I concur in the majority’s holding that Proposition 51, the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986 (hereafter Proposition 51 or the Act) violates neither the due process nor the equal protection guarantees of the state or federal Constitutions. I respectfully dissent, however, from its holding that Proposition 51 does not apply to causes of action which accrued before the measure’s effective date. I conclude, as did the Court of Appeal, that the Act was designed to apply to all cases yet to be tried, including the instant one. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal in its entirety.
Discussion
Because “nothing in the language of Proposition 51 . . . expressly indicates that the statute is to apply retroactively,” the majority concludes that it must apply prospectively. (Majority opn. at p. 1209.) Hence, the majority holds that the modified rule of joint and several liability enacted by the electorate shall not apply to any “cause of action” that accrued prior to the Act’s effective date even if suit had not been filed before Proposition 51’s enactment.
*1228The majority grounds its holding on three fundamental assumptions: 1) that section 3 of the Civil Code requires an express statement of retroactive intent, 2) that if the drafters of the Act had intended a retroactive application, they would have said so in the proposition, and 3) that a retroactive intent may not legitimately be inferred from sources other than the proposition itself. Each of these assumptions, as I shall explain, is legally incorrect and inconsistent with prior decisions of this court.
Aside from these three erroneous legal assumptions, the majority justifies its holding on two additional practical considerations. Application of the Act to all cases untried on its effective date, the majority asserts, would result in: 1) unfairness to plaintiffs who may have relied on the former rule of joint and several liability in making such tactical litigation decisions as whom to sue, and with whom and for how much to settle, and 2) an unwarranted “windfall” to insurance companies which computed their preProposition 51 premiums on the basis of the former law. As will appear from the discussion which follows, these asserted practical considerations are for the most part incorrect factually and in any event are unsound as a basis for decision.
The presumption of prospectivity said to be codified in Civil Code section 3 does not require an express statement of retroactive intent, nor does the absence of such a statement in the Act indicate that its drafters must have intended that the presumption should apply. The paramount consideration here, as in any other matter of statutory construction, is to ascertain the intent of the enacting body so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.
A wide variety of factors may be relevant to the determination of whether the enacting body intended a new statute to be given retroactive effect. As more fully explained below, two factors of particular relevance here are the Act’s history and its express remedial purposes. When these are considered in light of the relevant facts and decisional law, the conclusion becomes nearly inescapable that the Act’s purposes can be fully served only if it is applied to all cases not tried prior to its effective date.
As to the practical ramifications of an application of the Act to cases not tried before its effective date, a dispassionate analysis reveals the majority’s concerns to be largely groundless. Indeed the majority implicitly concedes as much by holding that the Act shall not apply to any cause of action that accrued prior to its effective date regardless of whether the plaintiff has taken any steps which could even arguably be construed as “reliance” on the former law.
I conclude, finally, by noting the strange logic that would attempt to justify a retrospective application of the radical restructuring of tort liability *1229which this court effected in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393], yet condemn as “unfair” a retrospective application of the relatively limited reform enacted by the electorate through Proposition 51. The inconsistency does little credit to this court, or to the principle and appearance of judicial impartiality.
1. Legislative Purpose and the Presumption of Prospectivity
The first and essentially the only real point of the majority opinion— intoned, however, with the drumbeat regularity of a Hindu mantra—is that the “presumption of prospectivity” is dispositive absent an express statement of legislative intent to the contrary. No matter how often repeated, however, the point is profoundly mistaken. This court has held that the presumption of prospectivity codified in Civil Code section 3 is relevant “only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent.” (Italics added, In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948]; accord Fox v. Alexis (1985) 38 Cal.3d 621, 629 [214 Cal.Rptr. 132, 699 P.2d 309]; In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 587 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371]; Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 686-687 [91 Cal.Rptr. 585, 478 P.2d 17].) As Estrada counseled, “That rule of construction ... is not a straightjacket. Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent.” (63 Cal.2d at p. 746; accord In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 587; Mannheim v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 686-687.) This has long been the rule. (See, e.g., Estate of Frees (1921) 187 Cal. 150, 156 [201 P. 112] [retroactive operation may be “inferred . . . from the words of the statute taken by themselves and in connection with the subject matter, and the occasion of the enactment. . . .” (Italics added.)].) And as this court has recently reaffirmed, “An express declaration that the Legislature intended the law to be applied retroactively is not necessarily required.” (Fox v. Alexis, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 629.)
