dissenting:
For purposes of this case, I will assume that nonconsensual, random, suspicionless urinalysis-drug-testing of student athletes is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, in spite of the Supreme Court’s approval of suspicionless drug testing in other contexts. See Skinner v. Railway La*951bor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). I write separately because the majority has misconstrued the basis for the trial court’s ruling concerning the question of voluntariness in such a way that, if accepted, would be undeserving of this court’s deference. Maj. op. at 946-949. Additionally, I believe that when properly construed, the trial court’s ruling should be reversed on the basis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine — application of which is plainly necessitated by the nature of the class which originally brought this suit. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
The trial court, in rendering its ruling, stated that
[t]he evidence produced during this trial failed to establish that the consents given by the University’s student-athletes are voluntary. It is quite clear that they are “coerced” for constitutional purposes by the fact that there can be no participation in athletics without a signed consent. As in the cases cited, the “consent” obtained by the University is not voluntary....
The majority finds that this ruling is based on “alternative grounds,” and concludes that the trial court’s factual finding concerning the question of voluntariness is itself sufficient to sustain the trial court’s ruling. Maj. op. at 948-950. Accordingly, the majority declines to opine “whether, in theory, it is ever possible for university students voluntarily to consent under the Fourth Amendment, or under Article II, section 7, to a drug-testing program if consent to that program is a condition of their ability to participate in intercollegiate athletics.” Id. at 950 n. 36.
The question of the voluntariness of consent for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is a question of fact which is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo.1984). Thus, in reviewing the trial court’s finding that “[t]he evidence produced during this trial failed to establish that the consents given by the University’s student-athletes are voluntary,” we defer to the trial court unless its finding is clearly erroneous or not supported by the record. See maj. op. at 946 (and authority cited therein).
The trial court was not, for obvious reasons, presented with any evidence by prospective student athletes concerning the voluntariness of consent to random drug testing which has not yet been given.1 No student athletes who are considering attending the University of Colorado (“CU”) and also considering “consenting” to CU’s drug-testing program testified; no individual who may become a student athlete testified regarding the voluntariness of consent which may be given if that individual becomes an athlete of intercollegiate caliber and then attends CU and is then informed about CU’s drug-testing program. In short, the only evidence presented to the trial court concerning the voluntariness of consent pertained, as logic requires, to “consents given” by actual CU student athletes. No evidence was, nor could it con*952ceivably be, presented regarding whether consent to drug testing — which has not yet been given — was given voluntarily as a matter of fact.
Moreover, the fact that “the procedures for obtaining consents are standard components of the drug-testing program and are uniform,” maj. op. at 949, in no way alters the conclusion that no evidence was presented regarding the voluntariness of consents which have yet to be given, because governmental conduct is not the sole fact to be considered in applying the totality of the circumstances test set forth in Busta-mante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041.
To the contrary, the totality of the circumstances test, as applied in this case, clearly requires that the level of coercion which is brought to bear on individual student athletes must be taken into account. The impossibility of determining, as a factual matter, the question of voluntariness with respect to this entire class is due, in part, to the fact that the relative degree of coercion will vary among individuals depending on their circumstances. For example, while the pressure imposed on a scholarship-dependent student may be obvious, the same cannot be said of the student who is not dependent on financial assistance in order to attend college but who is nevertheless required to consent to CU’s drug-testing program. Similarly, the pressure that may be brought to bear on a heavily recruited individual who essentially has the “pick of the crop” in terms of which college institution to attend, would clearly be less than an aid-dependent student whose only opportunity to attend college on an athletic scholarship may be to accept the conditions which CU attaches to such attendance. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s conclusory statement that if participation in athletics and receipt of an athletic scholarship are conditioned on a student’s consent to drug testing, then “[t]he pressure on a prospective student athlete to sign a consent to random, suspicionless drug testing ... is obvious.” Maj. op. at 52.
