dissenting.
The majority holds that the allegations against Little John’s in Winters’ complaint suffice to trigger defendant’s duty to defend Little John’s under its insurance policy. Those allegations are that Little John’s manager, Tuck Min-rds, acted within the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted Little John’s employee Winters at Tuck’s apartment. For the reasons that follow, I disagree with the majority’s analysis and with its conclusion that defendant’s policy provides coverage to Little John’s.
The majority is correct that defendant’s duty to defend is governed by the allegations in Winters’ complaint against Little John’s and the terms of defendant’s insurance policy insuring Little John’s. In the policy, defendant agrees to “pay those sums that the Insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury * * * to which this insurance applies.” The policy then excludes coverage for bodily injury to “[a]n employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of employment by the insured[.]” Defendant, relying on that exclusion, argues:
“The only conduct that [Little John’s] contend[s] did not take place in the course of [Winters’] employment with [Little John’s] is conduct that took place at Tuck Minnis’s apartment ‘after hours.’ However, because the claim against [Little John’s is] that [Tuck] was acting as [Little John’s] supervisor at the time, [Winters] also had to have been in the course of her employment as an employee being ‘supervised’ by [Tuck], Accordingly, the employee exclusion defeats coverage.”
The majority responds to defendant’s argument by reasoning,
“[d]efendant’s argument turns on two assumptions. Its argument assumes initially that Little John’s could be held *214vicariously liable for Tuck’s sexual harassment if, as Winters’ complaint alleges, sexual harassment was part of Tuck’s way of supervising Little John’s employees. Defendant’s argument also assumes that Little John’s could be held vicariously liable for Tuck’s conduct at the apartment only if Tuck was supervising Winters at that time. We agree with the first assumption. * * * We disagree with the second assumption. Even if Tuck were not acting as Winters’ supervisor when he invited her to his apartment, it does not necessarily follow that Little John’s may not be held vicariously liable for Tuck’s conduct at the apartment. Rather, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions make clear that Little John’s may be vicariously liable for Tuck’s intentional torts at the apartment if those torts were a direct outgrowth of earlier actions that he took on behalf of Little John’s.” 162 Or App at 204-05 (footnote omitted).
The majority proceeds to discuss the applicability of the holdings in Chesterman v. Barmon, 305 Or 439, 753 P2d 404 (1988), Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or 367, 977 P2d 1163 (1999), and Lourim v. Swensen, 328 Or 380, 977 P2d 1157 (1999), to this case. It explains:
“[I]n order to hold an employer vicariously liable when there has been a ‘time lag1 between acts taken on the employer’s behalf and the later intentional torts, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the two sets of acts. * * *.
“* * * In both [Fearing and Lourim], the court recognized that an employee, as part of his or her job, may establish a relationship with another person that results in sexual abuse. The court explained that it was not sufficient for vicarious liability that the employment merely ‘brought the tortfeasor and the victim together in time and place and, therefore, gave the tortfeasor the “opportunity” to commit the assaults.’ Fearing, 328 Or at 377 (explaining G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54, 757 P2d 1347 (1988)). Rather the allegations must permit the jury to infer that the acts taken within the scope of employment ‘were a necessary precursor to the sexual abuse apd that the assaults were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct that was within the scope of [the employee’s] employment.’ Fearing, 328 Or at 377.
*215“The allegations in Winters’ complaint would permit a jury to find that she met that standard.” 162 Or App at 206-07.
To unpack the majority’s reasoning, it is important to begin with an understanding of how the case is postured on appeal. Little John’s has appealed from a grant of summary judgment by the trial court after the court concluded that the policy did not provide coverage for the acts complained of by Winters. Little John’s is in a dilemma. To obtain coverage under the policy, Little John’s must demonstrate that it is vicariously liable for Tuck’s conduct — conduct that is covered by the policy — but it must also demonstrate that Winters, its employee, was not acting within the scope of her employment when she was injured by Tuck. Otherwise, the exclusion for bodily injury to an employee (Winters) arising out of the course of employment would defeat coverage. Two hypothetical examples illustrates the dilemma. If Tuck had sexually assaulted Winters while they were delivering pizza together to a customer, then it could successfully be argued that the sexual assault resulted from Tuck’s employment, giving rise to vicarious liability of Little John’s. However, because Winters’ injuries occurred within the course of her employment, the exclusion would preclude coverage for Little John’s for any bodily injury claim that she could bring. Alternatively, if Tuck had been working on the roof of the pizza parlor, and Winters, after finishing her shift, was walking home on a public sidewalk underneath the roof when Tuck dropped a brick that hit her, then Little John’s could successfully argue that the exclusion did not apply because Winters was not injured in the course of her employment. Thus, whether the exclusion applies depends on a careful scrutiny of the facts alleged by Winters in order to determine whether she and Tuck are deemed to have been in the course of their employment.
