Gikas v. Zolin

KENNARD, J., Dissenting.

When a motorist, charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152),1 successfully moves the trial court to suppress the evidence supporting the charge on the ground that he or she was illegally detained by the arresting officer, is the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereafter also referred to as DMV) collaterally estopped2 from relitigating the legality of the detention in a license suspension hearing held after the court’s dismissal of the criminal charge? The majority holds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply, and that the DMV may, after a court of law’s adjudication, relitigate, in an administrative proceeding, the legality of the detention. Justices Mosk and Panelli disagree; so do I. But the reasons for my disagreement differ from those articulated by my dissenting colleagues.

To reach the conclusion that the Legislature intended to permit the use of collateral estoppel at DMV hearings, Justice Mosk’s dissenting opinion (in which Justice Panelli concurs) looks to the Legislature’s omission of certain language from the final draft of the statutory scheme that regulates the manner in which a motorist’s license may be suspended for driving after consuming alcohol.3 I, on the other hand, am of the view that the statutory language it actually adopted signaled the Legislature’s desire to allow the parties at DMV hearings to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

I

Appellant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. He moved to suppress the evidence supporting the charge, asserting that the arresting officer lacked sufficient grounds to detain him. The trial court granted the motion and, upon the People’s representation that they were unable to proceed, dismissed the case against appellant. There was no appeal.

*873At an ensuing administrative hearing before the DMV to decide whether appellant’s driver’s license should be suspended, appellant argued that, as a result of the trial court’s order granting appellant’s motion to suppress evidence in his criminal case, the DMV was collaterally estopped from contending that he was legally arrested.4 The hearing officer disagreed, upheld the legality of the arrest, and suspended appellant’s license for four months. The decision was upheld on administrative review. Appellant then sought administrative mandate from the superior court, which denied relief. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the DMV was collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of appellant’s arrest.

II

Under California law, the Department of Motor Vehicles must immediately suspend the driving privileges of any person who has driven a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or greater. The notice of suspension may be served upon the motorist by a police officer (usually the arresting officer) or by the DMV. (§ 13353.2, subd. (b).) Thereafter, the DMV must review the suspension. If the DMV finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe that the motorist was driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 23152 or 23153 (the statutes prohibiting driving under the influence), that the motorist was arrested, and that the motorist was driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more, the DMV must sustain the suspension order. (§ 13557, subd. (b)(2).) The motorist may request an administrative hearing at which he or she is entitled to present evidence on these issues. (§§ 13557, subd. (e), 13558.)

In this case, appellant contends that the arresting officer lacked reasonable cause to believe appellant violated either section 23152 or 23153. The DMV concedes that this question had been resolved adversely to the People in appellant’s criminal case,5 but asserts that, contrary to appellant’s contention, it is not collaterally estopped from again litigating this issue at the license suspension hearing.

*874I agree with the majority that general rules governing the applicability of collateral estoppel do not govern this case because, as I shall discuss more fully later, the Legislature has enacted statutes that specifically address the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to issues litigated in DMV hearings and related criminal proceedings. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 852.) The majority, however, construes the statutory scheme at issue as establishing a legislative determination that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may not be invoked at DMV hearings. I disagree. As I shall explain, the pertinent statutory language compels the conclusion that when the legality of a motorist’s arrest has been litigated in the course of criminal court proceedings against the motorist, the prevailing party in that litigation may employ the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the issue before the DMV.

The Legislature addressed the question of collateral estoppel in section 13558, subdivision (g). That statute provides: “A determination of facts by the [DMV] upon a hearing pursuant to this section [such as the suspension hearing held in this case] has no collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent criminal prosecution and does not preclude litigation of those same facts in the criminal proceeding.”6

Through this provision, the Legislature signaled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable only when a party attempts to use a factual determination at a DMV hearing to bar relitigation of the issue in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Had the Legislature desired to also bar the use of collateral estoppel at a DMV hearing after adjudication in the criminal case, it would surely have said so. Therefore, applying the well-established doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another—we may infer that the Legislature intended the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply when a party to a license revocation proceeding seeks to relitigate at the DMV hearing an issue that has already been adjudicated in the criminal proceeding. (See generally, Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 921 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 226, 844 P.2d 545]; Kinlaw v. State of California (1991) 54 Cal.3d 326, 343 [285 Cal.Rptr. 66, 814 P.2d 1308]; Southern Cal. Gas. Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 653, 659 [156 Cal.Rptr. 733, 596 P.2d 1149].)