The majority attempts to distinguish our holdings in Mannheim, supra, 3 Cal.3d 678 and Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d 583, on the ground that there is no evidence in this case to show “the retroactivity question was actually consciously considered during the enactment process.” (Majority opn. at p. 1211, italics added.) None of our prior decisions, however, has ever suggested that Civil Code section 3 requires proof of a “conscious” legislative decision that a statute or initiative should operate retroactively. On the contrary, Estrada, Mannheim, Marriage of Bouquet and Fox, supra, 38 Cal.3d 621, all emphatically reaffirm the traditional rule that legislative intent may—indeed must—in the absence of an express declaration be *1230“deduced” from a “wide variety” of “pertinent factors,” including the “context of the legislation, its objective, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction . . . .” (Fox v. Alexis, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 629; In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 591; Mannheim v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 686-687; In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746.)
The majority’s fundamental misunderstanding of these basic principles leads it into other errors. Thus, the majority assumes that “the drafters of Proposition 51 would have included a specific provision providing for retroactive application of the initiative measure if such retroactive application had been intended.” (Majority opn. at p. 1212.) That is a false assumption. As we have seen, where the language of the statute is silent, the courts may not automatically assume that the enacting body must have intended that the law should apply prospectively. On the contrary, the presumption of prospectivity “[i]s to be applied only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent.” (In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746, italics added.)
Indeed, if we properly assume that the proponents of Proposition 51 were aware of the relevant law when they chose to remain silent, it is not unlikely that they assumed the Act would apply to all cases not yet tried, and thus had no reason to expressly so provide. As the majority notes, statutes which modify the recoverability of damages have frequently been held by this court to be applicable to cases not yet tried. (See, e.g. Tulley v. Tranor (1878) 53 Cal. 274; Feckenscher v. Gamble (1938) 12 Cal.2d 482 [85 P.2d 885]; Stout v. Turney (1978) 22 Cal.3d 718 [150 Cal.Rptr. 637, 586 P.2d 1228].)1 Contrary to the majority’s assumption, therefore, if anything may reasonably be inferred from the Act’s silence (which I do not strongly advocate, inasmuch as the evidence of intent is controlling) it is that the Act should apply retrospectively to all cases not yet tried.
Nor does Bolen v. Woo (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 944 [158 Cal.Rptr. 454], the “decision most closely on point” according to the majority, suggest otherwise. The issue in that case was whether an amendment to the Civil Code (§ 3333.1) which abrogated the “collateral source” rule in actions against health care providers applied retroactively. The Bolen court noted that prior to passage of the legislation, the Legislative Counsel rendered an opinion which counseled that the statute “would fall within the proscription *1231against retroactive application . . . (96 Cal.App.3d at p.958.) Thus, “[ajrmed . . . with . . . counsel’s opinion on retroactivity . . the Bolen court concluded, the Legislature’s silence could be considered sufficient proof of its intent that the statute should apply prospectively. (Id. at p. 959.) The majority’s reliance on Bolen for the proposition that mere legislative silence triggers the presumption of prospectivity is clearly misplaced.
2. Retroactive Intent and Remedial Purpose
Based on the mistaken notion that the presumption of prospectivity governs absent an express declaration to the contrary, the majority concludes that a retroactive intent may not validly be inferred from other sources. However, the law is precisely to the contrary. We have consistently held that the presumption applies “only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent.” (In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746, italics added.) As we recently reaffirmed in Fox v. Alexis, supra, 38 Cal.3d 621, a “wide variety of factors may be relevant to our effort to determine whether the Legislature intended a new statute to be given retroactive intent. The context of the legislation, its objective, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction may all indicate the legislative purpose.” (Id. at p. 629.) Two factors of particular relevance here are the “history of the times” and the perceived “evils to be remedied” by the Act.
