Robert Ortiz was convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, and burglary, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under OCGA § 17-10-7 (b), and to a consecutive sentence of 20 years imprisonment. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because the issue of the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) was properly raised and ruled on by the trial court.
1. Ortiz contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest on an unrelated peeping tom charge. Until he was suspected of rape, the peeping tom case remained closed because the victim did not want to press charges. Ortiz argues that the peeping tom arrest was merely a pretext for gathering evidence to establish probable cause to arrest him for the rape.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the detective who obtained the arrest warrant denied that the peeping tom case would not have been reopened had it not been for the rape incident. However, he further testified that, but for the rape, he would not have known anything about the peeping tom incident. The trial court found that the State had probable cause to arrest Ortiz on the peeping tom charge. However, the court concluded that the detective probably would not have arrested Ortiz on that charge except for his suspicion that Ortiz might be involved in the rape case. After initially withholding a ruling on the issue, the trial court concluded that the arrest of Ortiz was valid.
*753The present case is indistinguishable in principle from Hunter v. State, 190 Ga. App. 24 (2) (378 SE2d 352) (1989), and Taylor v. State, 181 Ga. App. 703 (353 SE2d 619) (1987). The arrest here was not rendered pretextual merely because the alleged victim declined to sign an affidavit seeking issuance of a warrant. Patterson v. State, 210 Ga. App. 735 (1) (437 SE2d 602) (1993). Under the particular facts of this case, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence discovered as a consequence of the arrest for peeping tom.
2. Ortiz contends that OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state constitutions, as well as a violation of his due process and equal protection rights.
OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2) provides that any person who is convicted of a “serious violent felony” and subsequently commits and is convicted of a second “serious violent felony” shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole or any other sentence-reducing measures. Serious violent felonies are defined as murder, felony murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated sexual battery. OCGA §§ 17-10-6.1 (a); 17-10-7 (b) (1).
(a) This Court has followed Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957 (111 SC 2680, 115 LE2d 836) (1991), holding that the choice of sentence by the legislature “is insulated from judicial review unless it is wholly irrational or so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. [Cits.]” Isom v. State, 261 Ga. 596, 597 (1) (408 SE2d 701) (1991).
[T]he point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 285 (III) (100 SC 1133, 63 LE2d 382) (1980); Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 300 (2) (368 SE2d 737) (1988). In Rummel, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a recidivist statute providing a life sentence for a third felony conviction did not violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
Furthermore, a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual does not become so simply because it is “mandatory.” Harmelin v. Michigan, supra at 995 (IV). Unlike the decision to impose the death penalty, a determination that a defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole does not require a consideration of mitigating factors. Harmelin, supra at 995-996 (IV). See *754also Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 772 (1) (257 SE2d 182) (1979).
We conclude, therefore, that OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the federal constitution. The reasons for so holding apply with equal force to the attack based on the state constitution. Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 468 (5) (405 SE2d 483) (1991). The trial court was correct in rejecting Ortiz’s constitutional arguments.
(b) This Court has held that the goal of deterring repeat drug sales by the same person is a rational basis for mandatory life imprisonment for a second sale of a controlled substance or possession thereof with intent to distribute. Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 356, 359 (4) (456 SE2d 560) (1995); Tillman v. State, 260 Ga. 801 (400 SE2d 632) (1991). Similarly, seeking to deter repeat “serious violent felonies” by the same person is a rational basis for mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Furthermore, contrary to Ortiz’s argument, “[d]ue process does not require individualized sentencing. [Cits.]” Isom v. State, supra at 597 (1). Therefore, the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment required by OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) does not unconstitutionally deprive defendants of due process. See Tillman, supra at 802.
(c) Ortiz “does not assert that the mandatory sentence statute was selectively enforced against him for some discriminatory or improper reason.” Isom v. State, supra at 597 (1). Contrary to Ortiz’s argument, those prosecuted under the death penalty statutes are not similarly situated, as there is a qualitative difference between death and all other penalties. Harmelin, supra at 995 (IV). Therefore, we find no violation of the right to equal protection.
Accordingly, we find no merit in Ortiz’s constitutional challenge to OCGA § 17-10-7 (b). See Knight v. State, supra (wherein this Court rejected a constitutional challenge, on the same grounds as in the instant case, to a mandatory maximum sentence for second felonies).
Judgments affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Sears, J., who dissents.