Thus, if the trial court regarded the factual question of voluntariness as a sufficient basis for ruling that consent to CU’s drug-testing program is per se invalid — i.e., involuntary as to present and prospective student athletes — that ruling is not supported by the evidence. Furthermore, because such a ruling would require an inference based upon “facts” which, by necessity, simply do not and could not exist, that finding is clearly erroneous. See Peterson v. Ground Water Comm’n, 195 Colo. 508, 516, 579 P.2d 629, 634-35 (1978) (inferences to be drawn from evidence will not be disturbed unless so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record). Thus, if the trial court did conclude, as a factual matter, that no members of the plaintiff class have/can voluntarily consent to CU’s drug-testing program, that finding is one that is not entitled to deference by this court.2
II
In my judgment, the trial court not only *953could not, but did not,3 rely on the factual question of voluntariness as its basis to conclude that the consent given by any member of the plaintiff class is involuntary. Rather, the trial court must have relied on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as support for its conclusion because only that legal finding logically could be. applicable to both present and future student athletes.4 Consequently, resolution of this case clearly requires us to decide the question which we granted cer-tiorari to review: Whether student athletes can give valid consent to the University’s drug-testing program if their consent is a condition of participation in intercollegiate athletics at the University?
A
While the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been criticized as “riven with inconsistencies,” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv.L.Rev. 1415, 1416 (1989), and commentators invariably point to the apparent tensions, ambiguities, and absence of a clear theoretical underpinning to the doctrine, see, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 Cornell L.Rev. 1185 (1990) and Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1293 (1984), there seems to be substantial agreement with respect to the general contours of the doctrine.
In its canonical form, this doctrine holds that even if a state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly “coerce,” “pressure,” or “induce” the waiver of constitutional rights. Thus, in the context of individual rights, the doctrine provides that on at least some occasions receipt of a benefit to which someone has no constitutional entitlement does not justify making that person abandon some right guaranteed under the Constitution.
Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, The Supreme *954Court 1987 Term, 102 Harv.L.Rev. 5, 6-7 (1988). The question, of course, is whether this case presents one of those occasions in which the receipt of a governmental benefit may not be conditioned on an individual’s agreement to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution. I would hold that it does not.
I am aware of no authority which directly confronts and analyzes the question of how a court should determine the constitutionality of conditioning a government benefit on the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. Though this question is not strictly one of first impression, in my opinion, the courts which have considered this issue have done so in such a way as to render their “analysis” all but useless as persuasive precedential authority.
For example, some courts simply have asserted that “a search otherwise unreasonable does not become constitutionally palatable because it is attached as a condition of employment.” Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1548 (6th Cir.1988). Tautologically concluding that consent to an “otherwise unreasonable search,” i.e., one that is conducted in the absence of consent, always amounts to an unconstitutional condition is, of course, simply a way of avoiding the unconstitutional conditions question — the term “otherwise unreasonable” as used here amounts to nothing more than saying “aside from the unconstitutional conditions question, an unreasonable search is an unreasonable search.”
Other courts have apparently assumed that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine stands as a per se rule proscribing the conditioning of governmental benefits on the waiver of constitutional rights. See American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F.Supp. 726, 736 (S.D.Ga.1986) (“Advance consent to future unreasonable searches is not a reasonable condition of employment.”). In fact, this appears to be the presumption that the trial court adopted in rendering its judgment on the unconstitutional conditions issue: “It is quite clear that they [i.e., consents] are ‘coerced’ for constitutional purposes by the fact that there can be no participation in athletics without a signed consent.”
In spite of some language to the contrary, see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (“It [the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests.... ”); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2001, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (“The government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right”), the Court has not established the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a per se prohibition on the government’s ability to condition the receipt of a benefit on the waiver of constitutional rights. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628, 66 S.Ct. 1277, 1279, 90 L.Ed. 1477 (1946) (holding that Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights may be waived as a condition of receiving a government contract: “when petitioner, in order to obtain the Government’s business, specifically agreed to permit inspection of his accounts and record, he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy which he otherwise might have had....”); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 177, 99 S.Ct. 471, 475, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (“incidental effect” of denial of social security benefits on right to travel does not render it unconstitutional); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (upholding discharge of employee for expressing labor grievance); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980) affd per curiam (upholding sanctions against CIA agent for breaching an agreement to submit all writings about his service for prepublication review); United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (upholding the Hatch Act’s ban on political campaigning by federal employees); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947) (same). See also Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum.L.Rev. 321, 322 (1935) (“Despite the broad language in which the doctrine of unconstitu*955tional conditions has been laid down, it is not the law that the exertion of a power is always unconstitutional when its purpose is to induce the foregoing of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has sustained many such exertions of power even after announcing the broad doctrine that would invalidate them.”).
