Hudgins v. Bacon

Birdsong, Judge.

This case involves the issue decided in the case of Holmes v. Worthey, 159 Ga. App. 262 (282 SE2d 919), affirmed 249 Ga. 104 (287 SE2d 9). Plaintiffs (Hudgins) sued the builder-sellers (Bacon and *857Loomis) of a new house for negligence and for breach of contract for failure to build the house in a workmanlike manner.

We will state at the outset that because there is evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ verdict, we must reverse the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict. But the plaintiffs’ verdict will not be reinstated because the trial court also granted a new trial in the event its judgment n.o.v. were reversed, and the evidence does not “require” the plaintiff’s verdict. OCGA § 5-5-50. Helton v. Zellmer, 238 Ga. 735, 736 (235 SE2d 35); Hicks v. American Interstate Ins. Co., 158 Ga. App. 220, 225 (279 SE2d 517).

The plaintiffs James and Wanda Hudgins of Albany entered into a contract with Bacon and Loomis to build and finish a “spec” house. The record in the case shows that this written contract (which the plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to place in evidence) expressly required defendants to complete the house “in a good workmanlike manner.” The trial court granted a directed verdict as to the contract count because of the misapprehension that under Holmes the contract merged into the deed at delivery. The plaintiffs then sought to show, pursuant to the language in Holmes (pp. 271-272), that there were defects in the house which they could not have discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence but which the defendants knew or should have known were present. Throughout the trial, however, defendants argued that the plaintiffs had to prove the “professional standard of care.” Ultimately the trial court agreed that no actionable negligence had been shown and rendered a judgment n.o.v. Several grounds in support of this judgment n.o.v. are urged by the defendants. Held:

1. Within a few months after plaintiffs moved into the house, the brick veneer began to crack and pull away from the house frame; it pulled away from the windows; large cracks appeared inside the house along the master bedroom wall; the bathroom tile cracked, and marble thresholds broke apart. The patio wall and the carport cracked and split and the footing itself cracked. The damage to the house, as agreed by all parties and shown in photo exhibits, is extensive.

Only that evidence necessary to the opinion will be set out. The contractor Bacon testified it was his standard procedure to install rebar (one-half inch strips of reinforcement steel) in the concrete footings of all houses he builds because rebar reinforces the concrete in the footings and strengthens the footings for the weight that will be placed on it. Rebar is installed in continuous twenty-foot sections with the ends tied together. Two strips of rebar are placed parallel in the wet concrete, four inches down with a six-inch gap between the rebars. Both Bacon and his “independent contractor” Drawdy testified that Bacon told Drawdy to put rebar in this house. Drawdy testified he did put rebar in the footings continuously throughout the *858house.

Thomas Driggers, a mechanical and structural engineer, testified that the brick veneer was placed on the outer edge of the footing, “almost through to the edge.” His letter report stated: “The cracks first observed on the rear of the house indicated a sheared footing indicating no rebar or rebar not [encased] in the concrete. . . . The rear wall appears to have a sheared footing and the left hand side dropped while the [righthand] side appears to have risen.” (Emphasis supplied.) He added at trial: “What’s happened, the footing has actually come apart. . . . my opinion at the time was that there was no steel in the footing and that’s why it cracked, because of uneven loads; the soil had not been compacted.” (Emphasis supplied.) He described what he meant by “uneven loads”: “The brick was placed on the outer edge of that piece of concrete, which would cause the footing to rotate slightly because of the offset loading on that piece of concrete. That could have twisted it and broken it.” This witness testified in essence that whatever were the problems with the soil or uneven loads, it was ultimately the lack of steel reinforcement (rebar) in the footings which caused the footings to shear or break.

The soils and materials engineer, Eldon Evans, testified that he drilled three three-inch diameter adjacent core samples into the concrete footings from top to bottom, across the width of the footing inside the brick veneer, and found no rebar. However, the soils engineer determined also that the soil around plaintiffs’ house contained a large amount of mineral which expands in very wet weather; it was his opinion that this “expansive soil” caused the house foundation to shift. Even so, his testimony did not preclude the conclusion, consistent with the other evidence, that the foundation would not have shifted if there had been reinforcing steel (rebar) throughout the house.

