dissenting, joined by RABINO WITZ, Chief Justice.
It is useful to ask what would have happened if there had been a follow-up written notification of the emergency transfer following the radio communication. The answer is that it would be incontestable that Grunert had thereby fished as the holder of a gear license issued under AS 16.05.670, and thus would be entitled to apply for a limited entry permit. The legislature, in defining those eligible to apply for entry permits included “applicants who have harvested fishery resources commercially while participating in the fishery as holders of gear licenses issued under,” among other sections, 16.05.670. Under section .670, an emergency transferee becomes a gear license holder by complying with the notification provisions of that section. No active issuance or other affirmative act by the Department is necessary.
Under former AS 16.05.670(e), only a gear licensee or a license transferee could operate licensed fishing gear. This was true even if the period of operation was only one or two days. Under subsection (c) of section .670, radio notification of a license transfer was permitted, but in all cases such notification had to be followed up by written notification within ten days of the radio notification. In the present case, Grunert alleges that he was told by Department employees that radio notification would be sufficient and that written follow-up was not required. If this can be proven there is, in my view, a case for application of the doctrine of estoppel.
The general elements of estoppel are assertion of a position, reasonable reliance, and resulting prejudice. Municipality of Anchorage v. Schneider, 685 P.2d 94, 97 (Alaska 1984). In this case there is a question of fact as to the first element, assertion of a position. The question is whether or not the state expressed the view that no follow-up paperwork was necessary. If this was stated it was wrong, for written *124follow-up is mandatory. Assuming such a position was expressed, it would be difficult to say that Grunert was not reasonable in relying on it. The resulting prejudice caused by Grunert’s reasonable reliance is that he is now ineligible to apply for a limited entry permit. This prejudice is different from that which would most likely flow from reliance. Ordinarily, if the state reversed its position, the prejudice would be an ensuing criminal prosecution. However, there is no requirement in the doctrine of equitable estoppel that the type of prejudice which results from reasonable reliance be foreseeable. I cannot think of any reason why such a requirement should be imposed.
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Schneider, we noted that the doctrine of estoppel should not be applied against a public agency where the general requirements for application of the doctrine are fulfilled if doing so would result in significant prejudice to the public interest. Id. The question of prejudice to the public interest can be answered by asking what the consequences of allowing Grunert to apply would be. The answer is that, at worst, one more permit would be issued for the Chignik purse seine fishery. I do not think that this can be regarded as prejudice to the public interest, or in this context, to the other permit holders in that fishery, of sufficient significance to deprive Grunert of the remedy that the doctrine of estoppel would otherwise give him.
For the above reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand this case with instructions for a further remand to the Commission to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the factual question concerning what Grunert was told by state agents with respect to the need for follow-up written notification.