with whom HARGRAVE, Vice Chief Justice, and LAVENDER, Justice, join, dissenting.
Today’s opinion affirms summary judgment for the plaintiff and quiets his title to all the coal rights in the property in litigation. The court holds that a reservation by the Oklahoma Commissioners of the Land Office [Commissioners] of a fifty-percent interest in all the “oil, gas and other mineral rights” underlying state lands retains in the grantor solely oil and gas, its constituents and components. The court specifically excludes from the ambit of the reservation both coal and other unspecified minerals. I recede from today’s pronouncement because, in my view, the Commissioners were without statutory power to convey more than fifty percent of “all minerals” in the state-owned land. I would hence reverse the trial court’s summary judgment and hold that the Commissioners’ reservation effectively withheld from the patent’s grantee a one-half undivided interest in the coal rights.
FACTS
The appellee, Claude Butler [owner], sought to quiet his title to the coal rights in certain land he claimed to own in fee simple. His predecessors in interest acquired title to the property from the Commissioners by three separate patents.1 The first patent contained a reservation to the state of “an undivided fifty percentum of all the oil, gas and other mineral rights.” The reservation in the other two patents was of “an undivided fifty percentum of all oil, gas and other minerals and mineral rights.” The property was sold to the owner’s predecessors in interest through a public sale of state-owned lands. In the notice of sale it was stated that the land would be sold subject to a reservation in the state of an undivided fifty percent of “all the oil, gas and other mineral rights.”
The owner sought summary judgment contending that the sole issue tendered was the construction of the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” and that the meaning of this phrase stood fixed as a matter of law. The Commissioners urged extrinsic evidence should be allowed to show the intention of the parties. By summary judgment the trial court quieted title to all the coal rights in the owner. Finding no significant distinction in the language of the reservations in the three patents, the court held that the state reserved only fifty percent of the oil, gas and minerals produced as constituents and components thereof, whether hydrocarbon and nonhydrocarbon, but failed to retain any other minerals, including coal. According to the trial court, since the language in the patents and in the notice of sale was clear, explicit and unambiguous, the intention of the parties could be ascertained from the writings alone, without resorting to extrinsic evidence in a search for the parties’ intent. The court took under consideration the pleadings, briefs of the parties and certified copies of pertinent documents on file in the court clerk’s office. These instruments included the minutes of the Commissioners’ meeting at which a resolution was adopted authorizing the sale of the lands in suit.
The Commissioners appeal from the adverse summary judgment. This court may review a lower court’s ruling on a pure question of law and correct any misinterpretation or misapplication of the applicable legal norm. The error sought to be presented stands preserved for corrective relief.2
The property in suit, which had been acquired by the State through foreclosure *1341proceedings, became a part of the corpus of the permanent school fund.3 That fund may be invested in first mortgages upon farmlands within the state.4 The land came to be sold by the State in accordance with the authority conferred by a 1937 statute.5
I
LEGISLATIVELY CONFERRED POWERS OF COMMISSIONERS
The validity of a Commissioners’ sale of public land is governed by the power conferred by the legislature. The applicable statute, 64 O.S.1941 § 82, must be construed to define the scope of the established authority. The statutory provisions empowering the Commissioners to issue patents become a part of the contract involved in the conveyance of the land. The rights of the parties must hence be determined in light of the statutory provisions.6 The Commissioners’ power to sell state lands or any interest in them is exercised validly only when their acts comply with the statutory mandate. Persons dealing with state functionaries are bound to know the extent of their authority7 and are charged with notice of the Commission’s statutory powers as well as with notice of the officials’ nonconformity to the legally prescribed norms.8
The provisions of 64 O.S.1941 § 969 set forth the terms of sale contracts and certificates of purchase for the sale of State land such as that involved in this case. This section provides in part, that “the Commissioners of the Land Office shall, in all cases, reserve and retain forever title to fifty (50%) per centum of all the oil, gas and other mineral rights in and under lands so sold.” In State v. Phillips Petroleum Co.10 we held that both this section and § 82(d)11 must be followed, even though the two provisions may be viewed as somewhat contradictory. In order to give full effect to both of these sections, the § 96(c) requirement, which calls for a fifty-percent reservation of the mineral estate, is to be regarded as controlling.
