concurring specially.
We granted certiorari to clarify the proper standard for determining when psychic injury is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Language in previous Court of Appeals cases has suggested, as the ALJ held in this case, that psychic trauma is compensable only if it arises directly from a compensable physical injury.2 This standard essentially requires a proximate cause link between the physical and psychic injuries. The Court of Appeals in this case and in others, however, has held that a lesser causation standard is appropriate, and that psychic trauma is compensable when it arises out of an accident in which a compensable injury occurred and the compensable physical injury contributes to or aggravates the psychic trauma.3 I believe this latter standard is more in keeping with the purpose of the Act to provide financial assistance for injuries arising during the course of employment.4 Therefore, I would disapprove the cases that suggest a proximate causation requirement.
*743Because the claimant’s psychiatrist testified that the post-traumatic stress disorder was intensified and prolonged by the knee injury,5 we need not reach the question of whether psychic trauma is compensable when preceded by no physical trauma.
See, e.g., Hanson Buick v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 129 (292 SE2d 428) (1982) (psychic injury compensable only if it arises “naturally and unavoidably from some discernible occurrence”); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749, 752 (120 SE2d 655) (1961) (psychic disability compensable “if arising from the physical injury”).
See, e.g., George v. Southwire Co., 217 Ga. App. 586 (458 SE2d 362) (1995); Howard v. Superior Contractors, 180 Ga. App. 68 (348 SE2d 563) (1986).
Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 2 (28 SE2d 280) (1943).
George v. Southwire Co., 217 Ga. App. at 587.