In contrast to the approaches exemplified by Lovvorn, 846 F.2d 1589 (6th Cir.1988), and Weinberger, 651 F.Supp. 726, the Supreme Court has consistently applied a balancing test to determine what conditions on the receipt of a governmental benefit are permissible and what conditions are not. Guided by these decisions, as well as the underlying purposes of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, I would hold that the unconstitutional conditions analysis in the context of a Fourth Amendment waiver should balance the asserted governmental interest in conditioning the benefit against the individual’s interest in not being requested to waive Fourth Amendment rights in order to receive that benefit. .
B
In upholding the conditioning of governmental benefits, the Court has regularly considered the asserted governmental interest in imposing those conditions. The governmental interest is then balanced against the interest of the recipient in order to assess whether the imposition of the condition is constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 971-73, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2847-49, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (state’s interest in preventing officeholders from vacating office prior to the end of term is sufficient to outweigh interference with first amendment rights) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (upholding discharge of an employee after balancing employee’s first amendment interests against the state’s interest in promoting efficiency). See also Sally Lynn Meloch, Note, An Analysis of Public College Athlete Drug Testing Programs Through the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 60 S.Cal.L.Rev. 815, 832 (1987) (“the unconstitutional condition doctrine reflects a balancing of the penalty against the justification”). There is no reason to assume that such a consideration is inapplicable in the context of a Fourth Amendment waiver. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-24, 91 S.Ct. 381, 386-89, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (considering, in dicta, the governmental interest in requiring consent to home visitations in order to receive, or continue receiving, Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits). Thus, one factor which must be considered in reviewing the trial court’s unconstitutional conditions ruling is the asserted governmental interests in imposing the condition.
The next question is what factors are to be weighed against the governmental interest. The Supreme Court has stressed, particularly in the area of individual rights, that the problematic aspect of unconstitutional conditions is the coercive element they impose on the rights holder. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1338, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (“the denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1050, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987) (invalidating denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh-Day Adventists who declined to work on Saturday concluding that the state had brought “unlawful coercion to bear on the employee’s choice” between worship and work). Cf. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 21, 35 S.Ct. 240, 246, 59 L.Ed. 441 (1915) (“To ask a man to agree, in advance, to refrain from affiliation with the union while retaining a certain position of employment is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional freedom. He is free to decline the employment on those terms.”); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492, 72 S.Ct. 380, 384, 96 L.Ed. 517 (1952) (public school teachers barred from subversive activities retain the choice of working subject to restrictions or of maintaining “their beliefs and associations and go[ing] elsewhere”). See also Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Pow*956er, and the Limits of Consent, The Supreme Court Term 1987, 102 Harv.L.Rev. 5, 7 (1988) (unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that the government “cannot grant [a] privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce/ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the waiver of constitutional rights.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv.L.Rev. 1415, 1428-42 (1989) (and authority cited therein, but concluding that “coercion” itself is an insufficient rationale to support the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). Thus, a court must determine whether, and the extent to which, the condition operates so as to coerce the beneficiary into waiving his rights.
In determining what conditions are impermissible, the Court has regularly considered the importance of the governmental benefit which is subject to the condition. For example, in rejecting Indiana’s defense of a welfare regulation which granted unemployment benefits only to those whose termination was for “good cause [arising] in connection with work,” against a free exercise challenge, the Court in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), concluded that “[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief.... the infringement upon free exercise is ... substantial.” Id. at 717-18, 101 S.Ct. at 1431-32.
