GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GUY, J., joined. McKEAGUE, J., (pp. 579-84), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.Jose Eduardo Urrieta appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. During a routine traffic stop, Deputy Sheriff Lee Young detained Urrieta beyond the time reasonably necessary to issue a citation, primarily because the officer mistakenly believed that Urrie-ta was not allowed to drive in Tennessee with a Mexican driver’s license. Deputy Young claims that, during the course of *571the traffic stop, he became suspicious that Urrieta was transporting drugs. Eventually Urrieta gave Deputy Young written consent to search his vehicle. The deputy discovered no drugs, but found three handguns and several fraudulent identification cards. Finding that Deputy Young had a reasonable suspicion to extend the detention and that Urrieta’s consent was voluntary, the district court denied Urrieta’s motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
On August 21, 2006, Urrieta, his girlfriend Maria Ramirez Montes, and her sixteen-year-old son were traveling eastbound on Interstate 24 in Tennessee. Ur-rieta was driving a 1998 Lincoln Navigator with an expired temporary registration tag and was towing a 1987 Honda sedan by means of a homemade towbar. Both vehicles were fully packed. At approximately 1:45 p.m., Deputy Young, an officer with the Rutherford County Interstate Crime Enforcement Unit, was stationed on Interstate 24. Deputy Young was trained in using drug-sniffing dogs, in interdiction, and in using highway traffic stops as a means to ferret out concealed secondary crime. On the day in question, a trained drug-sniffing dog was in Deputy Young’s patrol car. Deputy Young witnessed Ur-rieta’s car “swerving” between lanes, decided to follow it, and noticed that the Navigator did not have a valid registration sticker and that the taillights on the Honda were not working. On that basis, Deputy Young pulled Urrieta over to the side of the road.
The entire traffic stop was captured on video. Deputy Young approached Urrie-ta’s car at 1:49 p.m. and requested to see Urrieta’s driver’s license. Upon noticing that the vehicles were fully packed, the deputy asked Urrieta: ‘Y’all moving?” Urrieta responded that he was moving from California and going to Atlanta. Over the course of the stop, however, Ur-rieta eventually explained that his ultimate destination was West Palm Beach, Florida. Deputy Young noted that Urrieta was smiling and friendly, but that the two passengers in the car did not make eye contact with him and appeared nervous. The officer also noticed that Montes was wearing a waitress’s shirt.
Urrieta produced a Mexican driver’s license and temporary registration papers from California for the Navigator. The Navigator was registered to Montes, but the registration had expired in February of 2006, six months earlier. Urrieta then produced additional paperwork showing that the Honda was registered in his name. Deputy Young told Urrieta that he could not drive in Tennessee using a Mexican driver’s license unless he had a valid passport, asked Urrieta if he was “legally in the country,” and instructed him to search his fully packed car to find his passport.
At approximately 1:53 p.m., Deputy Young returned to his vehicle and called the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) to determine if Urrieta was legally in the country. EPIC provides information on drivers’ licenses, car registrations, and whether an individual has crossed the border at a checkpoint, was deported, or is under federal investigation. At 2:04 p.m., EPIC reported to Deputy Young that there was no information in the system on Urrieta, Montes, or their vehicles. The lack of information suggested that Urrieta and Montes had not entered the country legally, but also confirmed that they had not been previously deported. This is significant because illegal reentry after deportation is the only immigration violation *572that Deputy Young had the authority to enforce.
While waiting for the EPIC report, Deputy Young wrote a traffic citation for Ur-rieta, noting that Urrieta had committed three offenses: a lane violation, a taillight violation, and a registration violation. Deputy Young then called for backup from other officers, stating that he wanted to search the vehicles.
At 2:07 p.m., Deputy Young returned to Urrieta’s ear and asked him a series of approximately 40 questions about his immigration status, moving plans, job, and criminal history. Deputy Young did not issue Urrieta a citation or return his driver’s license. In response to Deputy Young’s questions, Urrieta was evasive about when he came into the country and, according to Young, began to change his story about his travel plans. Urrieta stated that he was “going back” to Mexico, that he planned to stay in Atlanta for only a short period of time, and then finally explained that he was going to Florida. He also stated that his girlfriend worked at Wendy’s, that she did not speak English, and that he did not have steady work.
When Deputy Young asked Urritea if his girlfriend had a passport, Urrieta said that he did not know. Although Urrieta originally asserted that he had a tourist visa, he admitted upon further questioning that he had only a passport. Deputy Young then asked Urrieta about his criminal history, and Urrieta said that he had none. Urrieta also denied having any illegal drugs or loaded guns in the car. In response to further questioning, however, Urrieta told Deputy Young that he did not know for sure if there had “ever” been drugs in the car, but stated that he did not “think so.”