The ascertainment of legislative intent is the cardinal rule of statutory construction.12 That intent is determined from the whole act in light of its general purpose *1342and object.13 All of the statutory provisions dealing with the same general subject should be construed together and their provisions harmonized.14 A statute should also be construed to render every word, sentence and provision operative. It is presumed that every provision of a statute was intended to have some useful purpose and should be given effect.15 The title to an act is a proper guide in ascertaining legislative intent.16
Section 82 is one in a cluster of statutes under Title 64 which deal with sales, leases and deficiency judgments relating to real property owned by the State and administered by the Commissioners.17 These statutes must all be construed together in order to arrive at the legislative intent in any particular section. The Commissioners’ authority vis-a-vis mineral rights in state lands is also dealt with in this chapter, although some of the statutes refer to these rights in different terms.
By the terms of § 92 the Commissioners are authorized to sell “oil, gas or other mineral leases” on state lands. This language suggests that the sale of mineral interests unrelated to oil and gas is covered by this statute. Reference is also made in § 82(d) to the execution of “oil, gas or mineral” leases by the State in the minerals reserved to it under this law. The title of the 1939 Act amending § 82 also provides in general terms that the amendments relate to the preservation of mineral rights. The titles to these acts and the references to mineral rights in general throughout this grouping of related statutes emphatically demonstrate a legislative design to require the State’s retention of all minerals in one half of the alienated lands.
A statute must also be construed so as to advance the beneficial purposes manifested by the legislature.18 It seems clear that the statutorily required reservation was designed to preserve in the State a valuable interest in the minerals underlying state-owned lands. This purpose is not met unless the reservation mandated by § 82 is construed to include all minerals in the retained subsurface estate.
In sum, the quantum of interest conveyed by the patents here in contest must be measured by the extent of the Commissioners’ legislatively conferred power to alienate land. The statutory provisions pursuant to which the Commissioners acted constitute an integral part of these patents. When the patents and applicable statutes are read together, it is crystal-clear that the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” is indeed unambiguous. Its meaning must be divined not from extrinsic evidence but rather by reference to the restriction on the Commissioners’ authority to transfer the State’s interest in the land sold.
II
EJUSDEM GENERIS AND THE PHRASE “OIL, GAS AND OTHER MINERALS”
The owner contends ejusdem generis should be applied in rendering the meaning *1343of the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals.” Under this well-known canon of construction, when a general phrase is followed by a list of specific items, the scope of the phrase is restricted by the nature of the specific items listed.19 Applying this rule to the language of § 82(d), the owner argues, the use of words “oil and gas” before the general phrase “and other minerals” requires that the “other minerals” be limited only to those closely related to oil and gas, i.e., those which are constituents or components of oil and gas.
Ejusdem generis is one of many guides to statutory interpretation. Other canons of construction are equally potent. The ejusdem generis doctrine must yield to the rule that an act should be so construed as to carry out the object sought to be accomplished by it, so far as that object can be collected from the language of the statute. If the use of the ejusdem generis rule would hinder or defeat the plain legislative purpose or intent, it may not be applied in statutory construction.20 It is apparent in the instant case that the application of ejusdem generis would defeat the clear intent of the § 82(d) command that the State retain a percentage of all mineral rights.
When construing the terms of § 82(d) together with § 96(c) our extant jurisprudence has implicitly recognized that the reservation contemplated by the legislature must encompass all minerals in the percentage interest required to be retained. Although the exact character of minerals included in the reservation was not specifically before this court in those cases, it is clear that we viewed the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language to embrace not only oil-and-gas, its constituents and components, but all other minerals as well.21
In the present case, the Commissioners were required to reserve fifty percent of all minerals. They were hence powerless to pass to the owner all of the coal rights underlying the property in suit. Because the conveyance cannot be held to have alienated more than the quantum authorized by statute to be sold, the owner’s predecessors in interest acquired only fifty percent of the coal. The remaining interest stood retained by the State’s reservation.