In paragraph 4 of the second amended complaint, Winters alleges that "[defendant Tuck Minnis was plaintiffs direct supervisor and acted at all material times in the scope of his employment.” (Emphasis added.) That language contains an allegation of fact (that Tuck was Winters’ supervisor) and a conclusion (that at all times, Tuck was acting in the scope of his employment). From those allegations, Little *216John’s argues that it could be inferred from the allegation that Tuck was in the act of supervising Winters when the operative facts that resulted in the sexual assault occurred and that it is Tuck’s act of supervision on which vicarious liability is allegedly imputed to Little John’s.
Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the complaint allege the facts about what occurred while Tuck was allegedly supervising Winters.
“7.
“During and throughout such employment as stated above, plaintiffs supervisor, defendant Tuck Minnis, aman approximately twenty years older than plaintiff, encouraged and engaged in a continuous pattern and practice of subjecting plaintiff to sexually explicit conduct and comments, creating a sexually hostile work environment, and conditioning plaintiffs continued employment on acquiescence to such an environment. Defendant Tuck Minnis’[s] sexually explicit comments included, but were not limited to the following:
“(a) Unwelcome statements and graphic descriptions of sex habits, activities, body parts and abilities;
“(b) Repeated offensive sexual comments about the anatomy of females;
“(c) Telling another employee under his supervision that he wanted plaintiff to ‘wear short skirts with fishnet stockings.’
“8.
“On or about May 28,1995, plaintiffs supervisor, defendant Tuck Minnis called her at home at 3:45 a.m. and implored her and her female roommate, the assistant manager of Little John’s Pizza Co., L.L.C., to come over to his apartment to help him grieve the death of his brother. Plaintiff and her roommate went to his apartment and stayed from approximately 4:30 a.m. until 9:00 a.m. During that time period plaintiff was subjected to sexually explicit, unwelcome, offensive and intimidating comments and conduct from her supervisor, defendant Tuck Minnis.
*217“9.
“The intimidating, unwanted, and demeaning sexual contact and remarks directed from defendant Tuck Minnis to plaintiff on or about May 28,1995, included but were not limited to the following:
“(a) Unwelcome forced kissing, and touching of plaintiffs breasts while pinning her arms against the wall;
“(b) Unwelcome lifting up of plaintiffs clothes and fondling plaintiffs body underneath;
“(c) Following plaintiff into the bathroom against her wishes and touching her against her will;
“(d) Intimidating and offensive graphic sexual comments (T want to make you come’) while forcing himself on top of plaintiff and asking her to have sex with him.
“(e) Unwelcome rubbing of defendant’s body against plaintiffs body.
“(f) Intimidating statements about his ability to fire employees at Little John’s Pizza Co., L.L.C., but that plaintiff should think of herself as his friend.”
Based on the above allegations, Little John’s argues that the employee exclusion in the policy does not apply because “the tortious conduct alleged in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the underlying complaint occurred off the job and not in the course of Winters’ employment.” That argument ignores the facts stated in paragraph 8. If Tuck was supervising Winters at his apartment as alleged, then it follows that Winters was being supervised by Tuck in the course of her employment, thereby triggering the policy exclusion. Moreover, the conclusions that Tuck was acting within the course of his employment and Winters was not within the course of her employment are belied by the facts actually alleged. According to the complaint, Winters was called to his apartment by Tuck to help grieve the death of his brother.