At approximately 2:13 p.m., Deputy Young asked Urrieta if he could search his car. Urrieta responded “sure,” at which point Deputy Young handed Urrieta a consent form and told him that the form gave law enforcement permission to search the car for illegal items. Deputy Young then told Urrieta to read over the form and to sign it, stating that he wanted Urrieta to “know what I’m doing.” The consent form was in English and in Spanish and stated in part: “I further state that no promises, threats, force, physical or mental coercion of any kind whatsoever have been used against me to get me to consent to the search described above or to sign this form.”
Another officer arrived at the scene and Deputy Young walked over to speak with him. The two officers then approached Urrieta’s car and the new officer began to question Montes while Deputy Young spoke with Urrieta. Urrieta had filled out the consent form, which gave consent for the officer to search only the Honda. Deputy Young then explained to Urrieta that he wanted to search the Navigator too, and instructed him “to just put ’98 Navigator’ on there.” Urrieta complied with Young’s instructions and amended the form to include the notation “98 Nav.” At 2:19 p.m., half an hour into the stop, Deputy Young and the other officer began to search the Navigator. The search uncovered three firearms and several fraudulent identification cards. Urrieta’s passport was discovered in the vehicle by the police in a subsequent search.
B. Procedural background
In August of 2006, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Urrieta for being an illegal alien in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924, and for possession of unlawful identification documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(6). Urrieta moved to suppress the firearms, docu*573ments, and several incriminating statements. The district court granted Urrie-ta’s motion to suppress certain of the statements, but it denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search after finding that (1) Deputy Young had a reasonable suspicion to detain Urrie-ta after 2:07 p.m., and (2) Urrieta voluntarily consented to the search. Urrieta entered a conditional plea of guilty in February of 2007 that preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The court then sentenced Urrieta to one year and one day in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
We review a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence under two “complementary standards.” United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265, 267 (6th Cir.2002). The district court’s factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous, but its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 937 (6th Cir.2004). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir.1999) (citations omitted).
B. The Fourth Amendment and the reasonable-suspicion standard
I. Seizure
The Fourth Amendment is violated when an individual is unlawfully seized. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unlawful seizure); United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (6th Cir.1983) (stating that the first question in a Fourth Amendment analysis is whether the party was seized). A seizure is unlawful if an officer, without a reasonable suspicion, “by means of physical force or show of authority ... in some way restraints] the liberty of a citizen.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
The parties in the present case do not dispute that Urrieta was “seized” during the entire encounter. We therefore turn to the question of whether Deputy Young had a reasonable suspicion to extend the stop.
2. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
A law enforcement officer may permissibly conduct an investigatory stop when he or she has “a particularized and objective” suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). To meet this standard, the government must point to “specific and articula-ble facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts,” reasonably suggest than criminal activity has occurred or is imminent. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. An officer must not act on an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but [on] the specific reasonable inferences from which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. at 27, 67 S.Ct. 13. Courts determine whether a reasonable suspicion exists by looking at the “totality of the circumstances” and considering “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time.” Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848-49 (6th Cir.2003).
The parties in the present case do not dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid. At issue is whether, at the conclu*574sion of the traffic stop at 2:07 p.m., Deputy-Young had a reasonable nonimmigration-related suspicion for the continued investigatory detention of Urrieta.
To detain a motorist any longer than is reasonably necessary to issue a traffic citation, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual has engaged in more extensive criminal conduct. United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir.2002) (finding that the police lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to continue an investigatory detention after the traffic stop was completed). This Court has determined that “[o]nce the purpose of the traffic stop is completed, a motorist cannot be further detained unless something that occurred during the stop caused the officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999) (finding that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, which allowed him to detain a motorist in order for a drug-detection dog to conduct a sniff search).