Ill
PANHANDLE AND ITS EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW
The phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” and similar phrases have been construed in a number of our decisions. Of primary significance is Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham.22 Panhandle dealt with the construction of three mineral deeds. The issue was whether copper, silver, gold or other metallic ores or minerals were included within the purview of the respective granting clauses in these deeds.
A. Farmers-Flag Deed
There were essentially two deed forms to be construed in Panhandle. The first one, the so-called Farmers-Flag deed, contained in the granting clause a conveyance of “oil, gas and other minerals.” Other provisions in that deed specifically referred to oil and gas and the right to execute oil-and-gas leases. The four-comers’ doctrine of construction23 was applied and all parts of the deed were carefully examined. It is *1344through this analysis that the deed, taken as a whole, was determined not to be ambiguous. The clear intention of the parties —divined from the face of the conveyance — was to include in the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” only those minerals that were produced as components and constituents of oil and gas. Although Panhandle recognized the ejusdem generis canon, we emphasized that it was not invoked in giving meaning to the Farmers-Flag deed. Rather, the intent of the parties to limit the effect of the granting clause to oil and gas and closely related minerals was ascertained from the clear language of the deed. Panhandle’s language — that “in contracts dealing with the production and utilization of oil and gas, the expression ‘and other minerals’ has a special purpose in extending the connotation of ‘oil and gas’ only”24 — must be regarded as restricted to deeds, such as the Farmers-Flag, which may be said to express the parties’ “preoccupation with oil and gas”. The holding does not, as a matter of law, govern the construction of all instruments or material in which the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” is used. We surely did not intend to pronounce that the quoted language, standing alone, must always be restricted in its meaning to “oil, gas and other minerals produced as oil or gas or produced as a component or constituent thereof, whether hydrocarbon or nonhydrocarbon.”
B. The Two Remaining Deeds
My view of the Panhandle’s ratio decidendi is reinforced by this court’s construction of two other deeds under consideration there. The granting clauses in those deeds also embraced “oil, gas and other minerals.” Because other clauses in the conveyances did not reflect a clear intention to pass only an estate in the oil, gas and related components, those deeds, viewed as a whole, were deemed to be ambiguous. The case was remanded with directions to consider extrinsic evidence in a search for the parties’ intent.
C. The Misperception of “Panhandle” and its Misapplication in Extant Caselaw
The Panhandle message may have been misread. In West v. Aetna Life Insurance Company25 a landowner sought to quiet title to his rights in metallic ores. The grantor-defendant had conveyed the property, but reserved the “oil, gas and other mineral rights.” The defendant contended the reservation’s language was ambiguous and extrinsic evidence should be allowed to show the intent of the parties. The court employed ejusdem generis to conclude that only minerals produced as components and constituents of oil and gas were reserved. The granting clause in West was similar to Panhandle’s, Farmers-Flag deed. Unlike in Panhandle, the court in West did not allude to other provisions in the deed or in the reservation. Its failure so to do makes it unclear whether the four-corners’ doctrine was given effect in like manner as in Panhandle to demonstrate that the reservation was free from ambiguity. West may have improperly relied on Panhandle for the application of ejusdem generis. The latter decision neither teaches nor suggests that ejusdem generis should be followed to the exclusion of other canons of construction.
*1345The owner places even stronger reliance upon Allen v. Farmers Union Co-Operative Royalty Co.26 Allen, which appears to rest on the same misperception of Panhandle as that found in West, does not cite West. The case similarly involved a deed that contained a reservation of “oil, gas and mineral rights”. The trial court refused to consider the subsequent acts of the parties as extrinsic evidence of the intended meaning to be given the phrase. Instead, the rule of ejusdem generis was viewed as applicable. Its use resulted in the determination that the deed included only minerals produced as components and constituents of oil and gas. We affirmed the trial court’s decision. There was no allusion in Allen to other provisions in the deed. This is so because Panhandle appears to have been accepted as clothing the phrase “all oil, gas and other minerals” with a fixed meaning. Panhandle’s construction of the phrase was not intended as a per se definition for use in all cases. Rather, the holding there doubtless was meant to be of limited application to instances where the meaning of the language is clear from the construction of the instrument as a whole.
