dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as it is my view that the trial court erred in refusing to give Whitley’s request to charge on last clear chance. I also believe the trial court erred in excluding evidence of similar side-impact collisions at the intersection, testimony from several other accident victims regarding visibility problems at the intersection and proof that the County had rated the intersection as one of its most dangerous intersections.
1. Although I agree with the majority the last clear chance doctrine has no application unless the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s perilous situation and had an opportunity to take evasive action, Simpson v. Reed, 186 Ga. App. 297, 298 (4) (367 SE2d 563), I cannot go along with the majority’s conclusion that there was no evidence to support a charge on last clear chance. Specifically, I strongly disagree with the majority’s factual finding that Officer Dewitt was unable to do anything but brake to avoid the collision. I have studied Officer Dewitt’s testimony, a diagram of the accident scene, photographs of the wrecked vehicles and a report concerning the relative positions of the vehicles at the time of the collision and I find no proof which demands a finding, as stated by the majority, that “Dewitt was unable to avoid the collision on the left due to a guard rail and bridge abutment, and he was unable to maneuver to the right because Whitley’s car was in the right lane.” While this logic is appropriate for jurors, I do not think it suitable for an appellate court upon judicial review.
“It is well established that a charge is proper if there is any evidence, however slight, on which to predicate it. Cale v. Jones, 176 Ga. App. 865, 868 (4) (338 SE2d 68) (1985).” Beal v. Braunecker, 185 Ga. App. 429, 433 (4) (364 SE2d 308). In the case sub judice, the evidence reveals that, after slowing at a traffic light just before approaching *26the subject intersection, Officer Dewitt accelerated to at least 50 miles per hour and then entered the bridge that went over the intersecting highway. Officer Dewitt testified that he observed James Allen Whitley’s car stopped some 50 to 80 feet from the intersection as he started over the bridge. Whitley’s car then proceeded into the intersection at about five to seven miles per hour, when Officer Dewitt’s patrol car was about 130 to 150 feet away. Officer Dewitt explained that when he saw Whitley’s car it was too late to take evasive action.
The evidence in this case bears no significant difference from the circumstances in Simpson v. Reed, 186 Ga. App. 297, supra, where this Court held that a charge on last clear chance was authorized by evidence indicating “that [the defendant], though 25 yards distant and aware of [the plaintiff’s] presence crossing the road on the diagonal, nevertheless failed to take advantage of the distance to avoid injuring appellee by taking evasive action.” Id. at 298 (4). I believe the above proof, along with the fact that Officer Dewitt could have turned left or right to avoid the collision (albeit a hard choice), authorizes a charge on liability based on last clear chance.
2. Mary Whitley argues that evidence of similar side-impact collisions at the intersection was not only relevant to prove the generally hazardous conditions at the intersection, but was also relevant to show that Officer Dewitt knew or should have known of hazardous conditions at the intersection before he accelerated into James Allen Whitley’s car. I agree and would reverse.
Although evidence of similar accidents is generally not admissible to prove negligence, Bassham v. Diamond, 148 Ga. App. 620, 621 (1) (252 SE2d 23), such evidence may be admissible if it tends to shed some light upon a fact in issue. See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183 (4) (460 SE2d 812). And while I agree with the majority that the relevancy of other occurrences generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, I cannot go along with a holding which affirms the exclusion of evidence which I view as probative to key issues that were before the jury. See Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Thompson, 208 Ga. App. 240, 247 (7) (430 SE2d 371); Reed v. Heffernan, 171 Ga. App. 83, 84 (1) (a) (318 SE2d 700). I think the majority’s view disregards the old maxims that “ ‘[e]very fact or circumstance serving to elucidate or throw light upon the issue being tried, constitutes proper evidence in the case.’ Sample v. Lipscomb, 18 Ga. 687. ‘Where the competency of evidence is doubtful, it should go to the jury, that they may consider how far its force is impaired by surrounding incidents.’ Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72 Ga. 217 (5 a) (52 Am. R. 838); and the converse of this rule has been stated thus: ‘It is relevant to put in evidence any circumstances which tend to make the propositions at issue either more or less probable.’ Todd v. Ger*27man American Insurance Co., [2 Ga. App. 789, 790 (4) (59 SE 94)]. ‘Evidence which is only indirectly relevant to the issue on trial, but which tends somewhat to illustrate it and to aid the jury in arriving at the truth of the matter, should be admitted . . . The rule in this State is to admit evidence^ even if it] is of doubtful relevancy.’ Talbotton Railroad Co. v. Gibson, 106 Ga. 229, 236 (32 S. E. 151); Dalton v. Drake, 75 Ga. 115; Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Flannagan, 82 Ga. 579 (9 S. E. 471, 14 Am. St. R. 183).” A. A. A. Hwy. Express v. Hagler, 72 Ga. App. 519, 520 (1) (34 SE2d 462).