Urrieta’s argument that Deputy Young lacked a reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of Urrieta’s detention is two-fold. He first asserts that Deputy Young imper-missibly detained him beyond the scope of the traffic stop due to the deputy’s mistaken understanding of the law (i.e., that Ur-rieta’s Mexican driver’s license was not valid without a passport and that Urrieta had to produce a passport in order to legally drive in Tennessee). Urrieta further argues that, at the time the traffic stop should have been completed (2:07 p.m.), Deputy Young lacked a reasonable suspicion that any other criminal activity was afoot, so that the remainder of the stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
In its response to Urrieta’s motion to suppress evidence, the government originally argued that Urrieta’s extended detention was justified on the grounds that his Mexican driver’s license was invalid and that Deputy Young had reason to suspect that Urrieta was an undocumented immigrant. The government withdrew these arguments, however, after conceding that they misstated the law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-304(4) (providing that a resident of any state or country may operate a motor vehicle in Tennessee with a valid license issued by the person’s home state or country); Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-7-103(a)(l) (allowing officers to conduct warrantless arrests for immigration violations only for felonies or continuing violations, thus prohibiting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors such as an illegal entry that was not committed in the presence of the officer); State v. Ash, 12 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (finding that the police may conduct warrantless arrests for misdemeanors only if the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of an officer of the law); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (establishing that improper entry into the United States by avoiding inspection is a misdemeanor); 8 U.S.C. §§ 103(a)(10) and § 1357(g) (stating that local law enforcement officers cannot enforce completed violations of civil immigration law (i.e., illegal presence) unless specifically authorized to do so by the Attorney General under special conditions that are not applicable in the present case).
To justify Urrieta’s extended detention then, the government must point to specific facts demonstrating that Deputy Young had a reasonable suspicion that Urrieta was engaged in some nonimmigration-related illegal activity. The government contends that, at the time the traffic stop was effectuated, Deputy Young had acquired a reasonable suspicion that Urrieta was transporting drugs that was distinct from the officer’s mistaken understanding *575of the law relating to Urrieta’s right to drive in Tennessee.
Deputy Young’s testimony and actions, however, belie the governments’s assertion that he had a nonimmigration-related reason for Urrieta’s continued detention. The deputy’s testimony at the suppression hearing made clear that he conducted the entire stop under the mistaken belief that Urrieta’s Mexican driver’s license was invalid. Based on this mistaken belief, Deputy Young incorrectly (1) informed Urrieta that he (Deputy Young) was required to inquire into Urrieta’s immigration status, (2) told Urrieta that he had to produce a passport to drive legally in Tennessee, and (3) ordered Urrieta to search his fully packed car for his passport. Deputy Young’s actions strongly suggest that his mistaken understanding of the law was the true reason that he detained Urrieta beyond 2:07 p.m. on the day in question.
Further proof that Deputy Young lacked a reasonable suspicion that Urrieta was involved in a drug-related crime can be found in Deputy Young’s decision not to use the trained drug-sniffing dog that was sitting in his patrol car during the course of the entire stop. If Deputy Young had suspected Urrieta of a drug-related crime, the most logical thing for the deputy to have done would have been to use the trained dog to confirm his suspicions. Deputy Young’s failure to do so strongly suggests that he did not have a reasonable suspicion that Urrieta was transporting drugs.
The government, however, argues that the following factors demonstrate that Deputy Young had a reasonable suspicion that Urrieta was involved in a drug crime: (1) Urrieta’s cars were fully packed and he was towing a second car, (2) Urrieta had a Mexican driver’s license, (3) the Navigator had an expired registration tag, (4) Urrieta fit the profile of a drug courier because his passengers appeared nervous, he was traveling from a drug-source state, and the Navigator and the Honda had different values, (5) Urrieta had been dishonest about his immigration status, and (6) Ur-rieta could not find his passport.
Based on these factors, the district court determined that “a concern about [Urrie-ta’s] general dishonesty” and the need to determine “if something else was going on in the car other than ... traveling to Atlanta” provided a reasonable suspicion to extend Urrieta’s detention beyond the traffic stop. We respectfully disagree.
Although the government finds it suspicious that Urrieta’s cars were “fully packed” and that he was towing another car, we are puzzled as to why either of these factors suggests that Urrieta was transporting drugs. Towing a second car while traveling with one’s girlfriend and her son in fully packed automobiles seems far more consistent with moving — the very explanation that Urrieta gave for his trip — than with drug running. Because these two factors are wholly innocent and more in line with Urrieta’s explanation for his trip than with the deputy’s assertion that Urrieta was a drug courier, they should be entitled to little if any weight in the reasonable-suspicion calculation.
Other factors cited by the government— that Urrieta had a Mexican driver’s license, was unable to find his passport, and had an expired registration — -are largely irrelevant to the determination of whether Deputy Young had a reasonable suspicion that Urrieta was a drug courier. As mentioned above, the government now concedes that noncitizens may legally drive on Tennessee roads with a foreign driver’s license and without a passport. And even if Urrieta’s Mexican driver’s license and his failure to produce his passport might have provided a reasonable suspicion to believe that an immigration violation had *576occurred, neither factor suggests that Ur-rieta was transporting drugs.