Allen also refers to another case in which the ejusdem generis canon was applied—Cronkhite v. Falkenstein.27 Cronkhite involved a dispute over whether the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” included gypsum rock. There, ejusdem generis was applied to conclude that gypsum was not within the grant. Extrinsic evidence was also considered in a search for the parties’ intent. The opinion emphasized that ejusdem generis is not to be applied when the result reached would be contrary to the parties’ intent.28 The use of ejusdem generis, together with the admission of extrinsic evidence, both led in Cronkhite to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to include gypsum in the reservation. Allen’s and West's reliance on Cronkhite to support the proposition that ejusdem generis could be used in every case to the exclusion of extrinsic evidence is clearly misplaced. Cronkhite stands for the principle that, when applicable, ejusdem generis may be used together with extrinsic evidence to arrive at the parties’ intention.
D. Early Case law Provides Guidance to Proper Application of Ejusdem Generis
A much earlier case, Wolf v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co.,29 demonstrates an approach similar to that used in Cronkhite. In Wolf a lease granted the right to produce all of the “oil, gas and other minerals.” Elsewhere in the lease, the lessor reserved the rights to “1/10 of all the oil and other minerals” produced. Yet another clause gave the lessor the right to $100 per year for every well producing gas only. Although the ejusdem generis canon of construction was applied to determine what minerals were encompassed within the phrase “all oil, gas and other minerals,” it is clear that the lease was considered in its entirety to then arrive at the conclusion that gas was excluded. Although Wolf may have left unclear the precise effect of ejusdem generis, that decision gives no ground for assuming that the rule may be used to the exclusion of the four-corners’ doctrine.
Ejusdem generis was again invoked in Vogel v. Cobb30 to ascertain if water was included in a grant of “oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt, and all other minerals.” The court considered extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent.
None of the cases discussed thus far has dealt with the specific issue of whether coal is included within the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals.” Most of them involve minerals very different in nature from oil *1346and gas, i.e. metallic minerals.31 A recent federal case, Sloan v. Peabody Coal Co.,32 addressed itself to the specific question whether coal is embraced in the quoted language. No doubt relying on a flawed analysis of Panhandle, the federal court was led to conclude that coal was excluded from a reservation of “oil, gas and other minerals.” Sloan, a federal case, is of course not binding on us here.
While today’s opinion appears to verbally clad ejusdem generis as a canon of construction, the court applies the doctrine as though it were an inflexible and universal rule of law. Its pronouncement gives the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” a fixed meaning that excludes every mineral other than the constituents and components of oil and gas. The very ascription of a fixed meaning to the phrase makes it one of universal application and hence a rule of law rather than a canon of construction. The purpose of ejusdem generis is not to accord fixed and unalterable meaning to some particular verbiage, but rather to use it as an aid in construing language where specific things are named in a series that follow a general term. By its very nature, ejusdem generis must be employed only on a case-by-case basis. There is no authority for our acceptance of ejusdem generis as a universal rule of law. In fact, Panhandle specifically rejects the notion of the maxim’s universality.
The court intimates today that the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” is attributable to early litigation over rights to other distinct substances produced at the wellhead, particularly casinghead gas. Its account, which attempts to explain how the phrase has developed, is of doubtful historicity. I am persuaded that the verbiage might have been fashioned in the aftermath of Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co.,33 where the court treated a reservation of “all mineral rights” as ambiguous and hence subject to further probing by parol evidence. It was after Barker that cautious conveyancers in the 1920s and 1930s began drafting “oil, gas and other minerals” to denote in deeds that oil and gas rights were either granted, excepted or reserved.34
IV
ACTS OF COMMISSIONERS CONTROL OVER NOTICE OF SALE
Another reason exists for concluding that the Commissioners did not have the power to alienate more than fifty percent of the coal rights. The provisions of § 82(a) require the Commissioners to adopt a resolution authorizing the sale of any land pursuant to this statute. The record in this case contains a certified copy of the minutes of the Commissioners’ meeting held on September 11, 1938. A resolution adopted at that meeting approved the sale of the land involved in this suit. The resolution, which had been voted upon and approved by the Commissioners, stated that the State shall retain fifty percent of the mineral rights in and under the lands sold. When the notice of sale was published, it included language different from that found in the resolution. The phrase “all mineral rights” had been changed to “oil, gas and other mineral rights.” The patents and certificates of sale used verbiage similar to that in the notice of sale. The Commissioners’ official action and their intent with respect to this property’s sale clearly was to retain fifty percent of all minerals.