Similarly, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), the Court invalidated an Arizona statute which imposed a dura-tional residency requirement as a condition to an indigent’s eligibility for nonemergen-cy hospitalization or medical care. After characterizing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), as a case which forbade the “denial of the basic ‘necessities of life’ ” on the exercise of constitutional rights, Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 259, 94 S.Ct. at 1082, the Court explained that “governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance than less essential forms of governmental entitlements.” Id. Because the Arizona statute granted the receipt of a benefit “necessary to basic sustenance,” in such a way as to penalize the right to interstate travel, the law was invalidated.
Though the rationale has not been expressly stated, in my opinion, the significance of the benefit must be taken into account for the simple reason that the greater the benefit, the greater the beneficiary’s relative lack of freedom to refuse it; and, accordingly, accept the conditions attached to its receipt. In short, the greater the benefit the greater the coercion that is brought to bear by conditioning that benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right.
Thus, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in the context of a Fourth Amendment waiver, requires a balancing of the significance of the benefit of participating in intercollegiate athletics against the asserted governmental interest in imposing the condition that one waive his Fourth Amendment rights. Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, I conclude that the required waiver does not impose an unconstitutional condition on student athletes who attend CU and participate in CU’s athletic program.
C
While CU’s drug-testing program conditions the receipt of a governmental benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right, the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics is undoubtedly a benefit of far less import when compared to other governmental benefits, the conditioning of which have been sanctioned by the Court. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425 (unemployment benefits); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980) (employment with CIA); United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (government employment); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S.Ct. 1277, 90 L.Ed. 1477 (1946) (government contracts). See also Wyman v. James, 400 *957U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (concluding, hypothetically, that receipt of welfare benefits could be conditioned on waiver of Fourth Amendment rights). Moreover, because participation in intercollegiate athletics is not necessary to basic sustenance, it is deserving of no greater constitutional protection than less essential forms of governmental benefits. See Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 259, 94 S.Ct. at 1082.
Consequently, I would hold that given the governmental benefit at issue here, imposing the condition that the recipient waive his Fourth Amendment rights is relatively insignificant. While this determination obviously cannot be quantified, it is clear that under Supreme Court precedent far less coercion is involved here than in cases where much greater benefits, indeed, “the basic necessities of life,” were constitutionally conditioned on the waiver of constitutional rights. See Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-26, 91 S.Ct. at 386-90 (stating, in dicta, that conditioning welfare benefits on the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights is constitutionally permissible).
I suppose that the benefit of participating in intercollegiate athletics, with all its accoutrements, is indeed of some value to student athletes.5 However, its value to potential recipients does not outweigh the governmental interest in imposing the condition on its enjoyment.
CU has asserted several interests which it seeks to further by imposition of its drug-testing program. These include CU’s desire to prepare its athletes for drug testing in NCAA championship events, promoting the integrity of its athletic program, preventing drug use by other students who look to athletes as role models,6 ensuring fair competition, and protecting the health and safety of intercollegiate athletes. In my opinion, most of these interests are valid and significant.
Thus, I am of the opinion that requiring student athletes to consent to CU’s drug-testing program as a condition of participation in CU’s athletic program does not impose an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of that governmental benefit.
Accordingly, I would hold that the CU drug-testing programs at issue here are constitutionally valid. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON joins in this dissent.
. The plaintiff class consists of both present and prospective student athletes. Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 23, the plaintiff class was certified as follows:
Those present and prospective undergraduate student athletes who are or will be subject to the University of Colorado intercollegiate athletic department’s drug education program as a condition of participation in the University of Colorado intercollegiate athletic program limited as follows: Those present undergraduate student athletes who have never tested positive or have been subject to discipline or sanction as a result of a positive test result; and those present student athletes, who, although having executed waivers, consents or agreements to participate in the University of Colorado’s drug education program, object to the program as being an unconstitutional condition of participation; and lastly, those prospective undergraduate student athletes who will execute waivers, consents or agreements to participate in the University of Colorado’s drug education program, but who object to the program as being an unconstitutional condition of participation.