The majority laudably prefaces its discussion of Proposition 51 with a “brief historical perspective.” (Majority opn. at pp. 1196-1199.) The perspective provided, however, consists almost entirely of prior decisions of this court. There is, curiously, almost no mention of the dramatic context in which Proposition 51 was conceived and adopted, of the so-called “liability crisis” or the pitched battle among government agencies, business interests, insurers, and consumer advocates over the origins of the perceived crisis or the efficacy of Proposition 51 to alleviate it; no mention of the increasingly common multimillion dollar tort judgments or the alleged inequities of the “deep-pocket” rule that saddled public agencies and other institutions with damages far beyond their proportion of fault; no mention of the prohibitive insurance premiums that had forced numerous persons and entities from doctors to day-care centers, municipal corporations to corporate giants, to either go “bare” or go out of business; and no mention, finally, of the electorate’s overwhelming approval, by a vote of 62 percent to 38 percent, of the tort-reform measure designed to mitigate this crisis, the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986, or Proposition 51.
An awareness of historical context illuminates more than merely the spirit of the Act; it clarifies the letter of the law, as well. The text of the Act *1232begins with an unusually forthright statement of “Findings and Declaration of Purpose.” The Act sets forth three specific findings: “(a) The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as the ‘deep pocket rule’, has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice that has threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments, other public agencies, private individuals and businesses and has resulted in higher prices for goods and services to the public and in higher taxes to the taxpayers, ffl] (b) . . . Under joint and several liability, if [‘deep pocket defendants’] are found to share even a fraction of the fault, they often are held financially liable for all the damage. The People—taxpayers and consumers alike—ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the form of higher taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums. [j[] (c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police, fire and other protections because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and insurance premiums.”
In light of these express findings, the Act explicitly declares that its purpose is “to remedy these inequities” by holding defendants “liable in closer proportion to their degree of fault. To treat them differently is unfair and inequitable.” The Act “further declare[s] that reforms in the liability laws in tort actions are necessary and proper to avoid catastrophic economic consequences for state and local governmental bodies as well as private individuals and businesses.”
Thus, it is clear from the plain language of the Act as well as from the context in which it was adopted, that Proposition 51 was conceived in crisis, and dedicated to the proposition that the “ ‘deep pocket rule’ has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice.” Its express goals were no less than to avert “financial bankruptcy, ” to “avoid catastrophic economic consequences,” to stave off “higher taxes” and “higherprices,” and to preserve “essential” public services.
In light of these express remedial purposes, the inference is virtually inescapable that the electorate intended Proposition 51 to apply as soon and as broadly as possible. When the electorate voted to reform a system perceived as “inequitable and unjust,” they obviously voted to change that system now, not in five or ten years when causes of action that accrued prior to Proposition 51 finally come to trial. When they voted to avert “financial bankruptcy” and “catastrophic economic consequences,” to stave off “higher prices . . . and higher taxes,” and to preserve essential public “services,” they clearly voted for immediate relief, not gradual reform five or ten years down the line. A crisis does not call for future action. It calls for action now, action across the board, action as broad and as comprehensive as the Constitution will allow. It is clear that the purposes of Proposition 51 will be *1233fully served only if it is applied to all cases not tried prior to its effective date.
The law not only permits, but compels such an inference. When legislation seeks to remedy an existing inequity or to impose a less severe penalty than under the former law, the courts of this state have long held that the enacting body must have intended that the statute should apply to matters that occurred prior to its enactment. This concept found classic expression in In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, where we held, notwithstanding the statutory presumption against retroactivity, that when an amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the final date of judgment, the amendment applies rather than the statute in effect when the prohibited act occurred. (Id. at pp. 744-745.) The amendment in question had indicated a legislative determination that the former punishment was too severe. Therefore, we reasoned, the Legislature must have intended that the new statute should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply, for “to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance,” an objective contrary to civilized standards of justice. (Id. at p. 745; accord People v. Durbin (1966) 64 Cal.2d 474, 479 [50 Cal.Rptr. 657, 413 P.2d 433]; Holder v. Superior Court (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 314, 316-317 [74 Cal.Rptr. 853].)
