specially concurring.
I agree with the result in this case. I write solely because the issue in this case is plainly not related to the issues raised in Desmond v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 522, 779 P.2d 1261 (1989). The defendant here was prosecuted under A.R.S. § 28-692(A), which provides that a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state when that person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor is guilty of a crime. The two cases in Desmond dealt with the admissibility of evidence under § 28-692(B). All that is at issue here is whether an expert may testify that in his opinion the defendant during or before his act of driving had ingested a certain number of alcoholic drinks. If such evidence tends to make the question of whether the defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol more probable than not, it is relevant. See Rule 401, Arizona Rules of Evidence. Such evidence, in a prosecution of this type, does not violate Rule 403. If this is the case and the person qualifies as one who can give such an opinion, then the issue is not one which was dealt with in Desmond, but is simply a question of how credible a juror feels that expert testimony is and how the juror wishes to use that opinion. See Rules 702, 703 and 705, Arizona Rules of Evidence. Whether to believe an expert who might opine concerning the number of drinks a defendant charged with a violation of § 28-692(A) might have had at the time of his driving goes to credibility, not admissibility. See State v. Pearson, 98 Ariz. 133, 135, 402 P.2d 557, 559 (1965).