(dissenting):
In the words of their spokesman, Warren C. Harmond, the landowners in this case “were betting on County Council to oppose the [road closing].”1
Although it initially opposed the closing, County Council subsequently dropped its opposition. Unfortunately for the landowners, Alton Duncan, their representative on Council, *122had left the meeting when the decision was made during executive session and later announced in public.
Mr. Harmond described the landowners’ predicament as follows:
Well, I just let my guard down. I assumed that it was the County’s position to defend public property, not mine to take dollars out of my pocket to defend public property, and that was the position. I just said, well, the land is going to be protected, so we just kind of fell back on it.2 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed Circuit Court’s denial of the landowners’ Rule 60(b)(1) motion to set aside the judgment.
Rule 60(b)(1) is virtually identical to S. C. Code Ann. § 15-27-130 (1976), which was repealed in 1985 with enactment of the Rules of Civil Procedure. As under the statute, the Rule requires a moving party to establish: (1) the judgment was taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; and (2) the existence of a meritorious defense. Mitchell Supply Co. v. Gaffney, 297 S. C. 160, 375 S. E. (2d) 321 (Ct. App. 1988).
The Majority concedes (1) that landowners’ motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and (2) that abuse of discretion arises when the factual conclusions lack evidentiary support or when the decision is controlled by some error of law. In my judgment the record does not support an abuse of discretion finding in this case.
First, there is no indication that the trial judge’s factual findings are unsupported by the evidence. To the contrary, his findings are in accord with those outlined in the Majority Opinion.
Second, there is no showing of legal error.3 That the landowners “assumed” and “bet” County Council would protect their private interests cannot be said to constitute, as a matter of law, conduct mandating Rule 60(b)(1) relief.4
*123In my view, the trial judge’s decision demonstrates no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Transcript of Record, page 41, line 7.
Transcript of Record, page 39, lines 13-17. [Emphases supplied.]
The judge’s viewing of the landing does not constitute such error since it had no bearing upon his decision regarding “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
The landowners’ failure to establish the first requirement of the Rule makes it unnecessary to address the meritorious defense prong. See Hodges v. Fanning, 266 S. C. 517, 224 S. E. (2d) 713 (1976); McInerny v. Toler, 260 S. C. 382, 196 S. E. (2d) 122 (1973).