The majority rescues Little John’s from that dilemma by embarking on a different course of reasoning. It ignores the fact that Winters alleges that Tuck was acting in the course of his employment when he “implored her * * * to come over to his apartment to help him grieve the death of his brother.” Rather, the majority holds that, because Tuck sexually harassed Winters at work while he was supervising *218her, it necessarily follows that Little John’s is vicariously liable for his actions at his apartment under the holdings of Fearing and Lourim. In other words, the allegation in Winters’ complaint that Tuck was at all times acting at Tuck’s apartment as Winters’ supervisor is immaterial to the majority’s analysis.
There are at least three problems with the majority’s reasoning. There is no causal connection between Tuck’s harassment of Winters at Little John’s and the assault at his apartment that could render Little John’s responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Second, the proper focus for an analysis under Chesterman is on the circumstances that resulted in Winters’ presence in Tuck’s apartment rather than the sexual harassment that occurred at Little John’s. Third, the majority’s rationale disregards the fact that Winters’ complaint alleges “supervision” at Tuck’s apartment as the gravamen of Little John’s vicarious liability and that defendant’s obligation to defend is circumscribed by Winters’ theory of her case. The majority should not advance its own legal theory apart from that advanced by Winters’ pleading and hold defendant responsible under its policy on a theory not pled.
The beginning point of the majority’s reasoning is based on its reading of the holdings in Chesterman, Fearing and Lourim.1 A discussion of the facts in each case is instructive as to the proper analysis. In Chesterman, defendant’s employee met with potential customers during an evening meeting to formulate plans and to obtain information for a remodeling project on behalf of his employer. After finishing his inspection of the property, he took a hallucinogenic drug while still on the property to counter feelings of depression and to give him energy to prepare a bid for the project. While driving to the site where he intended to prepare the bid, he stopped, broke into the plaintiffs locked bedroom and sexually assaulted her. The issue was whether the defendant employer was vicariously liable for the assault. Preliminarily, the court said,
*219“[consequently, if plaintiff had attempted to premise the [employer’s] vicariously liability solely on [its employee’s] Barmon’s acts of entry and assault, the [employer] would not be vicariously liable. The [employer] still may be found vicariously liable, however, if other acts which were within [its employee’s] scope of employment resulted in the acts which led to injury to plaintiff.” 305 Or at 443 (emphasis in original).
In analyzing the issue, the court said that three requirements for vicarious liability must be met:
“(1) whether the act occurred substantially within the time and space limits authorized by the employment; (2) whether the employee was motivated, at least partially, by a purpose to serve the employer; (3) whether the act is of a kind which the employee was hired to perform.” 305 Or at 442.
The court then applied the above requirements to the facts. It relied on the fact that the defendant’s employee took the drug while he was on the property of his employer’s potential customers and to help him prepare the bid. The assault occurred while the employee was traveling from one work site to another and while he was still within the course of his employment. The court also pointed to the fact that the defendant’s employee was motivated by a purpose to serve his employer when he ingested the drug. Finally, the court observed that a jury could find that, because the defendant’s employee was also the president of the corporate employer, he had authority to take measures to enable himself to continue to work on the project on behalf of the employer — arguably benefiting the employer by ingesting the drug. The court concluded that a jury could find that the breaking into the house by the employee and his assault of the plaintiff were acts that resulted from the employee’s ingestion of the drug on behalf of his employer’s business.2
In Fearing, the allegations by the plaintiff were that he had been sexually abused as a youth by a priest under the supervision of the defendant Archdiocese. The issue was *220whether the Archdiocese was vicariously liable for the activities of the priest. The plaintiff alleged that the priest was authorized by the defendant to act as a youth pastor and that as the result of the development of a relationship as a spiritual advisor and mentor, the priest had used the relationship to sexually assault him. Further, as the court explained,
“[t]he complaint describes [the priest’s] performance of his priestly and pastoral duties in developing a trust relationship with plaintiff and his family, together with the eventual sexual assaults, as ‘[manipulations.’ Plaintiff then alleges:
“ ‘The [manipulations * * * were committed within the time and space limits of [the priest’s] employment as youth pastor and priest, were committed out of a desire, at least initially and partially, to fulfill his employment duties as youth pastor and priest, and the [manipulations were generally actions of a kind and nature which [the priest] was required to perform as youth pastor and priest.’ ” 328 Or at 372 (emphasis added).
