The opinion of the court was delivered by
Six, J.:This is a prehminary hearing bind-over case. The State appeals from the dismissal of charges. Defendant Janetta Jean Wilson was charged with the sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of school property, conspiracy to sell cocaine, and unlawful possession of drug proceeds. The single issue is whether there was probable *531cause to believe Wilson had committed the crimes charged. Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1) (appeals may be taken to this court by the prosecution as a matter of right from an order dismissing a complaint, information, or indictment). We reverse the district court and remand the case, with directions to reinstate the charges.
FACTS
Patricia Giordano, a Junction City police officer, had been an officer for 4 years. She was trained to make observations about a person’s demeanor and appearance. Giordano was working in Saline County with a drug task force that included her supervisor, another detective, a confidential informant, and Deputy Sheriff Hughes of Saline County. The task force was operating in a specific Salina location. Giordano and the informant, who were in a vehicle together, stopped in the investigation area to visit with a Hispanic male who Giordano believed was selling narcotics. Giordano and the informant said they wanted one rock of crack cocaine. The Hispanic male advised he would go find somebody who had it. He entered a blue house and came out moments later advising them that someone was going to go “get it.” Giordano then saw a female walk out of the blue house. Giordano testified that the Hispanic male gave the female a $20 bill, and the female accepted it in exchange for the crack cocaine. Giordano stated that the female had the bill in her hand and was within 5 feet of Giordano when they “did the purchase.” Giordano continued her description of the transaction:
“She shortly — she came back shortly later, entered the blue house again and then the Hispanic male went back into the blue house, went back, said they’re cutting it up. He stayed there with us and then the female, the defendant, came back out of the blue house, walked behind the vehicle which we were at and then walked out of my sight for just not even two seconds and then walked over to the door of — the passenger’s side door of my vehicle and handed the Cl [The term “Cl” (confidential informant) is a misnomer. The “Cl” was a witness] a rock of crack/cocaine.
“Q. Were you in the vehicle at this time or were you outside the vehicle?
“A. Myself and the Cl were both inside the vehicle.
“Q. Do you see that female in the courtroom today?
*532“A. Yes, I do.
“Q. Okay. Did you ever exit the vehicle?
“A. No.
“Q. But you were in the front seat of the vehicle?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay. Did you see the crack/cocaine being handed to the Cl?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. And that was the defendant [Wilson] who handed that to him?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Him or her; is that correct?
“A. Yes.”
Giordano also testified that it was dusk at the time of the transaction and she was not immediately sure of the sellers' race or gender. On cross-examination Giordano explained:
“Q. Okay. In fact, tell me why you couldn’t tell whether it was a man or a woman.
“A. ‘Cause your defendant looks a little manly I guess you could say ‘cause her hair was pulled back in a ponytail, she didn’t have any makeup on. She looks a lot different today than she did that day.
“Q. But you also said that she looks a lot different today than what you remember; is that a correct statement?
“A. She looks different but I can tell she’s the same person.
“Q. And you didn’t become sure it was a woman until sometime later; is that correct?
“A. When I saw her picture, yes.
“Q. So someone gave you a picture and said could this be the person?
“A. They said does this look like the person and I said yes, it is the person.
“A. I thought it was a woman but I wasn’t hundred percent sure.
“Q. But, you’re hundred percent sure today?
“A. I’m a hundred percent sure the person we bought crack/cocaine from was your defendant or your client, excuse me.
“Q. In the picture that you observed that you were identifying my client from, when was this done?
“A. When did I look at the picture?
“Q. Uh-huh.
“A. I believe it was the next time we were in Salina, which would have been a couple of days later I believe.
*533“Q. So, two or three days later after seeing an androgynous person you identified her from that picture?
“Q. Okay. The picture they showed you to make this identification, were they all females, all males or a mix?
“A. They were a mix.” (Emphasis added.)
Deputy Hughes provided the photographs for Giordano to view. Giordano was advised by Deputy Hughes that the pictures were of “some of the people that they had observed in the area,” people “that hung out in the Seventh and Hamilton area.” Deputy Hughes did not present the photo lineup to Giordano as he would to a civilian because he felt Giordano “was properly trained and qualified.”
On redirect examination Giordano reaffirmed her identification:
“Q. Okay. And is there any doubt, as you look at Janetta Wilson today, that she was the person you purchased crack/cocaine from?
“A. There’s no doubt at all.”
On recross-examination Giordano again identified Wilson:
“Q. There’s no doubt that the person that you identified through a picture three days later is the person you see in the courtroom today?
“A. Or the person that sold us the crack/cocaine. There is no doubt in my mind.”
The photographs shown to Giordano were not introduced. Deputy Hughes did not know if he still had the photographs. Giordano first identified Wilson from the photographs. She again identified Wilson at the preliminary examination.
At the end of the hearing, the district judge said:
“Well, the issue of identification is obviously extremely important at a preliminary hearing because one of the findings the Court has to make is a finding that there is probable cause to believe that this defendant committed the offense. I got a problem, counsel, with this photo ID. The officer who positively identified this person in the courtroom today could not even, as Mr. Allen pointed out through cross-examination, identify whether the person sold the cocaine was male or female, was black or white or anything else until she allegedly saw a picture which verified or which made a strong suggestion apparently as to the identity of the suspect. Where is the picture? Where are these pictures? Officer Hughes was — testified . . . that he didn’t even know where these pictures are, whether he still has them. The defendant has an absolute right to confrontation in cross-examination of a photo lineup. Any subsequent — any subsequent identification of *534this defendant is tainted by the fact that the photo lineup has now been lost or destroyed. It was not presented subject to cross-examination and confrontation. She can sit here and tell me till tomorrow that she’s a hundred percent sure now after she sees the person in the courtroom, after she’s seen a photograph and after all this passage of time. That’s not a hundred percent sure identification because that identification is tainted by evidence which has not been presented to this Court subject to cross-examination and confrontation and which apparently is not available for cross-examination and confrontation.