In the case sub judice, Mary Whitley proffered, in pertinent part, multiple accident reports showing side-impact collisions at the subject intersection and testimony from several witnesses of these collisions concerning a visibility obstruction (a bridge guardrail) that caused the similar collisions. The majority concludes that this evidence was immaterial because Officer Dewitt denied prior knowledge of a dangerous condition at the intersection and the proffered evidence did nothing to refute Officer Dewitt’s claim of ignorance, i.e., the reports did not indicate that the officer investigated or was otherwise involved in the prior occurrences. This conclusion, however, fails to take into account proof that Officer Dewitt may not have been completely candid about his knowledge of prior collisions at the intersection in question.
Officer Dewitt had been a traffic control officer in Gwinnett County for 18 years before the collision, he had served on the County’s special accident investigation unit for several years and, in this capacity, he had worked with the County’s chief traffic control engineer, who admitted that he was familiar (before the fatal collision) with visibility problems at the intersection. While this evidence alone may not discredit Officer Dewitt’s claim that he had no prior knowledge of visibility problems at the intersection, when taken with proof that a long list of police accident reports existed involving similar collisions at the subject intersection (all which appear to have been compiled by the very accident investigation unit where Officer Dewitt was assigned before the fatal collision), the veracity of Officer Dewitt’s claim of prior ignorance of the visibility hazard at the intersection becomes an issue for the jury. Assuming the contrary, however, I believe the proffered accident reports would have been dN rectly relevant to Mary Whitley’s claim that Officer Dewitt should have known (as a long-time Gwinnett County officer, specializing in traffic control) about the dangers associated with accelerating toward a blind intersection, without pause. Under these circumstances, I do not agree that the trial court was correct in determining that the excluded evidence was immaterial.
3.1 also think the trial court erred in excluding Whitley’s proffer of testimony from several witnesses concerning a visibility obstruc*28tion at the intersection that was caused by a nearby guardrail. I believe this evidence was relevant to rebut the defense’s claim that James Allen Whitley’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of his fatal injuries. Specifically, James Allen Whitley’s perspective of the oncoming hazard posed by Officer Dewitt’s accelerating patrol car was relevant to issues of contributory negligence and to the defense of comparative fault. See Charles R. Adams Ill’s and Cynthia Trimboli Adams’ Georgia Law of Torts (1989), §§ 16-1 and 16-4, and §§ 17-1 and 17-2. The majority holds, however, that any error in this regard was harmless because Officer Dewitt’s supervisor in the accident investigation unit and the state trooper who investigated the collision testified about the guardrail obstruction. I cannot go along with this harmless error tact. Neither the trooper that investigated the collision, nor Dewitt’s supervisor in the accident investigation unit had experienced a collision due to the guardrail obstruction at the intersection. Witnesses proffered by Mary Whitley had. Only they would have been able to convey the full extent and consequences of the visibility obstruction that was presented to James Allen Whitley moments before the collision.
Decided March 15, 1996 Reconsideration denied March 29, 1996 James L. Ford, Terry D. Jackson, for appellant. Boyce, Ekonomou & Atkinson, Peter F. Boyce, William M. Coo*29lidge III, for appellees.*28When determinations of negligence and comparative fault may have been based upon the testimony of the only surviving eyewitness, Officer Dewitt, whom Mary Whitley was erroneously precluded from impeaching, an appellate court should not second guess the fact-finding process, but should reverse and remand for a new trial wherein determinations of negligence and comparative fault may be reached by a jury that is properly allowed to resolve the credibility of the witness. Dept. of Transp. v. Adams, 193 Ga. App. 866 (1), 867 (389 SE2d 343).
4. Finally, I agree with Mary Whitley’s contention that the excluded evidence regarding prior similar collisions at the intersection, as well as proof that the County had rated the intersection as one of its most dangerous intersections, was relevant to rebut an investigating police officer’s testimony that the intersection was no more dangerous than any other similarly situated intersection. “ Tt is error requiring the grant of a new trial to deny a party the right to cross-examine witnesses as to vital issues concerning which they have testified upon direct examination.’ Harrison v. Regents &c. of Ga., 99 Ga. App. 762 (1) (109 SE2d 854) (1959).” Dept. of Transp. v. Adams, 193 Ga. App. 866 (1), supra.