dissenting.
While I agree with much of what the majority holds, I respectfully dissent because I do not believe our Supreme Court’s decision in Aetna Cas. &c. Co. v. Davis, 253 Ga. 376 (320 SE2d 368) (1984), allows such a result. In Davis the Court held that “ ‘[t]he intentional delay of workers’ compensation payments does not give rise to an independent cause of action against the employer or its insurer where *729penalties for such delay are provided by the act. That is to say, where the Workers’ Compensation Act provides penalties for delay, such penalties exclude the employee’s use of common law remedies.’ In so holding, we considered and declined to adopt decisions of some other jurisdictions finding that intentional delay of compensation payments gives rise to an independent cause of action. See 2A Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 68.34 (c); ‘Tort Liability of Worker’s Compensation Insurer for Wrongful Delay or Refusal to Make Payments Due,’ 8 ALR 4th 902 (1981).” Davis, supra at 377. After finding that OCGA § 34-9-108 provides for the assessment of attorney fees against a party who unreasonably controverts medical payments, the Court found that “the employee’s use of common law remedies [was] excluded.” Id. at 378. I believe this broad language in Davis expressly bars the cause of action asserted here.
Likewise, I question the soundness of our decision in Jim Walter Homes v. Roberts, 196 Ga. App. 618 (396 SE2d 787) (1990). Neither of the cases relied on in Roberts involved the type of claim that was at issue in that case. See Murphy v. ARA Svcs., 164 Ga. App. 859 (298 SE2d 528) (1982) and Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888 (303 SE2d 71) (1983). While Roberts involved a claim for physical injuries resulting from an intentional delay of compensation payments, both Murphy and Cox involved claims for sexual harassment. Such a claim, as articulated in those cases, clearly falls outside the Act’s definition of “injury.” Moreover, Davis, which was decided at that time, expressly prohibited the cause of action asserted in Roberts.
While the claim in Roberts and in the case at hand arguably fails to meet the Act’s definition of “injury,” I am constrained in my dissent by the broad language in Davis, which bars such claims because penalties for the unreasonable refusal of medical benefits are provided by the Act. Furthermore, although Roberts and subsequent decisions have distinguished between claims for intentional financial injury and those for intentional physical injury, I can discern no reason why such claims should be treated differently where both result from a delay in paying benefits. Because both types of claims are predicated on an intentional and unreasonable delay in paying benefits, in each case the Act provides a penalty. See OCGA §§ 34-9-108 (b) and 34-9-221 (e). Although the majority cites Dutton v. Ga. Assoc. &c. Fund, 215 Ga. App. 607 (451 SE2d 504) (1994), as an example in which this Court has recognized the distinction, in Dutton we concluded that the cause of action asserted there was precluded by our Supreme Court’s decision in Bright v. Nimmo, 253 Ga. 378 (320 SE2d 365) (1984). Dutton, supra at 608.
Finally, while I sympathize with the plaintiff in this case and concede that an award of attorney fees is likely not sufficient to redress injuries such as are involved here, “ ‘[i]t is not our function to *730enlarge these statutory sanctions; rather, any enlargement of sanctions already available is for the General Assembly.’ [Cit.]” Bright, supra at 381.
Decided March 15, 1996. Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Arthur H. Glaser, Douglas T. Lay, for appellant. Jeffrey W. Frazier, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews and Judge Blackburn join in this dissent.