It is strenuously argued on appeal (and the trial court apparently found) that the plaintiffs did not show actionable negligence because there was no showing of a standard of professional care required of builders and no evidence that any negligence of defendants caused the damage. Defendants contend that it was undisputed that it was not a required or customary building practice in Albany to conduct soil tests before building a house, and that there was no direct evidence that the brick wall should have been centered on the concrete footing. Defendants contend that the only competent evidence as to the cause of the damage was the evidence concerning the “expansive soil”; however, this is patently not true in view of the clear evidence of the mechanical and structural engineer that the lack of rebar caused the footings to crack. This evidence as to causation was competent. Coursey Bldg. Assoc. v. Baker, 165 Ga. App. 521, 523 (301 SE2d 688); Pembrook Mgt. v. Cossaboon, 157 Ga. App. 675, 679 (278 *859SE2d 100).

The verdict of negligence is sustained by the evidence. Bacon admitted that his own standard procedure was to put rebar in all footings so as to strengthen the walls and because of its reinforcement qualities. Bacon’s testimony that he told the subcontractor Drawdy to put rebar in this house, and Drawdy’s insistence that he did put rebar in this house', the contradictory evidence that there was (at least in some places) no rebar in the footings; and the causative evidence that this absence of rebar ultimately resulted in the damage, made an issue sufficient for the jury to determine actionable negligence (known or knowable defect) without proving the professional standard of care required of builders. As to this, any insufficiencies or supposed ambivalence in any witness’ testimony affected its weight, not its admissibility. Woods v. Andersen, 145 Ga. App. 492 (243 SE2d 748). The weight and credibility of the evidence were jury questions. Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180 (263 SE2d 916).

The problem apparent in this case is that the plaintiffs repeatedly sought to show, consistent with the language in Holmes authorizing the cause of action, that there were “latent defects” which plaintiffs could not have discovered with reasonable diligence, and about which defendants knew or should have known. At the same time, defendants argued that plaintiffs should prove that a distinct professional standard of care or procedure applicable to contractors had been violated. On the surface, these two principles apparently seemed to these parties to establish opposed or different standards, but they do not. The defect is the actionable negligence, and the “professional standard” is generally the only competent means by which such negligence can be proved in professional liability cases. This is so for the obvious reason that in cases asserting professional negligence the jury cannot be left to speculate too freely on what constitutes actionable negligence. Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 345 (247 SE2d 107). But, equally obviously, if the defendant himself testifies that he should have performed and did perform an act which the evidence shows he did not perform, and if causation is shown, the case may become a “clear and palpable” case of negligence and proof of a professional standard is not required. See Hughes v. Malone, supra.

It is well established that “ ‘[t]he law imposes upon persons performing architectural, engineering, and other professional and skilled services the obligation to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and ability, which generally is taken and considered to be such a degree of care and skill as, under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances [this proviso would encompass any special local community considerations, such as excessively expansive soil], is ordinarily employed by their respective professions.’ Housing Auth. v. Ayers, 211 Ga. 728, 733 (88 SE2d 368) (1955).” (Emphasis supplied.) *860Rhodes-Haverty Partnership v. Robert &c. Assoc., 163 Ga. App. 310, 311-312 (293 SE2d 876). This rule applies to building contractors. Allied Enterprises v. Brooks, 93 Ga. App. 832 (93 SE2d 392).

In an action against a builder, “[i]t is essential to present competent evidence as to the acceptability of specific professional conduct.” Coursey Bldg. Assoc. v. Baker, supra, p. 523. The contractor Bacon presented evidence as to the acceptability of his own specific conduct in this case, by testifying that he always puts rebar in his houses and that he did put rebar in this house. It is generally true that one expert’s opinion that certain procedures should have been utilized does not properly establish the standard of care of a profession (see Wagner v. Timms, 158 Ga. App. 538, 539 (281 SE2d 295)), but it is possible for evidence to establish a known or knowable defect without proof of a professional standard, if the proof is clear and palpable to the jury. Hughes, p. 345.