The courts have applied similar reasoning to statutes designed to remedy inequities in the civil law. “In the construction of remedial statutes . . . regard must always be had for the evident purpose for which the statute was enacted, and if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied . . . .” (Abrams v. Stone (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 33, 42 [315 P.2d 453], italics added; accord Coast Bank v. Holmes (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 581, 595 [97 Cal.Rptr. 30].)
For example, In Harrison v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 197 [118 Cal.Rptr. 508], the court held that an amendment to the Labor Code which provided a cutoff date of five years for employer exposure to claims of occupational injury applied retrospectively to injuries incurred prior to the amendment’s effective date. After reviewing the “procedural morass,” delays and expense attendant upon the former law, the court concluded that the remedial purpose of the law required a retrospective application notwithstanding the absence of language in the statute manifesting such an intent: “[T]he amended legislation was designed and introduced for the purpose of ameliorating the procedural morass which has faced the board in multiple defendant cases. Thus, it is clear that the purpose of the amendment was to remedy an immediate situation which was imposing undue delay and expense upon litigants and hardship upon disabled employees . . . \T\he object of that legislation will not be effectuated unless *1234the board is permitted to apply the amendment retrospectively as well as prospectively. We conclude that it was the intent of the Legislature that it be so applied.” (Id. at pp. 205-206, italics added.)
Like reasoning also supported the decision in City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550 [90 Cal.Rptr. 843], where the court held that an amendment to the Government Code which relaxed the procedural standards governing local zoning proceedings applied retroactively. “It reasonably appears that the Legislature enacted section 65801 as a curative statute for the purpose of terminating recurrence of judicial decisions which had invalidated local zoning proceedings for technical procedural omissions. [Citations.] This legislative purpose would be fully served only if the section were applied . . . regardless of whether the offending procedural omission occurred before or after the section’s enactment.” (Id. at pp. 557-558, italics added.)
In Andrus v. Municipal Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 1041 [192 Cal.Rptr. 341], the issue was whether an amendment that repealed the statutory right to appeal from an extraordinary writ proceeding in the superior court challenging an action in the municipal court, applied to appeals filed before the effective date of the legislation. Though the language of the amendment was silent as to intent, the court concluded that the “obvious goal of the amendment . . . suggests the logic of retroactive application. ” (Id. at p. 1046, italics added.) The former statute, the court noted, provided broader appellate review of relatively trivial matters in the municipal court than was accorded an accused in the superior court. Therefore, “[t]o deny retroactive application to the amendment,” the court concluded, “is to subscribe to the notion that the Legislature desired to postpone the demise of a procedural loophole which was inequitable to defendants accused of more serious offenses, [and] placed unnecessary and redundant burdens on the appellate courts. .... We find that proposition absurd.” (Id. at p. 1047, italics added.)
It is, therefore, a fairly prosaic rule which holds that a retrospective intent may be inferred from a specific and compelling remedial purpose. The question before us is whether such an inference is justified in this case. As noted earlier, Proposition 51 was designed with the express intent to “remedy . . . inequities” in the existing rule of joint and several liability, inequities which threatened grave and imminent harm to the public weal. Indeed, such reform was “necessary,” the Act declared, “to avoid catastrophic economic consequences for state and local governmental bodies as well as private individuals and businesses.” (Italics added.) If this was not language evocative of “the logic of retroactive application” (Andrus v. Municipal Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 1046), then nothing is.
*1235To deny retroactive application to the Act would infer an intent to postpone the repeal of a rule which its drafters expressly condemned as inequitable and unjust. Indeed, it would infer an intent to perpetuate that rule in potentially thousands of actions that accrued prior to the Act’s effective date. Instead of a fair and uniform system of liability, it would infer that the drafters intended a dual system of justice, where the courts would apply a reformed rule of joint and several liability to one set of defendants, and a discredited, inequitable rule to another. I find that proposition patently untenable as well as unjust.
Nevertheless, the majority insists that a retroactive intent may not be inferred from a clear and compelling statement of remedial purpose. The reason, according to the majority, is that “[m]ost statutory changes are . . . intended to . . . bring about a fairer state of affairs” and therefore “almost all statutory provisions and initiative measures would apply retroactively rather than prospectively.” (Majority opn. at p. 1213.) Furthermore, the majority asserts, this court rejected a similar argument nearly 40 years ago in Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388 [182 P.2d 159]. Neither of these contentions withstands scrutiny.