The dissent also asserts that Urrieta was lying about having a valid driver’s license and passport. But neither Deputy Young nor the government have produced any evidence that either document was invalid. Deputy Young in fact admitted at the suppression hearing that he looked at the expiration date of Urrieta’s license and did not remember anything that suggested a problem. And although Urrieta was unable to locate his passport in his fully packed car when Deputy Young demanded it on the side of the road, the record shows that Urrieta’s passport was later discovered in the car. Finally, Urrieta’s expired car registration is equally unrepresentative of additional illegal activity. A lapsed registration tag may be a valid reason for a stop, but it is not, without more, a valid reason to suspect that a drug crime is underway.
The government further asserts that a reasonable suspicion was established because Deputy Young, with his training and experience, identified factors suggesting that Urrieta fit the profile of a drug courier. Standard drug-courier profiles, however, are highly problematic because they often “describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation [as the profile] could justify a seizure.” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980); see also United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that the drug-courier profile by itself does not establish a reasonable articulable suspicion); United States v. Carrasquillo, 877 F.2d 73, 76 (D.C.Cir.1989) (same).
This is not to say that the factors from the drug-courier profile cited by Deputy Young are entitled to no weight. An officer’s reasonable suspicion may be based on characteristics that include factors from a profile, so long as the suspicion is accompanied by other evidence. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (relying on factors in a drug-courier profile and noting that the factors contained in a profile may have independent evidentiary weight and should be considered in the context of the totality of the circumstances). But courts should hesitate before “rely[ing] too much on the drug courier profile because it lists behavior which can be attributed to perfectly legal activities, as well as illicit ones.” United States v. Fifty-Three Thousand Eighty-Two Dollars in U.S. Currency, 985 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1227-29 (6th Cir.1983) (questioning the use of characteristics from the drug-courier profile to establish a reasonable suspicion).
The government relies on three factors that Deputy Young asserted were consistent with the drug-courier profile: (1) Ur-rieta was traveling from California (a source state for drugs) to Atlanta, (2) the passengers in the car appeared to be nervous, and (3) the value of the Navigator that Urrieta was driving was greater than the value of the Honda that he was towing. We address each factor in turn.
First, the government cites the fact that Urrieta was traveling from California, a drug-source state, to Atlanta. As this court has noted, however, travel between population centers is a relativity weak indicator of illegal activity because there is almost no city in the country that could not be “charaeterize[d] as either a major narcotics distribution center or a city through which drug couriers pass on their way to a major narcotics distribution center.” United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 567 (6th Cir.1979); see also United States *577v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that a trip between Chicago, Illinois and Columbus, Ohio does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the traveler is transporting drugs); Saperstein, 723 F.2d at 1228 (holding that travel to and from a source city is such innocent behavior that it is entitled to little weight in a Fourth Amendment analysis).
California is the most populous state in the country, being the home of more than 35 million people. Travel between California and the major population hub of Atlanta, therefore, does not add any significant weight to Deputy Young’s suspicion that Urrieta was engaged in transporting drugs. And although the dissent notes that Urrieta’s travel between California and Tennessee was of a “relatively quick duration,” we are unclear as to why traveling without interim stops for sightseeing or other diversions is an indication of drug activity. One would hardly expect a leisurely pace of travel when three people are moving across the country in two fully packed cars, one towing the other.
The government next suggests that the “nervousness” of Urrieta’s passengers contributed to Deputy Young’s suspicions of illegal activity. Although nervousness may be considered as part of the overall circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion, this court has found nervousness inherently unsuspicious, and has therefore given it very limited or no weight in the reasonable-suspicion calculation. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that nervousness is “an unreliable indicator [of illegal activity], especially in the context of a traffic stop,” because many citizens become nervous when stopped by police “even when they have nothing to fear or hide”); Andrews, 600 F.2d at 566 (refusing to consider nervousness in the reasonable-suspicion calculation because nervousness is entirely consistent with innocent behavior among travelers, and holding that, without additional evidence of wrongdoing, nervousness is entitled to no weight).
In the present case, there is a clear nondrug-related reason why Urrieta’s passengers were nervous. Deputy Young admits that he suspected Urrieta and his girlfriend were in the country illegally, that he asked numerous immigration-related questions, and that he demanded to see Urrieta’s passport. The immigration-related focus of Deputy Young’s questioning easily explains the nervous behavior of Ur-rieta’s girlfriend and her sixteen-year-old son. Deputy Young acknowledged as much when he testified that often when “dealing with Hispanics, a lot of time they are ... scared of the police.” Under these circumstances, the nervousness of Urrie-ta’s passengers is a virtually nonexistent indicator of drug activity.
