1121 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating plurality opinion is not binding authority). In addition, the language relied upon by the majority was mere dicta, responding to the concerns expressed by the dissenters. Finally, the “main” Tritt opinion relied upon by the majority first declined to address the obvious constitutional vagueness problem because the issue was not raised in the lower court and the case was decided upon its facts. *500The two subscribers to the “main” opinion then suggested the statute was valid for the reasons set out in the next preceding paragraph.
¶ 45 Tritt is of little use for a more compelling reason: our Legislature has, in effect, defined delinquency, so there is no need to resort to surprise allegations thereof.2 Part 5, chapter 3a of Title 78 of the Utah Code is titled “Delinquency and Criminal Actions,” and provides that “[proceedings in minor’s cases are commenced by petition.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-502(l) (1996). To establish that a juvenile is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the State’s petition must include facts as provided in section 78-3a-104 of' the Utah Code.3 See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-504(3) (1996).4 A pre-Tritt statutory definition of “delinquent child”5 was incorporated into an earlier version of section 78-3a-104.6 Thus, while the Legislature at the time of Tritt had removed the identifiers, “delinquent child,” it incorporated substantially the same definition of delinquent/criminal acts into the statute setting out circumstances under which a juvenile comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The Legislature’s later act of entitling Part 5 “Delinquency and Criminal Actions” as it applies to juveniles makes it even more apparent that a statutory definition exists regarding what amounts to delinquency or a delinquent act by a juvenile.
¶ 46 Because the information here did allege a delinquent act identified in section 78-3a-104, the majority’s reliance on Tritt suggests that, when an adult is charged criminally, there is no need to include facts identified in section 78-3a-104, but, worse, the fact finder can convict when the undisputed evidence shows the defendants could not have caused the juvenile to remain delinquent in connection with the specific delinquent acts alleged in the information. Thus, to the extent the majority opinion relieves the State of the obligation to allege delinquency as established by our Legislature, or, worse, *501allows the fact finder to find delinquency from its sense of decency, morality, and what is harmful to the “mental, moral or physical well-being of the child,” see Tritt, 463 P.2d at 809, then section 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) as applied to these defendants is clearly unconstitutionally vague. See In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997) (stating, to withstand constitutional scrutiny, statutory language must be “ ‘ “sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited’””) (quoting State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted)); Board of Comm’rs of the Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1997) (same); Elks Lodges 719 & 2021 v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189,1202 (Utah 1995) (stating statute “will be held unconstitutionally vague ... if the terms of the law are so ambiguous that persons of ordinary intelligence are unable to determine whether their acts conform to the law”); State v. Hall, 905 P.2d 899, 901 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (same).
¶ 47 The majority unnecessarily and incorrectly attempts to breathe life into and extend a decision that has little value, prece-dential or otherwise; and worse, opens the door to prosecutions for offenses that are statutorily undefined. For the above reasons, I would hold that defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Information should be granted. Based on this disposition, I would not reach the other issues raised by defendants.
. Although not a separate issue on appeal, the language in the information does not track section 78 — 3a—801(1 )(a)(ii), as none of the counts charged allege that defendants caused the minors to "remain delinquent.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a — 801 (1 )(a)(ii) (1996). Defendants apparently did not object.
. The majority’s reliance on Tritt's "widespread usage” definition of "delinquency” is misplaced because of basic rules of statutory construction. "[Wjords and phrases used in a statute, if also defined by statute, must be construed according to that definition.” Utah State Bar v. Summer-hayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995); see also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1996) ("Words and phrases [if] defined by statute[ ] are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.”); cf. State v. Winward, 907 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Utah Ct.App. 1995) (stating only if statutory term is not defined by statute do "we look to its commonly understood meaning”). By examining the statutory scheme regarding the relationship between juvenile courts and juveniles, a statutory definition of "delinquent” is apparent.
. Under the facts of this case, the only- applicable section would be section 78-3a-104(l)(a), which provides: “(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: (a) a minor who has violated federal, state, or local law or ordinance-” Utah Code Anri. § 78-3a-104(1 )(a) (1996).
. Section 78-3a-504 was recently repealed and reenacted. See Act of Juvenile Court Recodification, ch. 365, § 41, 1997 Utah Laws 1417. The present provision comparable to former section 78-3a-504 is found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-109 (Supp.1998).
. Section 55-10-6 of the Utah Code provided:
The words "delinquent child” include:
A child who has violated any state law or any ordinance or regulation of a subdivision of the state.
A child who by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian or custodian.
A child who is habitually truant from school or home.
A child who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others.
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-6 (1953).
.Section 55-10-77 provided, in relevant part:
Jurisdiction of the juvenile court. — Except as otherwise provided by law, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings:
(1) Concerning any child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance, or any person under twenty-one years of age who has violated any such law or ordinance before becoming eighteen years of age, regardless of where the violation occurred.
(2) Concerning any child:
(b) whose behavior or condition is such as to endanger his own welfare or the welfare of others; or
(c) who is a habitual truant from school, or who has run away from his home or who is otherwise beyond the control of his parent, custodian, or school authorities.
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-77 (Supp.1967).