concurring.
Reluctantly, I concur in the affirmance. I write separately to further address the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) settlement (Settlement Agreement), and to observe that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania would have been much better suited to decide this motion.
As the majority explained, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) established MDL 1203 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The instant case was initially transferred to the MDL court and that court oversaw pretrial proceedings in this ease before remanding it back to the Eastern District of Tennessee in July 2007. On January 14, 2008, Wyeth moved for summary judgment based on the Tennessee statute of repose (TSOR). In addition to her arguments that Wyeth had waived the TSOR defense by failing to timely assert it and that Georgia law should apply, Montgomery argued that her PPH claim was preserved by the MDL and Settlement Agreement.
*469Montgomery was a plaintiff in the MDL.1 The complaint in that action was filed within the time allowed by the TSOR. While PPH claims were not “settled claims,” they were clearly part of the litigation until settlement, and the MDL court expressly exercised jurisdiction over those claims in approving the settlement.2 Further the Settlement Agreement defined PPH and addressed the rights of PPH claimants. Thus, any assessment of the timeliness of Montgomery’s PPH claim necessitates an examination of the nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement, approved by the Pennsylvania court.
Both the Settlement Agreement and Pretrial Order (PTO) 1415 state that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania “retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over this action and each of the Parties ... to administer, supervise, interpret and enforce the Settlement in accordance with its terms.” In re Diet Drugs, Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *72 (E.D.Pa. Aug.28, 2000). Although it can be argued that Wyeth’s motion is based on a statute unique to Tennessee, the primacy of the interpretation and effect of the Settlement Agreement and PTO 1415 in resolving the issue is apparent. For this reason, Wyeth should have moved for summary judgment during the pretrial proceedings in Pennsylvania. See Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 667-68 (6th Cir.1973) (holding that a MDL transferee court has authority to hear motions for summary judgment as part of pretrial proceedings); United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F.Supp.2d 25, 38 (D.D.C.2007) (noting that the transferee court’s “familiarity with the issues in this case — a case which by now encompasses a voluminous docket — as well as the many related issues in the other cases in this MDL, indicates that it would be much more efficient to proceed to summary judgment motions in this Court rather than to ask the transferor court to play catch-up”); Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 328 F.Supp. 365, 370-71 (D.Del.1971) (looking at the relevant legislative history and concluding that Congress intended “to grant to the transferee district court under § 1407 the power to pass upon all pretrial motions including motions to dismiss, motions for judgment on the pleadings, or motions for summary judgment”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.... ”). But cf. In re Accutane Prods. Liab. Litig., 560 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1370-71 (Jud.Pan. Mult.Lit.2008) (vacating a transfer order that would consolidate the case as part of a MDL because the pending motion for summary judgment involved issues of state law unique to the plaintiff).
In opposing Wyeth’s motion for summary judgment, Montgomery asserted that her PPH claim was preserved by the commencement of the MDL and also by the Settlement Agreement. While the former assertion is easily addressed as a pure question of Tennessee law, the latter requires an interpretation of the Settlement *470Agreement in light of the MDL proceedings.
Regarding the former assertion, I do not agree with the majority that the MDL did not commence an action within the TSOR. As stated above, Montgomery was a member of the class, the action was brought within the TSOR, and the court expressly exercised jurisdiction over all claims. The fact that PPH claims were not settled does not alter these facts. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with Montgomery’s essential assertion that the PPH claims were pending before the Eastern District of Pennsylvania after the dismissal of the MDL. While the MDL court retained jurisdiction to “administer, supervise, interpret and enforce” the Settlement Agreement, such jurisdiction was retained “[wjithout affecting the finality of this Final Order and Judgment in any way,” and PTO 1415 dismissed the Third Amended Complaint. In re Diet Drugs, Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *71-72. Thus, unless the Settlement Agreement itself preserved Montgomery’s claim, it is barred because it was not re-filed within the TSOR.
In opposing application of the TSOR to bar her claim, Montgomery argued that under the Settlement Agreement 1) PPH claims were expressly preserved for future litigation; 2) Wyeth agreed not to assert the statute of limitations defense or argue that a plaintiff split her claims; and 3) any conclusion otherwise would conflict with the class notice she received. Montgomery argues that the class notice led PPH plaintiffs to believe that if they satisfied the agreed-upon definition of PPH, their rights would be unaffected by the Settlement Agreement. However, the Settlement Agreement barred PPH plaintiffs from bringing a claim until they satisfied the definition of PPH contained therein, which, in Montgomery’s case, was after the TSOR ran. Therefore, the only way Montgomery’s claim remains unaffected by the Settlement Agreement, as represented in the class notice, is if the Agreement is interpreted to bar Wyeth’s assertion of the TSOR defense. Montgomery further argued that the intent of the MDL was to treat all cases uniformly, settle non-PPH claims, and preserve PPH claims for future litigation under an agreed-upon definition, in exchange for which Wyeth agreed not to assert a time bar.
All these arguments are plausible, and the MDL court might have agreed with one or all of them. In any event, on this record, neither the district court nor this court is in a position to put the gloss on the Settlement Agreement that Montgomery urges upon us, because such a gloss is rooted in the context, rather than the language, of the Settlement Agreement. On the other hand, the MDL court would have been within its retained authority to do so.
While Montgomery complained below that Wyeth “inexplicably failed” to make “its motion while this action was pending in the MDL,” she never asked the court to transfer the case back to the MDL court for interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, nor has she argued on appeal that the district court erred in failing to do so, or in interpreting the Settlement Agreement itself. I am therefore constrained to concur in the affirmance.
Lastly, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that “Montgomery’s relationship with Wyeth is more significant in Tennessee,” and agree with the district court’s determination that that relationship was centered in Georgia. Nevertheless, I also agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Tennessee courts would apply the TSOR because Montgomery consumed the Pondimin and suffered her injury in Tennessee.
. The Settlement Class included "All persons ... who ingested Pondimin and/or Redux” except those whose claims had previously been resolved through litigation or settlement. (ROA, Vol. 6, at 1028.)
. Pretrial Order 1415 stated: "The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action with respect to all claims, and has jurisdiction over all parties to this action, including all members of the settlement class and subclasses defined below.” In re Diet Drugs, Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *69 (E.D.Pa. Aug.28, 2000).