Aetna concerned the retroactivity of an amendment to the Labor Code that increased workers’ compensation benefits. In support of a retrospective application of the law, the injured workers relied on the statutory mandate that provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act are to be “liberally construed” to extend their benefits to injured workers. (Lab. Code, § 3203.) We rejected the workers’ argument, however, holding that a retrospective intent could not be “implied from the mere fact that the statute is remedial and subject to the rule of liberal construction.” (30 Cal.2d at p. 395.) The doctrine of “liberal construction” and the presumption of prospectivity, we noted, were merely two canons of construction, and “[i]t would be a most peculiar judicial reasoning,” we observed, “which would allow one such doctrine to be invoked for the purpose of destroying the other.” (30 Cal.2d at p. 395.)
Aetna therefore stands for the simple proposition that one general canon of construction (that workers’ compensation provisions are to be “liberally” construed) does not supersede another (that statutes are presumed to apply prospectively). The case at bar bears no resemblance to Aetna. Here the evidence relating to remedial intent consists not of abstract principles unrelated to the statute at issue, but of clear and unmistakable statements of particular remedial purposes in the Act itself, and of similar indications implicit in the history of the Act. The cases and authorities previously cited not only permit, but demand that we examine these expressions of remedial purpose for whatever clues they may provide on the question of retroactivity, and nothing in Aetna, supra, 30 Cal.3d 388, indicates otherwise.
*1236There is equally little merit to the majority’s assertion that the Act’s remedial purposes are irrelevant because many statutes could be described as “remedial.” The argument suggests that courts are powerless to weigh the probative value of the evidence of remedial purpose in each case, and decide whether an inference of retrospective intent reasonably and logically follows. Indeed, that is precisely the sort of function which courts perform daily.
Moreover, the purpose here was not merely remedial; it was to remedy a crisis. The question before us is whether, from that purpose, it may reasonably be inferred that the Act should apply to all cases not tried prior to its effective date. The evidence and our prior decisions overwhelmingly demonstrate that the answer to that question is “yes.”
3. The Fairness Issue
A. The Insurance “Windfall”
I am greatly troubled by the majority’s apparent concern that application of the Act to cases untried on the Act’s effective date would result in an unwarranted “windfall” to insurance companies because they computed their pre-Proposition 51 premiums on the basis of the former rule of unlimited joint and several liability. A little perspective here is in order. In Li v. Yellow Cab, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, this court abrogated the traditional all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence and adopted in its place a rule of comparative negligence. A few years later, in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899], we applied similar comparative fault principles to multiple tortfeasors, but retained the traditional rule of joint and several liability. In each case, we held that the new rule “shall be applicable to all cases in which trial has not begun before the date this decision becomes final . . . .” (Italics added, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 829; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Cal.3d 322, 334 [146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441] [applying retroactively the rule adopted in American Motorcycle].)
By thus retrospectively eliminating the existing complete defense of contributory negligence and yet retaining joint and several liability, this court imposed substantially increased liability upon insurance companies under policies the premiums for which had been calculated on the basis of the preexisting law. Yet we expressed no concern in those decisions that insurance companies were thereby compelled to pay greatly increased sums with respect to risks they could not have anticipated and for which they were not compensated. Nor did we decline to apply our abrupt change in the law retrospectively because to do so would have been “unfair.” On the contrary, we applied our rulings as broadly as constitutionally permissible, notwith*1237standing strenuous objections that such a radical alteration of existing law required legislative rather than judicial action, because we were “persuaded that logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice counsel against the retention of the doctrine rendering contributory negligence a complete bar to recovery . . . (Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 812-813, italics added.)
Consistency and impartiality would appear to demand, at the very least, that this court view the fiscal consequences to insurance companies of a retrospective application of Proposition 51, with the same cool detachment it manifested in Li scad American Motorcycle. Proposition 51, after all, was also designed to remedy certain perceived injustices in the existing tort liability system. If a retrospective application results in a “windfall” to insurers, what of it? Where the logic and justice of a retroactive application is otherwise compelling, I perceive no principled basis for holding to the contrary simply because the insurance industry might benefit.
