(dissenting).
I do not disagree with the majority that the legislature intended to protect both the rights of the parents and the child in the relinquishment of parental rights. I also believe the legislature constructed a set of procedures to achieve that balancing and that those procedures were scrupulously complied with in this case. I must therefore respectfully dissent.
Prior to the judicial hearing on the relinquishment of parental rights, Mother received full and extensive counseling from a state social worker regarding her other alternatives. Indeed, the counseling narrative presented to the district court discusses at length how various issues were explored with Mother, including her full understanding of the meaning and consequences of voluntary relinquishment and exploration of any reasons this decision was not of her own free will. This is all that is required by NMSA 1978, Section 40-7-38(A)(4), (Repl.Pamp.1989). However, the report presented to the court also indicated that Mother told the social worker that she felt “strongly that it’s best for Kira that she relinquish her parental rights” and “that she had been thinking about this decision for a couple of months.” She further “stated that she has discussed her thoughts and decision with her attorney, her mother, her husband, and with Dr. Ken Williams during her psychological evaluation.” (Emphasis added.) Mother’s second husband, the person Mother now claims “coerced” her into relinquishing her parental relationship with Kira, was not even present at this counseling session. Rather, Mother was accompanied to this session by her mother (i.e., Kira’s maternal grandmother).1
On November 15, 1991, three days after Mother’s session with the state social worker, District Judge Jewell fully reviewed the proposed relinquishment at length with Mother, who appeared with her attorney. The most pertinent part of that colloquy follows:
JUDGE: [Tjhere’s a four-page document here entitled, “Relinquishment Narrative.” It indicates that on the 12th of this month, you were interviewed by the Human Services Department, and there are several questions which are responded to in writing here. The first one is, “Do you understand what voluntary relinquishment means and do you understand its consequences?”
Mother: Yes, I do.
JUDGE: You’ve in fact discussed this with the worker. You understand what “voluntary relinquishment” is, and you do understand the consequences of that?
Mother: Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE: And are you making the decision to voluntarily relinquish of your own free will?
Mother: Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE: No one is promising you anything as a result of that, or there’ve been no threats or ...
Mother: No.
JUDGE: ... coercions against you?
Mother: No, Sir.
At the conclusion of the extended dialogue Judge Jewell concluded, “The Court is satisfied that the relinquishment is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.” Mother then signed the Relinquishment of Parental Rights and Consent to Adoption in front of the Judge.
On April 16,1992, HSD filed its mandatory six-month review report with the district court. This report indicated that Kira had a “last session” with Mother on January 2, 1992, and was informed she would not be going “home” in the future.
After her separation from her second husband, and six months after her representations to Judge Jewell, Mother filed a motion to revoke her relinquishment of parental rights. HSD opposed the motion on the basis, inter alia, it would not be in the best interests of the child. Judge Jewell issued a “summary judgment” denying Mother’s motion and further found it was in the best interests of Kira to remain in her specialized foster care2 home with any adoption proceedings to be held in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal.
Based on this record, I am obliged to conclude that both HSD and the district court strictly complied with all the requirements of Section 40-7-38(A). After such compliance, revocation of consent to termination of parental rights is controlled by statute and only authorized when “the consent or relinquishment was obtained by fraud.” Section 40-7-38(F).
Initially, courts must determine the legislative intent from the language of the statute, and when the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, other methods of statutory construction are not necessary. State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Indep. Schools, 111 N.M. 495, 500, 806 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Ct.App.1991). I believe the language of Section 40-7-38(F) is quite clear in authorizing parental withdrawal of relinquishment and consent to adoption only when “the consent or relinquishment was obtained by fraud.” Mother’s motion to withdraw her consent in this case did not allege the consent was obtained by fraud.
In addition to the statute, I believe our opinion in In re Adoption of Doe, 87 N.M. 253, 531 P.2d 1226 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975), dictates affirmance of the district court decision in this case. The majority would limit Doe “to its facts.” [At 806.] I find no significant distinction between the facts of Doe and those in the present case.
That the majority opinion acknowledges some degree of inconsistency with Doe seems implicit in its recognition of the “importance” of the dissent in Doe. The dissent in Doe would have Section 22-2-27(D) (predecessor to Section 40-7-38(F)) read “as if the word ‘valid’ had been inserted before the word ‘consent.’ ” [At 806.] Whatever the equity of that position, I do not believe we should read into a statute language .which is not there, particularly when the statute makes sense as written. See State v. Alderette, 111 N.M. 297, 299, 804 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Ct.App.1990).
I think an interpretation of Section 40-7-38(F) which limits the basis for revocation of parental consent to cases where fraudulent inducement is alleged is consistent not only with the unambiguous statutory language, but its history as well. Since our decision in Doe, the legislature has expanded the provisions of Section 40-7-38. At the time of Doe, the requirement that consent could not be withdrawn applied only to consent to adoption; subsequently the legislature placed relinquishment of parental rights as well as consent to adoption within the fraud requirement. Compare NMSA 1953, § 22-2-27(D) (Supp.1973) with § 40-7-38(F). More importantly, the legislature added Section 40-7-38(A) which sets forth in detail what the relinquishment form must contain. Section 40-7-38(A)(5) requires notice to the parent “that the consent to or relinquishment for adoption cannot be withdrawn.” In conformance with this requirement, Paragraph 7 of the Relinquishment of Parental Rights and Consent to Adoption form which Mother executed before Judge Jewell clearly states, “I understand that this document is final and binding and that I cannot revoke or withdraw it, nor can I later reclaim the child.”
