concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Tennessee Supreme Court erred in affirming the Tennessee trial court’s decision to reject Thompson’s claim that he is incompetent to be executed without holding an evidentiary hearing on his sanity. *445Thompson’s well-documented history of delusions and psychosis — -evidenced by, inter alia, three medical experts’ opinions, prison records spanning almost two decades, and conservatorship proceedings — is relevant in determining whether Thompson is presently aware of his impending execution and the reason for it. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s conclusion in Section I of the Discussion, supra, that Thompson has made a “substantial threshold showing” of insanity sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on Thompson’s present competency to be executed. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2862, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007); Ford, 477 U.S. at 426, 106 S.Ct. 2595. A remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Thompson’s present competency is required.
I also agree with the majority’s conclusion in Section II, supra, that Thompson has failed to state a claim that he is presently being involuntarily medicated in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Thompson’s “chemical competency claim”). Because the issue of chemical competency is admittedly not properly before us, the majority’s discussion on the issue is improper and dicta. However, as the majority has openly done so, I feel compelled to at least briefly explain why, in Section I infra, the view taken by the majority is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Also, I write separately to express, in Section II infra, that Thompson’s decision to raise his “chemical competency claim” in his substantial change petition to the Tennessee Supreme Court was procedurally inappropriate. I also contend that Thompson’s chemical competency claim is actually a collateral attack on his sentence and may not be raised in a second or successive habeas petition.
Finally, as demonstrated in Section III infra, the majority clearly erred in holding that Thompson’s Rule 60(b) motion fails because he has not brought his motion within a “reasonable time” as required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1).
I.
As the majority explains, Thompson formally raised his chemical competency claim for the first time in his substantial change petition to the Tennessee Supreme Court in September 2005. The district court found the claim procedurally defaulted because adding the claim in the substantial change petition was “procedurally inappropriate.” Thompson v. Bell, No. 04-CV-177, 2006 WL 1195892, at *30 (E.D.Tenn. May 4, 2006). The majority explains that because the Tennessee Supreme Court did not expressly reject the claim based upon a state procedural violation, the claim is not procedurally defaulted. Even if the majority is right, it does not matter because, as the majority expressly holds, Thompson has failed to state a claim that the state is involuntarily medicating him.
Thus, even though the claim is not properly before us, the majority nonetheless proceeds to express its view on the legal issue of whether a state can execute a prisoner rendered competent through involuntary medication. Given the importance of this question, I feel it necessary to point out why the majority’s view of this issue — that it is likely “cruel” to execute those who have been rendered chemically competent involuntarily — is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
As the majority correctly notes, there is no Supreme Court decision directly addressing whether the Eighth Amendment forbids a state from involuntarily medicating an insane prisoner to restore his competency for execution. However, Ford v. *446Wainwright and several Supreme Court cases addressing Fourteenth Amendment challenges to involuntary medication make clear that involuntary medication is not inherently unconstitutional and is actually compelled in certain circumstances.
First and foremost, the Supreme Court has deemed the death penalty constitutional. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).1 In Ford v. Waimmight, the Supreme Court addressed the Eighth Amendment’s limitation on a state’s power to execute the insane. The Court found the proscription on executing the insane carried over from England and took hold in our common law at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405, 407-09, 106 S.Ct. 2595. The Court recognized many divergent theories for barring the execution of the insane, including moral, theological, and ethical arguments, but the Court held one thing for certain: “The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” Ford, 477 U.S. at 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595. In his concurrence, Justice Powell offered a narrower opinion: “I would hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Id. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (Powell, J., concurring). Without a majority opinion, Justice Powell’s opinion controlled and set the standard for determining competency for execution. Panetti, 127 S.Ct. at 2856. While Ford limits a state’s right to executing the insane, it is an affirmation that the death penalty itself is constitutional.
In Washington v. Harper, the Court considered the question of what limit the Due Process Clause places on a state’s power to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill prisoner against his will. Harper was a state prisoner who suffered from schizophrenia. Harper, 494 U.S. at 214, 110 S.Ct. 1028. When he stopped voluntarily taking antipsychotic medications, the state began medicating him against his will under a state law authorizing involuntary medication “to inmates who are ... gravely disabled or represent a significant danger to themselves or others.” Id. at 226, 110 S.Ct. 1028. In resolving Harper’s due process challenge to the forced medication, the Court explained that a prison inmate possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. Id. at 222, 110 S.Ct. 1028. At the same time, the Court cautioned that the outer limits of that liberty interest must be determined within the context of the prisoner’s confinement because the state has a counterbalancing interest “in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others.” Id. at 236, 110 S.Ct. 1028. Thus, the Court held that, in a prison setting, “the Due Process Clause *447permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with anti-psychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Id. at 227, 110 S.Ct. 1028. Harper thereby affirmed a state’s right to impose involuntary medication under certain conditions.