Indeed, if the majority’s assertion that a retroactive application will result in savings to insurers is correct (the contention is premised on speculation, not on any hard evidence), it would appear to militate in favor rather than against retroactivity. As previously discussed, one of the goals of Proposition 51 was to slow the insurance-premium spiral by holding defendants liable for noneconomic damages only in proportion to their percentage of fault. As set forth in the Act’s findings, the so-called insurance crisis “threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments . . . higher prices for goods and services to the public and higher taxes to taxpayers.” To the extent that the Act results in less exposure and smaller payouts than insurance companies might otherwise have anticipated, it only serves to further these goals.
The majority’s inflated concern with insurance “windfalls” is thus largely misguided. That concern does, however, expose the unstated bias underlying the majority’s opinion. Implicit in the majority’s analysis is the assumption that Proposition 51 was essentially a private-interest bill designed to offer aid and comfort to corporate defendants; the broader its scope, therefore, the greater the prejudice to plaintiffs. However, if we were to judge the question before us strictly on a standard of fairness to plaintiffs, there is no doubt that the balance would fall squarely on the side of retroactivity. The Act’s statement of findings makes clear that its purpose was not exclusively or even principally to aid insurance companies. Ultimately, it is plaintiffs, not insurers, who suffer when tortfeasors lack insurance to pay judgments. It is the community as a whole, not the insurance industry, which suffers when day-care centers must close because they cannot afford insurance. Parochial interests, to be sure, supported the Act, but the People enacted it. *1238Their decision deserves an application equal to the pressing social and economic concerns which inspired it.
B. The “Reliance” Issue
Of course, in response to all of the arguments that militate in favor of retroactivity, one may justly recall that one party’s gain is another party’s loss. Proposition 51 purported to remedy an “inequity” in the existing joint- and-several doctrine by abrogating the rule as it applied to noneconomic damages. Though the Act placed no limit on the amount of noneconomic damages that plaintiffs could be awarded, it restricted plaintiffs’ right to full recovery of such damages in some instances by allowing recovery as to those damages from defendants only in proportion to their fault.
Courts may properly consider whether the retrospective application of a statute would affect substantial rights, or substantially alter rules on which the parties have detrimentally relied. (Hoffman v. Board of Retirement (1986) 42 Cal.3d 590, 593 [229 Cal.Rptr. 825, 724 P.2d 511].)2 The question presented, therefore, is whether an application of the Act to all cases not tried prior to its effective date would, as the majority asserts, unfairly deprive plaintiffs of “a legal doctrine on which [they] may have reasonably relied in conducting their legal affairs prior to the new enactment.” (Majority opn. at p. 1194.)
The majority concludes that an application of the Act to cases not tried before its effective date would place persons who “acted in reliance on the old law in a worse position than litigants under the new law.” (Majority opn. at p. 1215.) Two examples of such detrimental reliance are suggested. First, the majority opines that plaintiffs whose causes of action arose before Proposition 51 “will often have reasonably relied on the preexisting joint and several liability doctrine in deciding which potential tortfeasors to sue and which not to sue.” (Majority opn. at p. 1215.) Thus, the majority suggests that in reliance on the old joint and several rule, plaintiffs’ attorneys “often” refrained from filing suit against potentially liable defendants in order to save their clients the “added expense” of service of process. (Majority opn. at p. 1215.)
*1239There is no evidence that this occurred in any substantial number of cases. On the contrary, general experience teaches that plaintiffs usually sue everyone who might be liable for damages. Indeed, in most cases the former rule of joint and several liability encouraged plaintiffs to name as many defendants as possible because the entire judgment could be recovered from any one defendant, no matter how minimally liable. In the unlikely event, however, that a potentially liable defendant was actually omitted from a complaint in reliance on the former rule, it obviously constituted a tactical decision by the plaintiff to take advantage of a part of the old rule that was entirely unfair to marginally liable, deep-pocket defendants, a part of the very unfairness Proposition 51 was intended to remedy.