The notice of sale and the patents issued cannot be allowed to control over the spe*1347cific actions of the Commissioners. The Commission staff was without authority to act in contravention of the Commissioners’ intent clearly expressed in their resolution. One who purchases an interest in school lands without making inquiry as to the Commissioners’ compliance with the terms of their trust, is charged with notice of all defects and irregularities which exist in the sale proceedings and hence cannot claim the status of a bona fide purchaser.35 The original purchasers of this land were deemed to have notice of the discrepancy between the official action by the Commissioners and the language of the reservation contained in the notice of sale and in the patents. They cannot be said to have acquired more than fifty percent of the rights in all minerals, including coal. Subsequent purchasers also are charged with notice of those defects or irregularities in sale proceedings which are apparent upon examination of the records. The law draws here a close analogy to the principles that apply in guardianship sales.36
The court today rejects out of hand the long-held view that the permissible search for the quantum of interest conveyed by the State may extend beyond the four corners of the State’s conveyance to include the notices as well as the Commission minutes. Its refusal to allow an examination of critical and foundational instruments de-hors the patents is entirely without support in legal precedent and appears to be contrary to all extant jurisprudence.37
Because I cannot countenance the court’s mistaken reliance on ejusdem generis for its conclusion that the phrase “oil, gas and other minerals” has a universally fixed legal meaning whose definitional perimeter embraces only oil, gas and only those minerals that are produced as their constituents and components, I must stand in dissent from today’s pronouncement.
. The first patent was dated November 29, 1943, the second August 20, 1957 and the third December 5, 1961.
All statutory references to the cluster of enactments governing conveyancing by the Commissioners are to the 1941 compilation, the statutes that govern the interests in contest here.
. See 12 O.S.1981 § 630 and Southard v. Oil Equipment Corporation, Okl., 296 P.2d 780, 782 [1956].
. See Art. 11 § 2, Okl. Const. Included in the permanent school fund are proceeds of the sale of public lands that have been or may be given by the United States government for the use and benefit of the common schools.
. Art. 11 § 6, Okl.Const.
. Okl.Sess.L.1937, Ch. 28, Art. 1 § 6 [later codified in 64 O.S.1941 § 82].
. Hoover Equipment Co. v. Board of Tax Roll Cor., Okl., 436 P.2d 645, 649 [1968] and Baker v. Tulsa Building & Loan Ass’n., 179 Okl. 432, 66 P.2d 45, 50 [1936].
. State v. Frame, 200 Okl. 650, 199 P.2d 215, 217 [1948].
. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., infra note 10.
. We do not quote here the text of 64 O.S.1941 § 96 because only its subject and not its verbiage is relevant to our discussion of the issues.
. Okl., 258 P.2d 1193, 1198 [1953].
. The terms of 64 O.S.1941 § 82(d) provide in pertinent part:
"The Commissioners of the Land Office shall reserve and retain forever the title to not less than forty (40%) per centum of all the oil, gas and other mineral rights in and under all lands to be sold; provided further, that the Commissioners of the Land Office are empowered to join in the execution of any oil, gas, or mineral lease on school lands, which have been sold and in which they have retained mineral interest, at their own discretion and without the necessity of advertising as required on State-owned lands. Such reservation is to be set out and included in all Certificates of Purchase and Patents issued to cover lands hereafter sold by the Commissioners of the Land Office_”
. Riffe Petroleum Co. v. Great Nat. Corp., Inc., Okl., 614 P.2d 576, 579 [1980]; Lekan v. P & L Fire Protection Co., Okl., 609 P.2d 1289, 1292 [1980]; Midwest City v. Harris, Okl., 561 P.2d 1357, 1358 [1977]; Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, Okl., 301 P.2d 212, 216 [1956] and Adams v. Fry, 204 Okl. 407, 230 P.2d 915, 917 [1951].
. Midwest City v. Harris, supra note 12 at 1358 and Adams v. Fry, supra note 12, 230 P.2d at 917.