Applying Harper in the pretrial context, the Court in Riggins v. Nevada considered the state’s authority to involuntarily medicate a prisoner to render him competent to stand trial on serious criminal charges. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992). The Rig-gins Court reiterated that an individual has a liberty “interest in avoiding the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs,” id. at 134, 112 S.Ct. 1810, and explained that only a state’s “essential” or “overriding” interest could overcome it, id. at 134, 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810. The Court explained that rendering an accused competent to stand trial for murder would be one such interest, and held that involuntary medication would not violate due process if the state demonstrated that “treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins’[s] own safety or the safety of others.” Id. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810.2
The Supreme Court subsequently applied the framework erected by Harper and Riggins in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), where the Court articulated a four-part analysis courts must use in determining whether involuntary medication may be used to render a defendant competent to stand trial. The government must establish, by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of an “important ” governmental interest; (2) that involuntary medication “will significantly further ” that important interest; (3) that involuntary medication is “necessary ” to furthering the important interest; and (4) that the administration of the drugs is “medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.” Id. at 180-81, 123 S.Ct. 2174.
The Sell Court emphasized that the four-part analysis applies when a court “is seeking to determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.” Id. at 181, 123 S.Ct. 2174. However, the Sell Court also explained that a court need not conduct the four-part analysis “if forced administration is warranted for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in Harper related to the individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to the individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.” Id. (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 225-26, 110 S.Ct. 1028). Guided by Sell, this Court now applies the four-part Sell standard when the involuntary medication is requested to restore competency to a pretrial detainee and the pretrial detainee is not a danger to himself or others, but this Court applies the Harper standard if he does pose a danger to himself or others. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 545 & n. 5 (6th Cir .2008).
Additionally, states are constitutionally required to provide medical care to inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) *448(holding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, requires the state to provide adequate medical care to prison inmates). That duty exists as long as the prisoner is confined and is not extinguished or diminished because the inmate may be under sentence of death. See, e.g., Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026 (reasoning that “the best medical interests of the prisoner must be determined without regard to whether there is a pending date of execution”). Indeed, in this Circuit, we hold the state accountable for “deliberate indifference” — a violation of the Eighth Amendment — if the state culpably fails to treat an inmate’s serious medical need. See, e.g., Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir.2008); see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 2004) (defining a serious medical need as “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention”).
In short, as outlined above, the state has the following rights and obligations vis-avis prisoners: The state is obligated under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause to attend to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, 97 S.Ct. 285. The state is also not restricted by the Due Process Clause from involuntarily medicating a prisoner if he is a danger to himself or others. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223, 110 S.Ct. 1028. The state is further permitted under the Constitution to medicate a defendant to render him competent to stand trial. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81, 123 S.Ct. 2174. And the state may carry out the death penalty, Baze v. Rees, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 1529, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008), so long as the prisoner is competent on the eve of his execution, Ford, 477 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595.
It follows, then, that if all of the predicate acts of carrying out a valid death sentence on a mentally ill inmate are either constitutionally required or permitted, and the death penalty itself is constitutional, the state’s imposition of the death penalty to an inmate rendered competent via involuntary medication must also be constitutional. In other words, it is illogical to conclude that while the state has a duty to provide an inmate with medical care and can also render the prisoner competent to stand trial and possibly receive the death penalty, the state is barred from carrying out the death penalty if that medical care successfully reduces the symptoms of a mental illness and, as a result, the inmate regains his competency.
The en banc Eight Circuit is of a similar view. In Singleton v. Norris, the en banc court considered analogous issues to those raised by Thompson, namely “the interrelated issues of whether the State may forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a prisoner whose date of execution has been set and whether the State may execute a prisoner who has been involuntarily medicated under a Harper procedure.”3 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1023. Singleton was under a Harper order of involuntary medication, which he argued was initially valid while his execution was stayed but which subsequently became unconstitutional once his execution date was set. Id. at 1023. The en banc court disagreed, reasoning that the decision to medicate under Harper is made based upon the best medical interests of the prisoner, and “must be determined without regard to whether *449there is a pending date of execution.” Id. at 1026. Thus, according to the court, “the mandatory medication regime, valid under a pendency of a stay of execution, does not become unconstitutional under Harper when an execution date is set.” Id.