Thus, the sexual assaults allegedly occurred while the priest was performing his duties as a priest. Relying on its holding in Chesterman, the court held that its inquiry did not end after determining whether the alleged sexual assault was outside the scope of the priest’s employment. “The Archdiocese still could be found vicariously liable, if acts that were within [the priest’s] scope of employment ‘resulted in the acts which led to injury to plaintiff.’ ” Fearing, 328 Or at 374 (quoting Chesterman, 305 Or at 443). The court then held that the Chesterman requirements were satisfied by the allegations that the abuse resulted from the priest’s exercise of his duties. Id. at 375. In summary, the priest was alleged to have used his position as a pastor to build the relationship that had resulted in the abuse; the exercise of his duties occurred within the time and space limits of employment; he was motivated, at least partially, by a purpose to serve the employer and his conduct as a mentor and spiritual advisor was the kind of conduct that he had been hired to perform.
In Lourim, a similar situation existed. The plaintiff alleged that he had been sexually abused by his Boy Scout leader when the plaintiff was a minor. The defendants were *221Boy Scout organizations who had authorized the leader to have contact with individuals like the plaintiff. As a result of his duties on behalf of the organizations, the leader was able to form a relationship with the plaintiff that permitted him to gain a position of trust and to act as a mentor to the plaintiff. As a result of that relationship, the leader was able to sexually abuse the plaintiff while he was performing his authorized duties for the defendant organizations. The court recognized that
“[t]he complaint describes [the Boy Scout leader’s] performance of his duties as troop leader in developing a trust relationship with plaintiff and his family, together with the eventual sexual assaults as ‘[mjanipulations.’ Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the manipulations were committed in connection with [the Boy Scout leader’s] performance of his duties as troop leader:
“ ‘The [manipulations * * * were committed within the time and space limits of his responsibilities as troop leader, were committed out of a desire, at least initially and partially, to fulfill his duties as troop leader, and were generally actions of a kind and nature which [the Boy Scout leader] was required to perform as troop leader.’ ” 328 Or at 385 (emphasis added).
The court held the allegations sufficient to meet the three requirements of Chesterman because the relationship occurred within the time and space limits authorized by the employment, the leader was motivated to engender the relationship, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the organizations and the relationship was of a kind that the leader was authorized to form. Lourim, 328 Or at 387.
In this case, the majority holds that Tuck’s acts, as alleged, were a direct outgrowth and engendered by the management style that he employed on the job and that those facts suffice to bring Tuck within the course of his employment, even though he was not in the act of supervising Winters at the time he committed the assault. It points out that in Chesterman the court emphasized that, in cases where there is a time lag between the act producing the harm and the resulting harm, the proper focus to determine whether respondent superior applies is not on the act that causes the harm. Rather, it is on whether there is a casual *222connection between the authorized act by the employer and the act that causes the harm. For instance, the authorized act in Chesterman that resulted in the injury was the ingestion of the hallucinogenic drug that was intended to provide energy to prepare the bid for the work-related project. In Fearing, the authorized acts by the employer with the plaintiff involved the priest’s role as a mentor and spiritual advisor. In Lourim, the authorized act by the employer was the formation and perpetuation of a mentor-type relationship between the Boy Scout leader and the plaintiff. In each case, there was a casual connection between the actions authorized by the employer and the acts that resulted in harm to the plaintiffs. In other words, the harm occurred while the employee was engaged in an activity on behalf of the employer.
In this case, the majority endeavors to bring Tuck’s actions within the same kind of characterization. Winters alleges that Tuck engaged in a "continuous pattern and practice of subjecting [her] to sexually explicit conduct and comments, creating a sexually hostile work environment, and conditioning [her] continued employment on acquiescence to such an environment.” According to the majority, those allegations allege conduct for which Little John’s is vicariously liable and, because there was a continuation of Tuck’s offensive conduct outside the work environment when he assaulted Winters in his apartment, therefore there is a sufficient casual connection to hold Little John’s vicariously liable for the assault. The majority correctly describes the holdings in Chesterman, Fearing and Lourim but misapplies them to the facts of this case, resulting in a flawed analysis.
