concurring in part; dissenting in part.
The majority affirms defendant’s conviction for DUII because it holds that the officer’s initial search when she opened the door of defendant’s car meets the requirements of State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 840 P2d 1298 (1992), rev den 317 Or 163 (1993), for a valid search under the emergency aid doctrine. The majority also holds that the search of the Dristan tin in defendant’s possession exceeded the scope of a permissible search incident to an arrest for DUII, and that the trial court properly suppressed the evidence that was seized from the tin. I agree with the majority’s resolution of those issues. However, the majority also holds that the evidence seized as the result of the search of a paper bag in defendant’s car is inadmissible, and it reverses the conviction for possession of a controlled substance. It concludes that the evidence seized from the bag was not the result of a valid consent search or a lawful inventory of the car’s contents. I disagree with that holding.
In State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27, 854 P2d 399 (1993), the court made certain observations that are instructive in this case. It said:
“The distinction that we make here between voluntariness and exploitation is an important one. Unlawful police conduct occurring before a search made pursuant to a person’s consent may affect the admissibility of evidence seized during that search in two ways. In some cases, the unlawful conduct may bear on the issue of voluntariness. That is, the unlawful conduct may have some effect on the state of mind of the person giving the consent, affecting whether the consent is a voluntary act of that person’s free will. Where the unlawful conduct bears on the voluntariness of the consent, as in any other case where voluntariness is at issue, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was voluntary. * * *
“Where, as here, the question of the voluntariness of the consent has not been raised, or where the court has determined that the consent was voluntary, unlawful police conduct occurring before a consent search still may affect the *470admissibility of evidence seized during that search. This is so because that unlawful conduct — either an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure — occurring before the consent search was a violation of the defendant’s rights, even if the consent search by itself was not. Put differently: There may be cases in which suppression of evidence obtained during a consent search may be necessary to vindicate a defendant’s rights that were violated by earlier, unlawful police conduct.
“ Whether suppression is required in any such case will, however, depend on the nature of the connection between the unlawful police conduct and the evidence sought to be suppressed. As we have noted previously, evidence is subject to suppression in a criminal prosecution if it was ‘obtained in violation of a defendant’s rights under [Article I, section 9].’ Under that standard, there will have to be, at the very least, a causal connection between the unlawful police conduct and the evidence uncovered during the subsequent consent search. Thus, where the evidence would have been obtained even in the absence of the unlawful police conduct — i.e., where there is no causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of the evidence — the mere fact that the evidence was obtained after that conduct will not require suppression.
“A causal connection alone, however, still is not sufficient to require suppression. This court has rejected the so-called ‘but for’ test, which would require the suppression of any evidence that would not have been discovered ‘but for’ the unlawful police conduct. Thus, the fact that, ‘but for’ the unlawful conduct, the police would not have been in a position to (for example) seek a person’s consent does not, in and of itself, render any evidence uncovered during the ensuing consent search inadmissible.
“In what circumstances, then, does unlawful police conduct render evidence obtained in a later consent search inadmissible, where the consent to the search is voluntary? We think that evidence obtained during such a search should be suppressed only in those cases where the police have exploited their prior unlawful conduct to obtain that consent. Only where such exploitation occurs can it be said that the evidence discovered subsequently was ‘obtained in violation’ of a defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.
“Mere physical presence as a result of prior unlawful conduct does not constitute exploitation of that conduct. Exploitation occurs when the police take advantage of the *471circumstances of their unlawful conduct to obtain the consent to search.” 317 Or at 38. (Footnotes and citations omitted; some emphasis in original; some emphasis supplied.)
Under the standard in Rodriguez, the sequence of events in this case becomes critical to the analysis. The officer’s uncontroverted testimony is that, after the officer had the defendant turn the motor off in his car, she had him get out of the car, and she placed him in handcuffs incident to an arrest for DUII. Pursuant to that arrest, she conducted a search while he was standing outside his car, and before he was placed in the patrol car. It was during this search that the officer discovered and opened the Dristan tin. Thereafter, she placed defendant in the back of the police car and returned to his car to inventory its contents. She testified:
“Q [DISTRICT ATTORNEY] Do you have any orders that tells what you would do?
“A [OFFICER] It’s an inventory search so later on the person doesn’t claim that property was taken from the vehicle and to secure any property of great value, we wouldn’t want it left out.
“Q That’s pursuant to a published —
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Describe what occurred when you approached his car after having placed him in the rear of your patrol car and having already found what you believe to be meth in the Dristan tin.
“A His car door was already open. I looked in the front seat and saw a brown paper bag that was open. I looked inside the bag and saw a small box, a little cartoon-type box with the words Carla Brown on it, and a picture of scales.
“My experience in dealing with people who distribute drugs, they often use scales for weighing out the products and bag it. I picked up that bag and took it over to the car at that point. Arid that’s when the conversation of what everything was ensued with Officer Swan and [defendant].
“ Q So you were sitting in the front seat and you already testified Officer Swan had the door open on the driver’s side. The defendant was in the back. Where was the paper bag?
“A I don’t remember whether I still had it or Officer Swan had it. He had it for a while and I had for a while.
*472“Q Describe what occurred at this point as you were in the front seat and Officer Swan was outside speaking to the defendant.
“A When I took the bag over and asked what it contained and if it contained more drugs, he shrugged and agreed that it did. I found scales, a canister that was not empty. I asked him if it contained more crank and he said yes and he said we could look inside. And it contained two larger baggies than the quarter size ones that we had found with a larger amount of what appeared to be methamphetamines.”