Singleton also claimed that the Eighth Amendment barred his execution because the state was rendering him “artificially competent” especially so that he could be executed. Id. The Eighth Circuit rejected that argument too, explaining that “the state was under an obligation to administer antipsychotic medication” and, therefore, any investigation into whether the state had other motives was “unnecessary” and “irrelevant.” Id. at 1027. The court held, then, that “[a] State does not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Ford when it executes a prisoner who became incompetent during his long stay on death row but who subsequently regained competency through appropriate medical care.” Id.
Accordingly, based upon the Supreme Court precedent cited above, holding that an involuntarily chemically competent prisoner may not be executed would be problematic because it would tie the hands of state officials who may be involuntarily medicating inmates to satisfy their obligation to provide appropriate medical care and ensure the safety of prison employees and inmates. Those officials would be faced with the Hobson’s choice between administering medically appropriate treatments to the mentally ill inmate population under Harper and risking the possibility that lawfully imposed sentences may not be carried out. In that instance, it will likely be the inmates in need of medical treatment that suffer.
As the Singleton court held, “Ford prohibits only the execution of a prisoner who is unaware of the punishment he is about to receive and why he is to receive it.” 319 F.3d at 1027. And medications may reduce the symptoms of psychosis enough that a prisoner may be found Ford-competent. Medications may further quell the symptoms enough that a prisoner regains “the opportunity to prepare, mentally and spiritually,” for his death. Ford, 477 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. 2595. Accordingly, a state — which is adhering to either the Harper standard in involuntarily medicating a dangerous individual, or simply acting on its responsibility to address the medical needs of its inmates — does not violate the Eighth Amendment by executing a mentally ill inmate who is receiving antipsychotic medications so long as the prisoner meets the Ford standard for competency.
II.
For completeness, I would like to note that it was proeedurally inappropriate for Thompson to raise his chemical competency claim in his petition to the Tennessee Supreme Court alleging a substantial change in his mental condition. Ford claims are designed to determine whether a prisoner is competent to be executed at the time the execution is imminent. See, e.g., Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 823 (6th Cir.2000) (“Coe’s Ford competency claim was not ripe until his execution was imminent. ...”). As such, Ford claims are distinct from the merits. See Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628, 631 (9th Cir.1997) (explaining that “competency to be executed is not an issue of guilt or innocence” subject to AEDPA’s restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions), aff'd, 523 U.S. 637, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998). That is, Ford claims do not affect the underlying validity of the conviction and sentence, but only determine the prisoner’s present competency to be executed. That is all that Ford claims decide.
*450In Tennessee, if a prisoner challenges the state’s right to execute him on the grounds that he fails to meet the Ford standard for competency, the trial court will make a competency determination, which is automatically reviewed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 271-72 (Tenn.1999). If, on automatic review, the Tennessee Supreme Court finds the prisoner competent, then the Van Tran court explains that “subsequent Ford claims will be disallowed” except in one narrow situation: the prisoner,
by way of a motion for stay, provides this Court with an affidavit from a mental health professional showing that there has been a substantial change in the prisoner’s mental health since the previous determination of competency was made and the showing is sufficient to raise a substantial question about the prisoner’s competency to be executed.
Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 272.
In other words, the Van Tran court unequivocally states that the sole function of a substantial change petition is to raise a question about the prisoner’s present competency for execution after a court has previously found him competent, thereby allowing a prisoner to raise another Ford claim. Id. It does not authorize a prisoner to bring any other type of claim. Accordingly, it is procedurally inappropriate to add new claims attacking the underlying conviction and sentence, and any new claims would not be “fairly presented” in such a petition. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989) (holding that a habeas petitioner’s raising of a claim for the first time in two motions for allocutor to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not “fair presentation” of the claim because the procedural context in which it was raised rendered consideration on its merits unlikely).
To the extent Thompson argues that Tennessee may not execute him if he is involuntarily medicated, he is attacking the merits of his conviction and sentence, a legal argument.4 As such, Thompson’s chemical competency claim is analytically distinct from Thompson’s Ford claim, which only alleges that he is presently incompetent to be executed, a /aci-based argument. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595; Martinez-Villareal, 118 F.3d at 631; see also Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 643-45, 118 S.Ct. 1618 & n.* (1998) (considering “abuse of the writ” cases in deciding whether a habeas petitioner’s *451Ford claim is second or successive; however, leaving unresolved whether a “Ford claim [raised] for the first time in a petition filed after the federal courts have already rejected the prisoner’s initial habeas application ... would be a ‘second or successive habeas corpus application’ within the meaning of AEDPA”). Therefore, Thompson at a minimum should have brought the claim in his initial habeas petition attacking the merits of his conviction and sentence, but he failed to raise the claim in his 1998 habeas petition, which was dismissed on the merits in 2000. See Thompson v. Bell, 315 F.3d 566, 584 (6th Cir.2003).5
Because it was not raised in his initial petition, the claim could only be brought by way of a second or successive petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244. However, Thompson also failed to seek the permission of this Court before raising the claim to the district court, so it is not reviewable here.6 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), (3).