According to the majority, “[a] jury could reasonably find that the sexual harassment that Tuck inflicted on Winters at the job site was within the scope of his employment,] * * * [and] [t]he allegations would also permit a jury to infer that the sexual harassment at the job site was a ‘necessary precursor’ to the sexual abuse” that occurred at Tuck’s apartment. 162 Or App at 207. In other words, the syllogism proffered by the majority is that the sexual abuse of Winters at Tuck’s apartment was causally connected to Tuck’s employment because Tuck previously sexually harassed Winters at work. What that proposition ignores is that Little John’s vicarious liability for the sexual harassment of *223Winters at work occurs legally because Tuck was acting in bis role as Winters’ supervisor at the time. It is Tuck’s supervisory conduct at work that serves as the “precursor,” the predicate authorized conduct that results in liability under the doctrine of respondent superior. That predicate is missing in the allegations that describe the precursor to Winters being in Tuck’s apartment.
The necessity of Tuck being involved in a work-related precursor at the apartment to a legally cognizable casual connection between Tuck’s actions at the apartment and Winter’s employment becomes apparent when the facts as alleged in this case undergo the scrutiny of the Chester-man requirements, all of which must be met before vicarious liability exists. The first requirement is that Tuck’s actions that resulted in the sexual assault must have occurred substantially within the time and space limits of employment authorized by the employer, even though a time lag exists between the authorized conduct and the act producing the harm. In Chesterman, although a time lag existed between the taking of the drug and the assault, the employee was in the midst of his employment-related duties when the assault occurred. The same factual predicate existed in Fearing and Lourim. In contrast, Tuck was not in the midst of his employment as the manager of Little John’s pizza parlor when he was at his apartment grieving for his deceased brother at 4:30 a.m. Unlike the facts or allegations in Chesterman, Fearing and Lourim, there are no allegations in the complaint that meet the first requirement that Tuck’s actions that resulted in the sexual assault must have occurred substantially within the time and space limits of the employment authorized by the employer.
The second requirement asks whether Tuck yvas motivated, at least partially, by a purpose to serve Little John’s by the activity that prompted Winters’ presence at Tuck’s apartment.3 Again, Winters’ pleading clearly answers that question. Winters was “implored” to come to Tuck’s *224apartment “to help him grieve the death of his brother.” That activity is unrelated to any motivation to serve the interests of Little John’s in the preparation and selling of pizza to the public. The final requirement is that Tuck’s act that resulted in the assault at the apartment must have been the kind that Little John’s hired him to perform. Once again, Winters’ complaint fails that requirement. Helping a supervisor grieve a personal loss dining off-work hours is not alleged to be the kind of act that Tuck or Winters were hired to perform by Little John’s. Compare Chesterman, 305 Or at 443 (holding that the president of a company arguably has authority to take steps to continue a work project even if it means taking a drug to enable him to continue) with Bray v. American Property Management Corp., 156 Or App 356, 365, 965 P2d 426 (1998), (holding that a parking attendant’s use of excessive force in responding to an attack by a businessman was not reasonably foreseeable from the nature of his job to be the kind of act the attendant had been hired to perform).
In summary, the majority’s effort to bring this case under the holding of Chesterman and to avoid Little John’s dilemma must fail. Tuck’s conduct at work and at his apartment are discrete events. The only connection that they have with each other is that they involve the same participants. The fact that Tuck sexually harassed Winters at work is not part of the chain of causation that resulted in his sexual assault of her at the apartment. Winters does not allege that she was prompted to go to Tuck’s apartment because she had been sexually harassed at work or that the sexual assault would not have occurred but for the harassment at work. Winters alleges that she went to Tuck’s apartment because he was her work supervisor. The only plausible connection between Winters’ work environment and her presence at the apartment is that Tuck was her supervisor.4 Consequently, *225there is no allegation that gives rise to the inference that Tuck’s sexual harassment of Winters at work was a “necessary precursor” in the chain of causation that led to Winters’ victimization.
Little John’s has recognized in its legal theory of its case what the majority has not: for it to be vicariously hable, Tuck must have been engaged in an activity at his apartment on Little John’s behalf that led to the assault. That is why it alleges that Tuck was acting as Winters’ supervisor “at ah material times.” That is also why Little John’s cannot avoid its dilemma: if Tuck was acting within the scope of his managerial duties when he “implored” Winters to come over to his apartment at 3:45 a.m. and “help him grieve the death of his brother,” then the exclusion for Winters acting in the course of her employment in the policy also applies. In light of Little John’s theory of its case, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant on the claims for bodily injury.