The government also suggests that a working-class family driving a Navigator while towing a less expensive car is suspicious. It notes Deputy Young’s explanation that his training led him to believe that the 1998 Navigator might have been a “bargaining chip” for a drug-courier job. Before completion of the initial traffic stop at 2:07 p.m., however, the only information that Deputy Young had about the economic status of Urrieta and his passengers was his observation that Urrieta’s girlfriend was wearing a waitress uniform, that all of the passengers were likely of Hispanic origin, and that Urrieta was a Mexican citizen. This information falls far short of establishing a reasonable suspicion that Urrieta was a drug courier. Urrieta provided evidence that the 1998 Navigator was nearly eight years old and worth approximately $12,500 at the time of the traffic stop in August of 2006. There is no reason why two working-class Mexican citizens could not afford such a vehicle. *578Likewise, there is nothing inherently suspicious about driving a newer vehicle on a cross-country trip while towing an older car.
Finally, the government argues that although the above profile-related factors may not in and of themselves have supported Urrieta’s continued detention, they provided Deputy Young with a reasonable suspicion to detain Urrieta for further questioning when considered in the context of Urrieta’s dishonesty about his immigration status. At the heart of the government’s argument is the assertion that Ur-rieta might have been engaged in drug running because he lied to Deputy Young about his legal status in the country. Or, as the district court put it, Urrieta’s “general dishonesty” about his immigration status provided Deputy Young with a reasonable suspicion that “something else” illegal was going on in Urrieta’s car.
In 2006, however, as many as 12 million people in the United States lacked legal immigration status, 6.2 million of whom were from Mexico. See Pew Hispanic Center, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S., at 2 (March 7, 2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf. Although false or evasive statements to a law enforcement officer might indicate criminal activity, see United States v. $67,220.00 in U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 280, 286 (6th Cir.1992), the fact is that very few undocumented immigrants are likely to admit to law enforcement that they are in the country illegally. The government’s reasoning that dishonesty about one’s immigration status suggests drug running, therefore, opens the door to allowing millions of undocumented immigrants to be detained for further questioning on that basis. To hold that one’s illegal presence in this county is a sign of anything more than an immigration violation stretches the Fourth Amendment much too far.
Deputy Young’s testimony at the suppression hearing provides further confirmation that he was relying on an impermissible, ill-defined hunch that Urrieta, as a presumptively undocumented immigrant from Mexico, was likely to be transporting drugs. The Fourth Amendment prohibits detention based on an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ ” and instead requires law enforcement to provide “specific and articulable facts” showing that a crime has occurred. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Yet Deputy Young explained at the suppression hearing that he knew that Urrieta was “up to something” illegal in the same way as “when I walk in the house and I look at my little boy, I know whether he has done something wrong.” The district court dismissed the officer’s statement as irrelevant to the reasonable-suspicion calculation. To the contrary, however, we find Deputy Young’s statement to be quite revealing as the very definition of a “hunch,” which strongly suggests that he lacked a reasonable suspicion that Urrieta was a drug courier. See id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The Fourth Amendment simply does not allow a detention based on an officer’s “gut feeling” that a suspect is up to no good. See id. at 21, 27, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
The government also implies that detaining Urrieta after 2:07 p.m. was justified because the extended detention was reasonably brief. We respectfully disagree. Under the Fourth Amendment, even the briefest of detentions is too long if the police lack a reasonable suspicion of specific criminal activity. See United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 541, 545 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that to detain a motorist any longer than is reasonably necessary to issue a traffic citation, an *579officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual has engaged in more extensive criminal conduct). In other words, law enforcement does not get a free pass to extend a lawful detention into an unlawful one simply because the unlawful extension was brief.
Chief Justice Earl Warren once wrote that the “demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, n. 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The factors relied on in the present case are simply too vague and nonspecific to support a reasonable suspicion of drug running. For that reason, we cannot uphold the district court’s highly nonspecific finding that the extended detention was justified because “something else” illegal might have been going on in Urrieta’s car. Although we do not relish the consequence of allowing a person possessing prohibited items to go free, we find even more unpalatable the thought of putting our stamp of approval on the practice of unlawfully extending the detention of traffic violators based on nothing more than an inchoate hunch.
III. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the extended detention violated Urrieta’s Fourth Amendment rights, we have no need to address the district court’s finding that Urrieta’s later consent to the search was voluntary. The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and all evidence acquired after 2:07 p.m. must be suppressed as the “fruit[] of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999). This case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.