The other “reliance” factor cited by the majority concerns settlements. The majority suggests that plaintiffs in pre-Proposition 51 cases “may frequently have settled with some defendants for a lesser sum than they would have accepted if they were aware that the remaining defendants would only be severally liable for noneconomic damages.” (Majority opn. at p. 1216.) A moment’s thought reveals that this contention, like the first, contains far less than meets the eye.
First, the argument again runs counter to common experience. In a case with multiple defendants of varying degrees of solvency, plaintiffs rarely settle first with the “deep-pocket” defendants in order to pursue the defendants who are effectively judgment-proof. Where the “deep pocket” defendant does settle first, however, it is not likely to be for substantially less than the case is worth, since there is little likelihood of substantial recovery from the remaining defendants.
Second, it is well to recall exactly what Proposition 51 provides. It repeals the joint and several rule only as applied to noneconomic damages, i.e. pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium and the like. (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(2).) It has no effect whatsoever on the joint and several rule as applied to the more common tort damages—medical expenses, loss of earnings, loss of property, costs of repair or replacement, and loss of employment or business opportunities. (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(1).) Thus, whatever reliance a settling plaintiff may have placed on the former rule of joint and several liability, that reliance remains largely undisturbed by the enactment of Proposition 51.
Finally, it is clear that with or without the former joint and several rule, a good faith settlement (at least since our decision in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 [213 Cal.Rptr. 256, 698 P.2d 159]) must fall within a reasonable range of the settlor’s proportionate share of liability. (Id. at p. 499.) As this court further recognized in TechBilt, every settlement involves a multitude of factors which could reason*1240ably impel a plaintiff to settle for less than the settling defendant’s proportionate share of fault. For example, “ ‘a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ ” (Id. at p. 499, quoting from Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 238 [132 Cal.Rptr. 843].) Other factors include the “recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial,” as well as the obvious avoidance of the risk, costs and inconvenience of trial. (Ibid.)
We do not mean to suggest by this that the former “deep pockets” rule may not have influenced some plaintiffs to settle for less than a defendant’s proportionate share of noneconomic damages. To the extent any such settlement was for substantially less than the settling defendant’s estimated range of liability, however, it was unfair to nonsettling defendants and should not have been sanctioned by the trial court in the first place. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.) Moreover, when the former rule is viewed as only one out of a myriad of factors that may have legitimately influenced plaintiffs’ decisions to settle for less than a defendant’s proportionate share of liability, the question of reliance becomes rather hopelessly speculative. The role that the former joint-and-several rule may have played in the overall decision-making process is certainly far less significant than the majority implies.
In light of the foregoing, it is no surprise that the majority itself studiously ignored the “reliance” argument when formulating its holding in this matter. For the majority broadly holds that the Act shall not apply to any “cause of action” that accrued prior to its effective date, regardless of whether plaintiffs have manifested even the slightest potential reliance on the former law. If the “reliance” argument had any merit, the majority surely would have tailored its decision to hold, at a minimum, that the Act would be inapplicable only to cases filed prior to its effective date. Its failure to do so reveals the makeweight nature of its “reliance” and “unfairness” arguments.
In sum, I am not persuaded by the majority’s assertion that a retrospective application of Proposition 51 would result in a significant diminution of plaintiffs’ rights or expectations under the former law.3 On the contrary, it is clear that the purposes of the Act and the interests of the public as a whole would be served only by an application of the Act to all cases not yet tried prior to its effective date.
I would note, finally, that our earlier discussion of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804 and American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, *1241supra, 20 Cal.3d 578, also bears directly on the issue of fairness to parties who might have relied on the preexisting law. As the majority acknowledges, our decision to apply the principles of Li and American Motorcycle retrospectively affected substantial rights and expectations arising out of transactions that occurred before those decisions. The relatively limited reform effected by Proposition 51 pales in comparison. Yet the same court that unhesitatingly determined to apply retroactively the sweeping changes effected by Li, now purports to be offended when the same broad application is urged for the limited reform contained in Proposition 51. It is a puzzlement.