. Melton v. Quality Homes, Okl., 312 P.2d 476, 479 [1957] and Becknell v. State Industrial Court, Okl., 512 P.2d 1180, 1183 [1973].
. Matter of Ernest James C., Okl., 578 P.2d 352, 355 [1978] and W L. Street v. Bethany Firemen’s Rel. and Pens. Fund, Okl., 555 P.2d 1295, 1298 [1976].
. Phillips v. Oklahoma Tax Com’n., Okl., 577 P.2d 1278, 1282 [1978] and Perry v. City of Oklahoma City, Okl., 470 P.2d 974, 979 [1970].
. For other statutory provisions, see 64 O.S.1941 §§ 81-100.
In this group, 64 O.S.1981 § 91 commands that the Commissioners reserve "all oil, gas and minerals.” The title of this section, enacted in 1963, provides that "all mineral rights [are] to be retained by the State.” “Subsequent legislation may be considered as an aid in construing prior enactments upon the same subject." Letteer v. Conservancy District No. 30, Okl., 385 P.2d 796, 801 [1963].
. McGannon v. State, 33 Okl. 145, 124 P. 1063, 1067 [1912].
. Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, Okl., 352 P.2d 396, 399 [1960].
. Couch v. State, 71 Okl.Cr. 223, 110 P.2d 613, 616 [1941] and Baccus v. Banks, 199 Okl. 647, 192 P.2d 683, 687 [1947] appeal dismissed 333 U.S. 858, 68 S.Ct. 743, 92 L.Ed. 1138, reh. den. 333 U.S. 883, 68 S.Ct. 911, 92 L.Ed. 1158 [1948].
. State v. Duggins, Okl., 258 P.2d 891, 894 [1953]; Penner v. State, Okl., 302 P.2d 144, 149-150 [1956]; State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 10 at 1199 and State v. Bright, Okl., 261 P.2d 875, 877 [1953].
. Okl., 495 P.2d 108, 113 [1972].
. The four-corners’ doctrine refers to the rule that confines construction of a written instrument to its four corners. See Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison, Okl., 621 P.2d 528, 532 [1980]. Extrinsic evidence to be used in search of the *1344instrument’s intended meaning is admissible only when the language used is susceptible of multiple meanings and there is a dispute between the parties as to the intended meaning of the language in controversy. See Bryan v. Everett, Okl., 365 P.2d 146, 148 [1961] and Rose v. Cook, 207 Okl. 582, 250 P.2d 848, 850 [1952]. Extrinsic evidence was unnecessary in this case because the phrase "oil, gas and other minerals” is not ambiguous when the statutes pertinent to their issuance are read in conjunction with the patents.
. Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, supra note 22 at 113.
. Okl.App., 536 P.2d 393, 397-398 [1975].
. Okl., 538 P.2d 204, 208-209 [1975].
. See supra note 19 at 399.
. Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, supra note 19 at 399.
. 77 Okl. 81, 186 P. 484, 485 [1920].
. 193 Okl. 64, 141 P.2d 276, 280 [1943].
. Allen v. Farmers Union Co-Operative Royalty Co., supra note 26 and West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 25.
. 10th Cir., 547 F.2d 115, 116 [1977].
. 64 Okl. 249, 167 P. 468, 469 [1917].
. See Bell, The Continuing Problem of ‘Other Minerals:’ Oklahoma Needs a Uniform Rule of Construction, 56 OBJ 2919 (footnote 4 at page 2928)[1985] and Emery, What Surface is Mineral and What Mineral is Surface, 12 Okla.L.Rev. 499, 512 [1959].
. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 10 at 1199; State v. Duggins, supra note 21 at 894 and State v. Bright, supra note 21 at 877-878.
. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 10 at 1199; Selement v. Gibson, 171 Okl. 513, 43 P.2d 759, 760-761 [1935]; Lowery v. Richards, 120 Okl. 261, 248 P. 622, 624-625 [1926]; In re Standwaitie's Estate, 73 Okl. 255, 175 P. 542, 543-544 [1918] and Burton v. Compton, 50 Okl. 365, 150 P. 1080, 1082 [1915].
. See State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 10.