dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because, like the trial court, I am convinced that the Colorado “long-arm” statute does not authorize, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment positively prohibits, this state’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants in this case.
I first note that, although plaintiff had the burden of demonstrating that the service of process upon defendants was sufficient under Colorado’s long-arm statute, D & D Fuller CATV Construction, Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo.1989), he presented not an iota of evidence upon the issue. He rested, instead, solely upon the allegations of his complaint. While the allegations of the complaint may be looked to for this purpose, those allegations do not disclose many facts that might well be deemed important.
Thus, there is no information in this record disclosing where the national magazines in which defendants advertised are published, nor is there any description of the method used by the publishers to distribute these materials in Colorado, nor any evidence as to defendants’ knowledge of the publishers’ distribution markets or practices.
Further, while plaintiff’s complaint stated that he “traveled to Omaha, Nebraska to meet with” defendants, his complaint contains no express allegation that this *565travel was in reliance upon any representation made by defendants. Indeed, while he seeks to recover “damages relating to the original purchase price of the vehicle, repairs to the vehicle, loss of benefit of the bargain and other consequential damages,” his complaint contains no specific request to be reimbursed for any travel expenses.
Hence, we must assess plaintiffs claim . of jurisdiction in light of his evidentiary showing.
I.
Plaintiff’s complaint contains four claims for relief, plus an annexed request for exemplary damages. Three of these claims (fraud, concealment, and deceptive trade practices) allege intentional torts; one (negligent misrepresentation) is based upon simple negligence.
Thus, in the instance of each claim, plaintiff must rely upon § 13-l-124(l)(b), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A), which allows service upon a non-resident if the claim arises from the commission of a “tortious act” within this state; no other provision would authorize such service.
Under this statute, the term “tortious act” means the “total act” of a completed tort, including “the cause and effect through the continuum of time.” Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967). There exists no tortious act, therefore, until a defendant’s wrongful action has caused injury, thereby completing the tort. Thus, it is the situs where injury occurs that is the location of the “tortious act.” Vandermee v. District Court, supra.
Here, none of the torts alleged could have occurred until plaintiff relied upon defendants’ statements to his detriment and suffered injury thereby. Further, both the majority and I appear to agree that the location where plaintiff suffered the primary injury for which he seeks to collect damages was in Nebraska, where he paid for the vehicle, acquired title thereto, and accepted delivery.
The majority insist, however, that plaintiff also suffered “injury” for purposes of the long-arm statute, i.e., that defendants’ tort was complete, the moment he left his home in Colorado to travel to Nebraska. The injury occurring in Colorado presumably consisted of the cost to plaintiff of traveling from his home to the Colorado state line. And, it is with this conclusion that I disagree.
I concede that the federal district judge in Rose v. Franchetti, 713 F.Supp. 1203 (N.D.Ill.1989) gave birth to such a concept. That opinion, however, is unpersuasive to me.
Plaintiff’s specific allegations are that he “took action [in reliance upon defendants’ statements] by paying the defendants nine thousand dollars ($9,000) for the purchase of the vehicle.” I would take plaintiff at his word. And, since the act of reliance that plaintiff has alleged in his complaint took place in Nebraska, I would conclude that no tortious act occurred in Colorado.
II.
Even if I were to assume that the Colorado statute can be read broadly enough to apply here, nevertheless, I am convinced that the assertion of jurisdiction would offend against the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In order to determine whether a defendant has had sufficient “minimum contacts” with Colorado under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), so as to enable the courts of this state to assert in personam jurisdiction over him, it is necessary to apply a three-part test. Such jurisdiction may be asserted only if (1) the defendant has “purposely availed” himself of acting within this state or of causing important consequences here, (2) the claim asserted against him arises from his activities or consequences occurring in this state, and (3) those activities or consequences are sufficiently substantial so as to make it reasonable to exercise judicial power over him. Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, 189 Colo. 145, 538 P.2d 425 (1975). See also Mr. Steak, Inc. v. District Court, 194 Colo. 519, 574 P.2d 95 (1978); Trans-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. A Little Bit *566of Sweden, Inc., 658 P.2d 271 (Colo.App.1982).
Under this test, it is clear that the sale in another state of a commodity which is then brought to this state does not, by reason of that fact alone, give jurisdiction over defendant with respect to a claim relating to that commodity. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972). See also Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo.1982) (repair of vehicle in another state).
