concurring.
Under Oklahoma’s Constitution, Art. 23 § 8,1 express or implied contractual waivers of a constitutional right appear to be unenforceable.
If Mary Long’s arbitration agreement now in suit were to be construed as an implicit waiver of her fundamental right to a trial by jury, then, under the cited provisions of this state’s fundamental law, her promise might be avoidable.
The arbitration clause sought to be enforced against Mary Long appears to be governed by the laws of the State of New York. The contract she signed so recites and she claims no infirmity in that clause. Nor does she argue here that her arbitration agreement is unenforceable as viola-tive of some public policy principle espoused by the law that governs the parameters of her contractual promise.2
Because I cannot conclude that Mary Long’s arbitration agreement is governed by Oklahoma law, I must concur in the court’s judgment and in its opinion.
. The terms of Art. 23 § 8, Okl. Const., provide:
"Any provision of a contract, express or implied, made by any person, by which any of the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and void.” [Emphasis added.]
. See Benham v. Keller, Okl., 673 P.2d 152, 153 [1983].