I am also of the opinion that the legislature’s strict limitation of withdrawal of relinquishment to situations where such consent was obtained by fraud “makes sense as written.” Professor Clark’s observations on the revocation of consent to termination of parental rights provide a useful backdrop for consideration of the issue:
Attempts to revoke consent to adoption have produced more litigation than any other aspect of consent. Two factors may be responsible for this. One is the contemporary unwillingness to recognize that we all are and should be responsible for our decisions, that our actions have consequences which cannot be evaded. The other is the profound emotional bonds which prospective adoptive parents feel for the children placed with them for adoption, bonds which spring up with extraordinary quickness after the placement. It is not surprising that these psychological factors produce vigorously litigated conflicts even after some states have made serious and thoughtful efforts to avoid them.
2 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 21.5, at 618 (1987) (footnote omitted). In other states where the legislature has also “made serious and thoughtful efforts” to limit such litigation, the courts have generally rejected attempts to expand the basis for withdrawal of consent. See, e.g., In re Sarah K, 66 N.Y.2d 223, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384, 487 N.E.2d 241 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108, 106 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed.2d 914 (1986); In re Parental Rights to TR, 777 P.2d 1106 (Wyo.1989).
I believe Section 40-7-38 also protects an entity the majority has overlooked, an overburdened family court system. Section 40-7-38(A) indicates the legislature carefully considered the procedural steps most likely to insure that the relinquishment by the parents is voluntary. To require HSD and the children’s court to scrupulously follow this procedure, and then allow a mother to claim the whole procedure was but a charade, makes a mockery of the statutorily mandated procedure. If the parent repeatedly represents that the relinquishment is voluntary and expressly denies coercion, how can the children’s court judge determine if consent is truly voluntary?
The majority states repeatedly that no adoption petition had actually been filed. [At 515, 516, 519, 864 P.2d at 804, 805, 808] This ignores the fact that the district court had approved Kira’s permanent plan calling for consideration of adoption by special foster parents and the interest already indicated by Kira’s special foster mother in such an adoption. More importantly, the majority fails to indicate why a parent cannot allege the “constructive fraud” [At 517, 864 P.2d at 806] or any other legal challenge to “voluntary” consent after an adoption petition is filed. The majority concludes “that this issue is for the children’s court to decide in the first instance” [At 519, 864 P.2d at 808] but recognizes that its requirement of a second hearing is “despite the court’s initial certification of the consent document.” [At 518, 864 P.2d at 807] I do not believe Section 40-7-38 evidences a legislative intent to burden the children’s court with such potentially limitless proceedings.
Although it was not necessary for the majority to consider the issue, my disposition would require us to address Mother’s constitutional attack on Section 40-7-38. Mother contends that if Section 40-7-38(F) allows withdrawal of consent only when induced by fraud, it violates due process. She argues that “due process may be violated by the involuntariness of a confession” and therefore that due process is violated if her consent was not voluntary. The key element to invalidating an involuntary confession, or indeed any other due process claim, is state action. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-67, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520-21, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Mother alleges not that HSD or some judicial official coerced her, but that her second husband subjected her to duress. This factual allegation cannot support a due process claim. See id. Moreover, provisions which terminate parental rights with absolute finality do not violate due process merely because there is no right to later revoke inappropriate consent. Kathy O. v. Counseling & Family Servs., 107 Ill.App.3d 920, 63 Ill.Dec. 764, 438 N.E.2d 695 (1982); cf. In re Voyles, 417 So.2d 497 (La.Ct.App.) (failure to revoke within statutory period not a due process violation), cert. denied, 420 So.2d 981 (La.1982); In re Myers, 131 Mich.App. 160, 345 N.W.2d 663 (1983) (same).
Procedural due process requires only notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial panel. McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Comm’n, 94 N.M. 602, 614 P.2d 14 (1980). Mother was provided not only a full and complete hearing, but also was given the benefit of extended counseling on her legal options and had the advice of her own attorney. Judge Jewell also considered briefs and held a hearing on Mother’s motion to withdraw consent.
Mother’s problem is that she now wishes to claim she committed perjury before Judge Jewell, and to be relieved of the resulting consequences. I do not think the legislature intended to provide such a remedy unless the consent was induced by fraud. The observations of the Texas Supreme Court in rejecting a constitutional challenge to their parental relinquishment procedure seem apropos:
In this cause, Brown voluntarily executed the affidavit in question in the presence of two witnesses, before a notary. The affidavit clearly sets out she is relinquishing all parental rights, that suit will be filed to terminate her rights, that she will not be further informed about the suit, and that this act is irrevocable. Certainly this Court recognizes the parent-child relationship as a basic civil right due a high degree of protection. In the Interest of G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.1980). However, when a parent voluntarily terminates this parent-child bond, the best interests of the child become paramount. Once that child has been surrendered to a licensed agency for adoption, the safety, education, care and protection of the child, not the contentment or welfare of the parent, is of utmost importance. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Galveston, Inc. v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960). Children voluntarily given up in compliance with the Family Code, as was done in this case, cannot be snapped back at the whim of the parent. By these provisions in the Family Code the Legislature was seeking some small amount of security and stability for children placed in this position.
Brown v. McLennan County Children’s Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Tex.1982).
I believe the language of Section 40-7-38(F) is unambiguous and allows a parent to withdraw consent to termination of parental rights only when there are allegations the consent was obtained by fraud, No such claim is presented in this case, so I must therefore respectfully dissent.
. This would seem to contradict the majority’s conclusion that the husband's threats of coercion would require her to lie convincingly to the district court "because the threatened party would realize what answers should be given to achieve the result desired by the person making the threat." [At 808]
. Special care foster parents are licensed foster parents who receive intensive, specialized training in order to provide substitute care for children with physical, behavioral, or psychological conditions which require specialized care.