It is an irony, as well. For although, as the majority notes, Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, “served to reduce much of the harshness of the original all-or-nothing common law rules, the retention of the common law joint and several liability doctrine” in American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578, nevertheless perpetuated other inequities. Proposition 51 “was addressed,” the majority observes, to these remaining problems. (Majority opn. at pp. 1197-1198.) If the inequities in the rule of contributory negligence compelled a retrospective application of Li, notwithstanding its impact on settled expectations, surely the injustice inherent in the unlimited rule of joint and several liability compels an equally broad application of Proposition 51.
The majority, however, concludes otherwise, arguing that because Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, was a judicial decision “the court was the appropriate body to determine whether or not the new rule should be applied retroactively . . . .” (Majority opn. at p. 1222.) No one suggests otherwise. The point, however, concerns the fairness of the court’s decision to apply Li retroactively, not its power to do so.
The majority also attempts to distinguish Li on the ground that “statutes operate . . . prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively.” (Majority opn. at p. 1221.) This not only misstates the general rule as applied to statutes (the intent of the enacting body governs the interpretation of statutes, not the presumption of prospectivity), but distorts the rule as to judicial decisions, as well. For judicial decisions are not automatically governed by a mindless “presumption” of retroactivity any more than statutes are governed by a presumption of prospectivity. As this court carefully explained in Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 152 [181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642 P.2d 1305], “[T]he question of retroactivity [of judicial decisions] depends upon considerations of fairness and public policy.” (Id. at p. 152; accord Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 333; In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 850 [126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, 94 A.L.R.3d 164].) As we further explained, the issue comprehends such considerations as the “extent of the public reliance upon *1242the former rule,” the “purpose to be served by the new rule,” and the “effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application.” (Id. at pp. 152-153; see also Isbell v. County of Sonoma (1978) 21 Cal.3d 61, 74-75 [145 Cal.Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188]; Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 193 [98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421].)
If considerations of fairness, public policy and the purposes of the new rule announced in Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, compelled its retroactive application, notwithstanding the extensive reliance placed by insurers and others upon the former rule, surely the same broad application of Proposition 51 is compelled here. It is a strange logic indeed which can justify the retrospective application of a virtual revolution in the common law of civil liability, yet later deny similar scope to an enactment of the electorate designed to redress certain lingering inequities in that selfsame revolution. Perhaps the commentators will be able to reconcile these differing results. I cannot.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal in its entirety.4
Eagleson, J., and Anderson (Carl W.), J.,* concurred.
The petition of real party in interest Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., for a rehearing was denied June 23, 1988.
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Proposition 51, of course, does not actually change the amount of damages that plaintiffs may be awarded, but merely modifies the allocation of noneconomic damages among tortfeasors. Thus, it constitutes less of a change than a modification of the measure of damages so as to reduce the amount recoverable.
Indeed, courts have long attempted to distinguish statutes that affect “substantive” rights from those that affect merely “procedural” rights in determining the propriety of retrospective operation. (See, e.g. Abrams v. Stone, supra, 154 Cal.App.2d 33 at p. 41; Coast Bank v. Holmes, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593-594.) Some courts have even suggested that statutes which affect only “procedural" matters should not be defined as “retroactive” when applied to events that occurred prior to their effective date. (See, e.g. Coast Bank v. Holmes, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593-594; Morris v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co. (1935) 2 Cal.2d 764, 768 [43 P.2d 276].) As the majority correctly observes, however, this court has long since rejected such a distinction. (See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 394-395.) The critical issue is not the form of the statute but its “effects.” (Id. at p. 394.)
Needless to say, we find no merit in plaintiffs’ related contention that a retrospective application of the Act would result in an unconstitutional deprivation of vested rights.
Because of its conclusion that Proposition 51 does not apply to the case at bar, the majority does not reach the additional issues decided by the Court of Appeal and briefed by the parties, relating to the apportionment of damages to nonjoined defendants, and the meaning of “economic” damages under Proposition 51. I would affirm the Court of Appeal’s well reasoned holding that under Proposition 51, damages must be apportioned among the “universe” of tortfeasors, as well as its holding that “economic” damages include future medical expenses and future loss of earnings.
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.