The trial court also ruled that defendant did not have a duty to defend under the “personal injury” coverage of the policy. The policy defines “personal injury” to mean injury, other than bodily injury, arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
“a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
“b. Malicious prosecution;
“c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right or private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies, by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor;
“d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparage a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services; or
“e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.”
Little John’s argues that Winters alleges that she was “detained” or “imprisoned” within the meaning of subsection a. and that Tuck wrongfully entered into a room occupied by Winters under subsection c. It points to allegations *226that Tuck assaulted Winters “while pinning her arms against the wall” and that he followed her “into the bathroom against her wishes.” However, none of Winters’ claims is identified in her complaint as a false imprisonment or wrongful entry claim.5
Nonetheless, the labels of a pleading are not determinative. “[An] insurer has a duty to defend if the complaint provides any basis for which the insurer provides coverage[,]” and the obligation of defendant to defend depends on whether any of the facts alleged in Winters’ complaint can reasonably be interpreted to include conduct within the coverage of the policy. Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or 397, 400, 877 P2d 80 (1994) (emphasis in original). Even if Winters’ complaint alleges some conduct outside the coverage for personal injury, defendant has a duty to defend if certain allegations of fact without amendment could impose liability for conduct covered by the policy. Here, Winters alleges that she was pinned against the wall while she was being sexually assaulted. A “false imprisonment” occurs when there is an unlawful restraint of one’s freedom of movement. The restraint need not be for more than a brief time, so long as the person being confined is aware of the confinement. See Lukas v. J. C. Penney Co., 233 Or 345, 353, 378 P2d 717 (1963). Winters’ allegations can reasonably be interpreted to satisfy the elements of the tort of false imprisonment without amendment. It follows that the coverage in the policy for false imprisonment and defendant’s duty to defend Little John’s against claims of false imprisonment could be triggered, assuming that Winters has alleged ultimate facts from which it can be inferred that Tuck was acting in his capacity as Winters’ supervisor at the time.
For the reasons previously discussed, none of the allegations in paragraphs 4, 7, 8, and 9 suffices to impute vicarious liability to Little John’s for false imprisonment under Chesterman. The conclusory allegation in paragraph 4 that Tuck was acting “at all material times in the scope of *227his employment” is just that — a bald conclusion. The duty of defendant to defend under the policy depends on whether these are “ultimate facts” alleged that, if true, would establish that Tuck was acting within the course of employment when he assaulted Winters. The only pertinent ultimate facts alleged by Winters are that Tuck was her supervisor at work and that she was “implored * * * to come over to his apartment to help him grieve the death of his brother.” To echo the court’s opinion in G.L., there is no allegation, and, I cannot imagine one, that the employee was acting for the purpose of furthering any interest of the employer when Tuck asked Winters to come to his apartment. 306 Or at 61.6
For the above reasons, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant. I dissent.
The briefs and arguments in this ease were submitted after Chesterman but before Fearing and Lourim were decided.
Chesterman came to the court for review of a summary judgment for the employer.
In G.L., the court recognized that “[t]he most common limitation on employer liability is that the intentional act must have been undertaken with the intent of furthering the business purposes of the employer, however misguided that intent might seem.” 306 Or at 60.
The logical extension of the majority’s reasoning is that an employer becomes vicariously liable for any tort committed by an employee against another employee during off-work hours if it can be shown that the tort is part of a continuing pattern of conduct that occurred during work hours. The majority’s rule, in effect, makes the employer the insurer of a supervisor’s off-work activities and extends the concept of vicarious liability beyond previously cognizable boundaries. Cf. Mains v. II Morrow, Inc., 128 Or App 625, 631-32, 877 P2d 88 (1994) (reviewing the connection between the policy of risk allocation underlying vicarious liability and the requirement that the employee act within the scope of employment).
According to her complaint, Winters alleges claims for “Sexual Harassment and Retaliation for Resisting Sexual Harassment-ORS 659.030,” “Wrongful Discharge for Resisting Sexual Harassment,” “Sexual Assault and Battery,” two counts of “Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress,” and aiding and abetting a violation of ORS 659.030.
In G.L., the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a respiratory therapist employed at the defendant’s hospital where she was recovering from surgery. 306 Or at 56. The therapist was not treating her when the assault occurred.