Sound policy supports this legislative determination. The Legislature may well have concluded that because of the informal nature of administrative hearings before the DMV, it would be inappropriate to use the doctrine of *875collateral estoppel to bar relitigation, in an ensuing criminal proceeding, of issues already determined at the DMV license suspension hearing. By contrast, when the legality of a police officer’s actions in detaining or arresting the motorist has already been adjudicated by a court of law, with its attendant formality, there appears to be no sound reason to again litigate the issue at the DMV hearing. To allow relitigation in this instance would lead not only to a more costly license revocation process, but it would also result in delaying that process, thus frustrating the Legislature’s intent to create “ ‘an expedited driver’s license suspension system ....’” (Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 312 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 830].)

Here, in reaching its conclusion that the Legislature did not intend parties to rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation at DMV hearings of issues finally adjudicated in the related criminal proceeding, the majority relies on section 13353.2, subdivision (e). That statute states in relevant part: “If a person is acquitted of criminal charges relating to [driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater], the department shall immediately reinstate the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle . . . .” Through this provision, the majority reasons, the Legislature “has specified exactly what preclusive effect the criminal proceeding has” on the DMV hearing, and thus this court “may not grant greater preclusive effect . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 852.) I disagree.

The language that the majority quotes from subdivision (e) of section 11353.2 has nothing to do with collateral estoppel. It simply says that if a motorist whose license has been suspended is later acquitted of the charges that led to the suspension, the DMV must reinstate the motorist’s driver’s license. It casts no light on whether the Legislature intended the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply at DMV hearings held after adjudication of identical issues in a related criminal case.

I therefore conclude that in this case the DMV should be collaterally estopped from relitigating, at its administrative hearing, the legality of appellant’s detention and arrest, because that issue had already been determined by a court in the related criminal proceeding. In view of this conclusion, I need not reach the question whether, as Justice Panelli asserts in his dissenting opinion, the same result is compelled by Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (d), which states that when a motion to suppress is granted, the evidence “shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing . . . .”

Ill

In this case, it is a motorist who seeks to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar the DMV from relitigating the legality of the arresting *876officer’s detention. But collateral estoppel is a two-way street. By holding that the doctrine does not apply at DMV hearings, the majority not only bars motorists from using it, but it also precludes the DMV from relying on the doctrine in those cases in which a court, in the related criminal case, has denied the motorist’s motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the motorist’s detention or arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.

To allow both parties to the DMV license suspension proceeding—the motorist and the DMV—to invoke collateral estoppel would simplify those proceedings by preventing relitigation of issues already reliably determined by a court in the context of a criminal prosecution. As I have shown, this result is consistent with the specific language of section 13558, subdivision (g), and with the legislative goal of “ ‘an expedited driver’s license suspension system . . . .’” (Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 312.) The majority, by its holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel has no applicability to DMV license suspension proceedings, forces the parties to engage in unnecessary, time-consuming, and wasteful relitigation. Surely this is not what the Legislature intended.

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an issue decided against the party in a prior proceeding. For collateral estoppel to apply, the party seeking to invoke the doctrine must show; (1) that the issue in question is identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) that the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding; (3) that the issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding; (4) that the decision in the former proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is to be applied is the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 [272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 2 A.L.R.5th 995].)

In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Panelli also concludes that the DMV is barred from relitigating the legality of an arrest or detention found in violation of the Fourth Amendment in a criminal case by Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (d).

As I shall explain, a motorist’s license may not be suspended for driving under the influence of alcohol if the motorist’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of illegal searches and seizures.

This concession appears to be correct. Although at first glance the issue litigated in the suppression motion in appellant’s criminal case (whether appellant was legally detained) appears different from the issue to be litigated in the DMV hearing (whether the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe that appellant violated section 23152 or 23153), it is well established that at a license suspension hearing the DMV must find that the motorist was “lawfully arrested.” (Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.Sd 753, 760 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].) A prerequisite to a lawful arrest is a lawful detention.

The hearing held in this case was covered by section 13558, subdivision (g). Almost identical statutes govern other DMV suspension hearings. (See §§ 13353.2, subd. (e), 13557, subd. (f), 13559, subd. (b).)