“The State has not identified this defendant as the person who committed the offenses alleged in Count 1, 2, or 3 and there is no probable cause to bind this defendant over on those three counts. The defendant is discharged.”
DISCUSSION
We are at the bind-over stage of a criminal case. All agree a felony was committed. The only question is whether there is probable cause to believe that the felony was committed by Wilson, a question of law over which we have unlimited review. State v. Bell, 259 Kan. 131, 133, 910 P.2d 205 (1996). The legal standards we apply are well known. Guidance comes most recently from State v. Powell, 266 Kan. 282, 971 P.2d 340 (1998).
Powell teaches: (1) From the evidence presented the court must draw inferences favorable to the prosecution, (2) the evidence need only establish probable cause, not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) probable cause signifies evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the defendant’s guilt, (4) the court’s function is not to determine the wisdom of the decision to file charges, (5) and it is not the court’s function to conclude there should be no prosecution because the possibility of a conviction may be remote or virtually nonexistent. Powell, 266 Kan. at 283.
Here we are concerned with the dismissal of a complaint. We are not reviewing either a motion to suppress Giordano’s photo identification or a claim of error in a direct appeal. A “far stricter standard of review is required” when determining a sufficiency of evidence question in a direct appeal. Powell, 266 Kan. at 291. Here, the State need only present evidence of probable cause; evidence to support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. 266 Kan. at 290; see also State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d *5351265 (1994) (discussing the eyewitness identification test applied in ruling on a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress).
It is well established in Kansas that in determining whether probable cause exists, a judge is required to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses called by the prosecution and defense. Relying on the earlier decision of this court in State v. Jones, 233 Kan. 170, 660 P.2d 965 (1983), we said in Bell:
“When evaluating evidence presented at a preliminary hearing, the judge must seriously consider the defendant’s defense and pass judgment on the credibility and competency of both the State’s and the defendant’s witnesses. If there is a conflict in witness testimony that creates a question of fact for the jury, the preliminary hearing judge must accept the version of the testimony which is most favorable to the State.” 259 Kan. 131, Syl. ¶ 4.
The question of the credibility of a witness at a preliminary examination must be approached with caution. In State v. Chapman, 252 Kan. 606, 619, 847 P.2d 1247 (1993), we noted when passing upon this question that the judge must keep firmly in mind “other basic principles applicable to consideration of sufficiency of the evidence at a preliminary examination.” A review of those basic principles is appropriate here.
“ ‘A preliminary examination differs from a trial. This court stated in In re Mortimer, 192 Kan. 164, 166, 386 P.2d 261 (1963):
“There is a difference between the quantum of proof essential to a binding over for trial and that required to convict at the trial. The guilt or innocence of a defendant is not adjudged at a preliminary examination, and it is not necessary that evidence upon which a defendant is held for trial should be sufficient to support a conviction. It is enough if it shows that an offense has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe the defendant is guilty.” ’ ” 252 Kan. at 620.
In State v. Chapman, 252 Kan. 606, the district magistrate judge dismissed certain charged offenses after the preliminary examination. No reasons were stated. In reversing the magistrate’s decision, we noted that the bulk of the evidence at the preliminary examination was the testimony of two convicted felons who may have hoped to lighten their own punishment by testifying against Chapman. We also acknowledged that “[i]t was the magistrate’s duty to *536assess their credibility.” 252 Kan. at 616. However, we further noted that if the reasoning of Jones, 233 Kan. 170, is followed,
“the court would not require the magistrate to discharge Chapman due to doubts about the witnesses’ credibility as long as the doubts did not obviate the appearance that he probably committed the felony with which he was charged. [Citation omitted.] ... ‘At the prehminary examination when there is a conflict in testimony, a question of fact exists for the jury, and the magistrate must draw the inference favorable to the prosecution.’ [Citation omitted.]” 252 Kan. at 616.
We reversed and reinstated the charges against Chapman.
Here, we have an in-court identification by a police officer. The photos were viewed by Giordano as a trained officer carrying out her investigatory duties in relation to a staged drug buy. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Giordano positively identified Wilson six times as the person making the buy. If the trial court had doubts about Giordano’s credibility, those doubts should have been resolved in favor of the State so long as they did not obviate the appearance that Wilson probably committed the crime charged.
The question of whether the identification was tainted is an issue more properly resolved in a motion to suppress after the defendant is bound over for trial. Here, the district court found the identification was tainted without holding a hearing on the matter. Hughes did not testify that the photos were lost or destroyed. He stated he did not know whether he still had the photographs. The State should have been given an opportunity to produce the photos for a proper determination as to whether the identification was tainted. The State may have chosen to produce the witness in the car with Giordano to positively identify Wilson at a suppression hearing. Under these facts and at this stage in the proceedings, it was inappropriate for the district court to conclude the identification was tainted.
We too question the suggestiveness of the identification and Giordano’s credibility. But, we cannot say, based on these facts, that these questions have obviated the appearance that Wilson probably was the person who sold the crack cocaine to Giordano. See Chapman, 252 Kan. at 616. Applying the legal standards appropriate to a preliminary hearing, Wilson should have been bound over for trial.
*537Reversed and remanded to reinstate the complaint.