. Moreover, considering the factual question of whether consent given by student athletes can be voluntary under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), when no deference is paid to the trial court’s finding leaves this court in the position of attempting to resolve a factual question on the basis of a record that is, by necessity, inadequate to do so. The reasons this is so, of course, are the same reasons why the trial court’s ruling, as characterized by the majority, is erroneous and lacks any evidentiary support: No evidence is contained in the record which provides, or could provide, the factual basis for the finding that consent is not voluntary for persons who are not yet student athletes at CU and have not been informed of, nor "consented” to, CU’s drug-testing program.
While I agree with the majority that CU bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a consensual search, maj. op. at 946, the majority's presumption that the factual question of voluntariness is one which could be made as to this entire class creates a burden on CU which logically cannot be met under any circumstances conceivable to me. This fact adds additional support to my conclusion that the trial court did not, and could not properly, rest its decision respecting voluntariness on “alternate grounds” but had to rely on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in order to render a decision applicable to this entire class. See supra § II, pp. 4-5.
. The majority states that the authority cited by the trial court in rendering its decision supports the “obvious” conclusion that the trial court relied on alternative grounds in deciding the voluntary consent issue, maj. op. at 947-949, i.e., voluntariness as a factual matter and volun-tariness as a legal question under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. While I am willing to concede that the majority correctly characterizes the authority cited by the trial court as relying on both types of voluntariness analysis, I think it far more probative to examine the propositions which the trial court cited that authority in support of. Doing so clearly indicates that the trial court was relying almost exclusively on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in rendering its decision (as is required by the nature of the plaintiff class).
The trial court, after citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), cited Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (unconditional conditions analysis), and Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F.Supp. 245 (N.D.Ga.1986); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F.Supp. 578 (N.D.Ohio 1987); American Federation of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F.Supp. 726 (S.D.Ga.1986); and Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.1988). The trial court cited each of those later four cases in support, respectively, of the following propositions: " ‘Consent’ by city clerk’s office and police personnel to urinalysis testing was not voluntary where employment would have been terminated if personnel refused to participate”; “Police academy cadets did not voluntarily consent to urinalysis for drug testing where cadets believed that producing urine samples was necessary to retain their jobs”; "Because signed consent to Department of Defense mandatory urinalysis drug testing was given only because jobs would be lost if consent form were not signed, the 'consent' obtained was not voluntary”; and "‘Consent’ by high school student-athletes to drug testing not effective as consent because participation in urinalysis testing was required for participation in interscholastic athletics.”
The trial court cited these cases as support for a finding of involuntariness based on the fact that "consent” had been given because the receipt of a governmental benefit was conditioned on giving such consent. This is precisely what the unconstitutional conditions doctrine concerns itself with.
. The force of logic alone does not preclude the possibility that the trial court erred by ruling that the factual question of voluntariness is sufficient to render a decision applicable to this class. A plain reading of the trial court’s ruling, however, belies such a conclusion. See supra p. 951 (quoting trial court’s ruling) and supra note 3, at 953.
. I do not assume, however, that the benefit to student athletes is primarily, or in many cases even significantly, one of educational opportunity and growth; although I readily acknowledge that "the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics is of substantial economic value to many students.” California State Univ., Hayward v. National College Athletic Ass’n, 47 Cal.App.3d 533, 121 Cal.Rptr. 85, 90 (1975). While not true for all college sports, the fact that "to many, the chance to display their athletic prowess in college stadiums and arenas throughout the country is worth more in economic terms than the chance to get a college education," id., has propagated the rather unfortunate climate in which "[i]t cannot be seriously maintained that college football is not a business, or that the relationship between a college and student-athlete is not a business relationship.” Barile v. University of Virginia, 2 Ohio App.3d 233, 441 N.E.2d 608, 615 (1981).
In my opinion, the beneficiaries of this "business” whose interest are given primary concern and attention are not the student athletes who attend college, but the legions of coaches, trainers, and the like as well as the universities themselves who stand to gain financially by enlisting athletes in the university’s athletic program. Given the university’s rather obvious rai-son d’etre, such prioritizing is, to put it mildly, misguided.
. Although the role model rationale was offered, I can hardly believe that even the most naive freshman student would look to college athletes as role models in light of the well-documented abuses of nationally recognized intercollegiate athletic programs.