The determination of whether a “defect” existed which the homebuyer could not have discovered and which the builder knew or should have known, is the grounds for actionable negligence set forth in Holmes v. Worthey, supra. That language was the delineation of Holmes’ extension of liability from fraud to negligence. Holmes, supra, p. 271. See also Worthey v. Holmes, supra, pp. 105-106. That language does not replace the standard of care which is generally required to prove negligence in cases against builders and other professionals. As earlier pointed out, the known or knowable “defect” as described in Holmes is the actionable negligence; the “standard of care in the profession” is only the means by which such professional negligence is generally proved.

The contractor Bacon testified that his own standard procedure is to put rebar in all concrete footings to reinforce and strengthen the footings. This is not proof of the “standard of care in the profession generally” (Wagner v. Timms, supra). But in this case there was “competent evidence as to the acceptability of (the) specific professional conduct” (Coursey Bldg. Assoc., supra) of failing to install or properly install rebar. Bacon’s testimony that he did put rebar in the footings, with the evidence that there was no rebar in at least part of the footings and the causative evidence that this lack of rebar caused the footings to “shear,” is evidence of a defect which the defendants “knew or should have known.” Thus in this case, although it may be the rare one, the jury could find clear and palpable proof of actionable negligence without advertence to the standard of care in the profession. In the usual case, in order to prove a breach of legal duty, it is necessary to prove deviation from a specific professional standard of care; but after all, the “professional standard” is a means to the end of proving negligence. Where a defect is proven which the builder knew or should have known, and that defect is shown to be the cause *861of damage, actionable negligence has been established (Holmes v. Worthey, supra) and we cannot say such proven negligence should be ignored merely because the plaintiff was able to prove it without the means of the “professional standard.”

2. The trial court erred in directing a verdict for defendants on plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract for failure to build the house in a workmanlike manner. The court apparently based its ruling on the misapprehension that under Holmes, the contract to build, and any of its terms, merged into the deed upon delivery of the deed. To the contrary, a major premise of Holmes is that the written contract to build does not merge into the deed because where the contract to build “ ‘contains provisions imposing obligations upon the vendor other than those relating to title or possession, and . . . collateral thereto . . . such collateral provisions will be held to survive the deed.’ [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Holmes, supra, p. 267. Whether the contract to build is to be performed or finished before or after delivery of the deed, is irrelevant. Holmes, p. 266. Transfer of the deed, which is performance only of the agreement to convey, does not extinguish any duties and obligations arising out of the agreement to build. Holmes, p. 267. See also Worthey v. Holmes, 249 Ga. 104, 105 (1), supra.

Defendants contend the plaintiffs cannot complain of the directed verdict because no enumeration of error was made as to the exclusion of the contract from evidence. The plaintiffs’ enumeration of error fairly encompasses the exclusion of the contract. See OCGA § 5-6-48 (f).

3. The standard of proof on the contract claim for breach of the express duty to build the house in a fit and workmanlike manner is essentially the same as for proof of negligence. “ ‘The law imposes upon building contractors and others performing skilled services the obligation to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and ability, which is generally taken and considered to be such a degree of care and skill as, under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances, is ordinarily employed by others of the same profession. [Cits.]’ ” Howell v. Ayers, 129 Ga. App. 899, 900 (202 SE2d 189). Holmes, supra, p. 266. However, the subject matter of such a claim is the contractual obligation of the builder to build the house in a fit and workmanlike manner. Holmes, supra, p. 268. In a negligence claim, the subject matter “depends for its existence upon a comparison of the knowledge and expertise of the builder-seller with that of the purchaser.” Worthey v. Holmes, supra, p. 106; see esp. Holmes v. Worthey, supra, pp. 270-272. As in every negligence case, an analysis is required of the comparative exercise of care of both parties. But, the plaintiff’s own actions will generally (in the absence of some special equity like waiver) not be relevant in a breach of contract claim, *862where the duty to build a fit and workmanlike product is the builder’s express contractual obligation. This distinction and the one discussed in Division 4 herein, illustrate the efficacy of suing for both breach of contract and negligence. Of course, where there is no contract to build, but only the purchase of the house, the negligence count stands alone.

