dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Section 15-11-803(3), C.R.S., provides that the beneficiary of a life insurance policy who kills the person under whose life the policy is issued “is not entitled to any benefit” under the policy. That statute should be construed to arrive at a just and reasonable result, § 2-4-201(l)(c), C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Vol. IB), and in my view, such a result may be effected only if the murderer of an insured is prevented from exercising any control in the disposition of the policy proceeds or from receiving any benefits, directly or indirectly, in those proceeds.
Here, Katherine Becker was the owner of both policies. As owner she designated herself the primary beneficiary, designated her estate and her children as contingent beneficiaries, and named her children as successor owners of the policies if she died before Seidlitz. In my view, each of these prerogatives of ownership represents a “benefit” that, under § 15-11-803(3), she forfeited by killing the insured.
*778Consequently, the result the majority reaches is neither just nor reasonable pursuant to § 15-11-803(3) since it effectuates Becker’s intent to benefit her children as a result of her murder of Seidlitz. I do not believe it was the General Assembly’s intent to allow a person to designate her progeny as the beneficiaries of a life insurance policy and then to secure those insurance proceeds for her children by killing the insured. See Bernstein v. Rosenthal, 671 P.2d 979 (Colo.App.1983) (killer’s estate should not benefit from his wrongdoing); Beene v. Gibraltar Industrial Life Insurance Co., 116 Ind.App. 290, 63 N.E.2d 299 (1945) (a life insurance beneficiary who intentionally kills the insured forfeits the benefits of the policy; therefore, his as-signee also forfeits the benefits); Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass’n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N.W. 800 (1900); Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Weightman, 61 Okl. 106, 160 P. 629 (1916).
I interpret the language of the statute to preclude Katherine Becker’s receipt of any benefit from the life insurance including the indirect benefit of designating her children as successor-owners or beneficiaries and thereby enriching her family by providing them with the proceeds. It is irrefutable, in a practical sense, that Katherine Becker’s absolute control over the ultimate disposition of the insurance proceeds is a “benefit” within the meaning of § 15-11-803(3).
The plaintiff originally filed wrongful death claims against Becker and the insurance company. Her claim against the insurance company alleged that it knew or should have known it supplied Becker with a motive to kill the insured since she had no insurable interest in his continued existence. The plaintiff agreed to dismiss her wrongful death claim against the insurance company with prejudice and the insurance company agreed to interplead the proceeds.
Thus, the sole issue presented requires us to determine who, between the murderer’s children and the victim’s estate, should receive the benefit of the policies. Inasmuch as the award of the proceeds to benefit a murderer’s children is contrary to the legislative intent of § 15-11-803(3), and since Seidlitz' murder prevented support of his family and any future augmentation of his estate, the proceeds of the policies on his life should inure to the benefit of his estate.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court.