In employing that three-part test here, the record shows that there are only two acts that can be relied upon to demonstrate that defendants “purposely availed” themselves of the benefits or protections of Colorado law. See Trans-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. A Bit of Sweden, Inc., supra. They advertised in magazines which are claimed to be circulated nationally. Later, they engaged in a series of interstate telephone conversations that were initiated by plaintiff. Except for these two actions, the record is clear that defendants conducted all of their business with plaintiff within the boundaries of Nebraska, where plaintiff first inspected the vehicle, paid the purchase price therefor in cash, received title to the vehicle, and took delivery thereof.
On strikingly similar facts, our supreme court has held that the requirements of due process prohibit the judiciary’s assertion of in personam jurisdiction. In Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (Colo.1968), relied upon by the trial court, the Illinois defendant advertised in three nationally circulated magazines and, in addition, had several telephone conversations which were initiated by the Colorado plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff contracted with defendant for an African safari. 'Claiming that defendant breached that contract, plaintiff instituted suit in this state.
The supreme court issued its writ prohibiting the trial court from asserting jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. It noted that “interstate telephone conversations ... [do not] constitute acts by which the [defendant] purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within Colorado_” Further, with respect to national advertising, the court said this:
“Advertising in national magazines distributed within the forum state does not alone constitute a transaction of business within that state. See Bolger v. Dial-A-Style Leasing Corporation, [159 Colo. 44, 409 P.2d 517 (1966)]. If the rule were to the contrary, advertisers in any nationally distributed magazine would be subject to the jurisdiction of each of the states in which the magazines are distributed. Insull v. N.Y. World-Telegram Corp, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir.1959). Such a contact is simply too tenuous upon which to found a claim of jurisdiction. See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.1956).
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Under all of the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case, it would be a mere fiction to hold that petitioner had minimal contacts in Colorado sufficient to meet the due process test so as to enable a Colorado court to exercise ‘long-arm’ jurisdiction over him.” (emphasis supplied).
See also Pickens v. Hess, 573 F.2d 380 (6th Cir.1978); Carothers v. Vogeler, 148 Vt. 316, 532 A.2d 580 (1987); Kleinfeld v. Link, 9 Ohio App.3d 29, 457 N.E.2d 1187 (1983).
Because I consider myself bound by the supreme court’s conclusion in Safari Outfitters v. Superior Court, supra, I would follow its dictates, even if the conclusions in the federal decisions relied upon by the majority were inconsistent with Safari Outfitters. However, those cases are not inconsistent with our supreme court’s conclusion; in both such federal cases, defendant’s contacts with the forum state went beyond mere advertisements in national magazines.
In Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460 F.2d 661 (1st Cir.1972), the false represen*567tations were contained in correspondence sent by defendant personally to plaintiff in the forum state and in a check sent to plaintiff there, pursuant to a contract calling for payments to be made in that state.
In Ammon v. Kaplow, 468 F.Supp. 1304 (D.Kans.1979), defendant not only advertised in a national magazine, but after the sale of the advertised horse, arranged for the issuance of a certificate attesting to the horse’s soundness so as to comply with the substantive law of the forum state.
Finally, I do not view anything contained within the supreme court’s opinion in D & D Fuller CATV Construction, Inc. v. Pace, supra, to be inconsistent with Safari Outfitters or supportive of the Colorado courts’ jurisdiction in this case. The defendants in D & D Fuller were the grandparents of a child whose custody had been awarded by the Colorado courts to the plaintiff mother, a Colorado resident, and the grandparents’ wholly-owned corporation. Plaintiff’s allegations were that defendants conspired with the child’s father to kidnap the child, to have the child removed from Colorado, and to prevent the plaintiff from contacting the child, all in violation of the order of the Colorado court.
Noting that these actions constituted the commission of a crime in Colorado, the supreme court concluded that each case must be analyzed on an ad hoc basis to determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction would meet due process requirements:
“Frequently, the commission of a tort, in itself, creates a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the state so as to satisfy the due process inquiry. In such cases there is no need to further engage in a minimum contacts analysis, because the defendant is so connected with the forum state that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not offended by the state’s exercise of jurisdiction. ... In addition, a defendant can reasonably foresee being haled into court to answer for his tortious conduct. In other cases, even if an injury is sustained in the forum state, the defendant’s tortious acts may be so remote as to require a closer nexus between the defendant and the state.” (emphasis supplied)
In sum, it is my view that, even if it could be said that plaintiff sustained an injury in this state as a result of the defendants’ tortious actions, those acts had such a remote connection with Colorado as not to provide a proper foundation for the assertion of jurisdiction over them. Hence, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.