dissenting.
I dissent.
The issue of the application of Wyo.Stat. § l-3-lll(a) (1988) was res judicata when we remanded Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates, 824 P.2d 560 (Wyo.1992). In an order dismissing the Bredthauers’ claim against Davis Surveying, which is not a party to this appeal, the district court determined that § 1-3-111 (a) did not apply to the facts of this case. It also held that Wyo.Stat. § 1 — 3—107(a)(i) (1988) did apply and was fatal to the Bred-thauers’ case. It is clear that TSP and CSSA were relying upon only § • 1-3-107(a)(i) as a bar to the Bredthauers’ action against them. The Bredthauers appealed, but the other parties, including TSP and CSSA, did not appeal the ruling on § 1-3-111(a), which was adverse to them and which was appealable because the district court made the required W.R.C.P. 54(b) certification (no just reason for delay and express direction that judgment be entered). The only purpose for the interlocutory review pursuant to the W.R.C.P. 54(b) certification was to determine whether the Bredthauers’ suit was barred by time (either by the statute of limitations or by the statute of repose). When this case was remanded to the district court, at least one thing was certain: Neither § l-3-107(a)(i) nor § 1-3-111(a) barred the Bredthauers’ action.
It is of no great significance whether we premise our decision upon the doctrine of res judicata or upon the law of the ease. However, in my view, the doctrine of res judicata is the appropriate theory in this instance.
If the district court’s ruling had done some sort of violence to the law, I might have been inclined to go along with the majority in this case; however, the district court was correct in its initial decision and, absent an appeal and reversal of that determination, its decision must stand.