4. Defendant Loomis, the alleged real estate investor, no doubt (like the builder Bacon) never drove a nail, but he was obligor to the contract to build the same as was the builder Bacon. If the house had never been built at all, the plaintiffs could have sued Loomis for the breach; if the express or implied agreement to build in a fit and workmanlike manner has been breached, the obligor Loomis may be liable just the same. Too fine distinctions between builders and mere investors, partners, or joint venturers — none of whom may have driven a nail, but who have held themselves out to construct and sell fit houses — may defeat the purpose of the action which is, ultimately, to render the builder-sellers liable for unfit work. Directed verdict and judgment n.o.v, in favor of Loomis, who was a real obligor of the contract to build, was improper.

The result as to an investor would generally not be the same on a negligence count, where liability is based upon a defect which the actual builder-seller knew of or would have discovered in the exercise of reasonable care (proved generally by the violation of the professional standard of conduct, see Division 1, infra). Unless such knowledge can be proved against the “builder-seller” who is really no more than an investor or obligor on the contract, there would be no imputed negligence liability, and no grounds to impute the actual builder’s knowledge to him, unless of course the builder is himself the employee or subcontractor of the investor as in the case of a development venture which sets itself up and holds itself out to construct and sell houses, and retains a builder to do the actual work. See OCGA § 51-2-5.

5. Defendants contend they cannot be liable for any negligence of the “independent contractor” Drawdy, who poured the footings and laid the foundation. It is suggested that, in particular, if there was no rebar embedded in parts of the concrete footing, the contractor Bacon obviously could not have known it. But in the first place, the basis of liability is the builder-seller’s holding himself out as having the ability and expertise, or his assumption of the contract obligation, to build a fit and proper dwelling (see Division 3, infra; Holmes, supra, pp. 270-272; Worthey, supra, p. 106). It would be too easy for a builder-seller of a house to avoid liability by hiring inexperienced crews, providing little or no supervision, and then claiming the culprit of any negligence was an independent contractor. The contract to build, with its attendant obligations, is between the buyer and builder, not the buyer and any independent contractor. See OCGA § *86351-2-5 (3); McGinnis v. Milhollin, 64 Ga. App. 462 (13 SE2d 591). As for a negligence claim, having held himself out as having the ability to build a fit and proper house, the builder generally cannot abdicate to an “independent contractor” his duty to do it. The right to direct and control the work is assumed and retained by the builder in these cases. See OCGA § 51-2-5 (5).

Decided July 10, 1984 Rehearing denied July 31, 1984 Stephen C. Steele, Bonald E. Strickland, for appellants. R. Kelly Raulerson, T. Lee Bishop, Jr., for appellees.

This is analogous to the policy underlying OCGA § 34-9-8, where in workers’ compensation cases the principal contractor is liable for compensation to any employee of a subcontractor, which by policy definition includes an independent contractor. Wright Assoc. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496 (277 SE2d 41); Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 149 Ga. App. 229 (253 SE2d 805). The liability of the contractor in such a case is not premised on his control of performance, but is premised upon the principal contractor’s having undertaken to perform and furnish certain goods or services (American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 123 Ga. App. 585, 587 (181 SE2d 876)). Just so, the builder has undertaken to build a fit and workmanlike house and has held himself out as having the ability to do it. Holmes, supra, p. 270; Worthey, supra, p. 106.

6. The damages awarded were within the range of evidence and supported by the evidence. Any supposed deficiencies in proof can be remedied on retrial.

Judgment reversed and case remanded for new trial pursuant to the original grant of trial court.

McMurray, C. J., Been, P. J., Quillian, P. J., Banke, P. J., Pope and Benham, JJ., concur. Carley and Sognier, JJ., dissent.