Defense counsel argued to the trial court that defendant’s consent to the search was not voluntary:
“[Defendant] is in the back seat of a police car, handcuffed, being interrogated by two police officers and because if the court finds there is also an intervening bad police practice such as an illegal search of this tin and he has found drugs at that point [defendant] may have — how can it be voluntary? He has given up basically.”
Counsel also said:
“Well, I think the Court should apply a similar analysis to the subsequent seizure of the brown paper bag which contained a box and a film canister also. The police officer attempts to justify that on the basis of an inventory search and/or a consent by [defendant].
“The inventory is an established exclusion of the rule. Same problem getting into closed containers that are in this brown paper bags. Clearly, no reasonable relationship to the Driving Under the Influence. No obvious connection to drugs which if the Court does suppress the Dristan box, then we start with a clean slate.”
The trial court found that the consent was voluntary and denied the motion to suppress.
The first issue is whether defendant’s consent was given voluntarily or was the result of express or implied coercion. We are bound by the trial court’s findings of voluntariness if the undisputed historical facts are sufficient to satisfy constitutional standards of due process. State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 502, 624 P2d 99 (1981). The fact that defendant was under arrest for DUII does not render the consent to search involuntary per se. In seeking the consent, *473the officers made no threats or promises. In addition to Officer Lish’s testimony, there is evidence that Officer Swan also asked defendant if they could search his car and defendant replied “sure.” I agree with the trial court that the state has proven that defendant voluntarily gave his consent to search the paper bag.
The next issue is whether the consent was obtained by the police “exploiting” the search and seizure of the Dristan tin’s contents. Under State v. Rodriguez, supra, we resolve this issue by asking two questions: First, is there a causal connection between the unlawful police conduct and the consent, and second, if so, did the officer exploit her prior unlawful conduct to obtain the consent:
“[W]here the evidence would have been obtained even in the absence of the unlawful police conduct — i.e., where there is no causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of the evidence — the mere fact that the evidence was obtained after that conduct will not require suppression.” 317 Or at 39.
The record establishes that the officer was going to undertake an inventory of the contents of the vehicle incident to the DUII arrest, whether the Dristan tin had been searched or not. She was proceeding under an administrative policy necessitated by defendant’s arrest. When she entered the car to conduct the inventory, the bag was open, and she could see inside it. She picked up the bag and took it to the patrol car, because she could see a box in it that had a picture of scales on it. That act was lawful. She was entitled to seize the bag and inventory it as a paper bag with a box of scales in it.1 She was *474also entitled to seek defendant’s consent to search it. Because the evidence shows that the consent was a product of the inventory process and was unrelated in time and place to the seizure of the drugs in the Dristan tin, our analysis should be at an end. On that basis, we should hold that the evidence seized from the paper bag is admissible.
Contrary to those facts, the majority holds that there was a causal connection between the unlawful police conduct and the giving of the consent by defendant. Even assuming that fact, the majority again errs when it concludes that the officer exploited her search of the Dristan tin to obtain the consent:
“Defendant was handcuffed, placed in the back of a patrol car and had been asked several questions about the contents of the Dristan tin. The officer then confronted him with the paper bag and asked if it contained more drugs. There is a direct connection between asking that question and the fact that the officer had illegally discovered methamphetamine in the earlier search. We conclude that the methamphetamine and scales discovered in the bag must be suppressed, because the police obtained them by trading on evidence that they had only as a result of the illegal search incident to arrest.” 124 Or App at 467. (Emphasis in original.)
Apparently, the majority holds that there was an exploitation of the seizure of the drugs in the Dristan tin, because the officer used the word “more” when she asked defendant whether he had drugs in the bag. The majority misapplies the test articulated in Rodriguez, because it fails to recognize that a causal connection alone is not sufficient for suppression. “Exploitation” occurs when the police take advantage of the prior illegality to obtain the consent. Even if the mention of “more” drugs establishes a causal connection to the prior illegality, the mention of “more drugs” in passing does not constitute the “taking advantage of’ or “trading” on the discovery of the drugs in the Dristan tin contemplated by the holding in Rodriguez. Nothing in the constitution prevented the officer from asking about drugs based on what she had seen in the open bag. The reference to “more” was incidental to the inquiry for inventory purposes about what the bag contained. In contrast, an example of exploitation would have been a representation by the officer to the effect: ‘ ‘Because we found drugs in the Dristan tin, you might as well consent to a *475search of the paper bag; because if you don’t, we are going to get a search warrant.” See State v. Williamson, 307 Or 621, 772 P2d 404 (1989). Here, no exploitation occurred because of the officer’s questions. Nothing in those questions “exploited” the prior illegality within the meaning of Rodriguez to compel defendant to consent to the search of the bag. The majority’s holding is not supported by the facts nor is it a proper application of the holding in Rodriguez.
For these reasons, I dissent.
The majority is wrong when it says that defendant argued below that the search could not be justified on the basis of an inventory, because the inventory was not conducted in accordance with the requirements of State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 10, 688 P2d 832 (1984). Defendant did not make that specific argument to the trial court. As the previously quoted material illustrates, defendant argued to the trial court that the inventory search was improper because it lacked a reasonable nexus to the arrest for DUII. Not only did defendant not make the argument on which the majority relies, but the argument defendant did make to the trial court about the inventory is wrong. The scope of an inventory of an impounded vehicle is not circumscribed by the nature of the arrest. Rather, its scope is governed by the administrative procedures that are adopted to protect against lost or stolen property. The essence of the requirement that error be preserved is arequirement that the objecting party tell the trial court enough so that the court can rule in an informed manner. Defendant did not argue to the trial court that a search of the contents of the bag exceeded the scope of a permissible inventory and we should not decide that unpreserved issue.