I realize that the Eighth Circuit, in Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc), held that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)’s restrictions on “second or successive” petitions did not apply to a habeas petitioner’s Ford claim and “Ford-derived” Eighth Amendment challenge to involuntary medication. In Singleton, the petitioner raised a Ford-competency claim in his initial and second habeas petitions. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1021-22. Both times, the courts did not reach the Ford claim because the petitions were decided on other grounds. Id. Finally, in his third habeas petition, the en banc court had to decide whether the petitioner’s Ford claim — and his Ford-derived chemical competency claim — were barred as second or successive habeas petitions. The court, relying in part upon In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234 (5th Cir.1998), a Fifth Circuit case considering an inmate’s challenge to loss of good-time credits, held that a claim that “had not arisen” at the time of a previous habeas petition was not second or successive. According to the en banc majority, the petitioner’s chemical competency claim did not arise until he was subject to a Harper order of involuntary medication and the execution date was set. 319 F.3d at 1023. Because the petitioner was not under a Harper order until after his initial petitions were adjudicated, the claims “had not arisen” at the time of the prior petitions and were, thus, not “second or successive.” Id.
One judge dissented. Judge Loken would have concluded that Singleton’s claim was ripe by the time Singleton had filed his first federal habeas petition: “Whereas a Ford competency claim is fact-intensive, whether it is constitutional to execute an inmate who is competent only by reason of medical treatment — ivhether voluntarily or involuntarily administered — is an issue of law that was apparent to Singleton’s attorneys no later than the May 1995 competency hearing.” Id. at 1028 (Loken, J., dissenting in part). In my view, Judge Loken correctly character*452izes the chemical competency claim as a question of law distinct from a fact-driven Ford claim. And while certain facts are necessary to ripen the claim — namely that the prisoner is, or likely to be, under an order of involuntary medication — the chemical competency claim is not tied to the same facts relevant to a Ford petition — namely the imminency of an actual execution date. Cf. Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 418-19 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that the statute of limitations in a § 1983 challenge to a state’s lethal-injection protocol began to run upon conclusion of direct review of death sentence and not when execution date was imminent).
Thus, were the issue properly before us, the proper answer would be that Thompson’s chemical competency claim presents a question of law, distinct from his fact-intensive Ford claim, and should have been raised in his initial habeas petition in 1998 attacking the merits of his state conviction and sentence. Indeed, Thompson claims that the state forcibly medicated him as early as 1995. See Thompson, 2006 WL 1195892, at *32 n. 17. Therefore, the factual basis for this claim undeniably existed when he first petitioned the district court for habeas relief in 1998. And it was most certainly available in 2004 when he filed his Ford petition. Because the claim was ripe in 1998, it could and should have been raised in Thompson’s initial petition or via a separate 28 U.S.C. § 2244 petition. Since it was not, the claim should be dismissed pursuant to § 2244(b)(2).
III.
I agree that the promulgation of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 39 (“Rule 39”) is an “extraordinary circumstance” under this Court’s reasoning in In re Abdur’Rahman, 392 F.3d 174 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc) (“Abdur'Rahman I”), vacated, 545 U.S. 1151, 125 S.Ct. 2991, 162 L.Ed.2d 909 (2005). However, this Court should not have considered Thompson’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from the district court’s judgment based upon Rule 39 because he has failed to raise this motion within a reasonable time. See Fed. R.Crv.P. 60(c)(1). The limits of reasonable time “ordinarily depend[ ] on the facts of a given case including the length and circumstances of the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party by reason of the delay, and the circumstances compelling equitable relief.” Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir.1990); see also Lester v. Zurn Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 54 (6th Cir.1994) (“What constitutes ‘reasonable time’ depends upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and [the consideration of] prejudice [if any] to other parties.”).
Thompson had many reasonable opportunities and sufficient notice to bring his Rule 60(b)(6) motion well before his eventual January 20, 2006 filing. Rule 39 was promulgated on June 28, 2001, which provided notice to Thompson of the district court’s error respecting exhaustion law in Tennessee. At that time, Thompson was actively pursuing an appeal in this Court of the dismissal of his initial § 2254 habeas petition. Indeed, Thompson even felt compelled to file a notice of supplemental authority referencing Rule 39 to this Court on August 1, 2001. Thus, Thompson was aware of Rule 39 and its potential effect on his interests at least as early as August 1, 2001. For this claim to be timely, Thompson should have been diligently pursuing his 60(b) motion in 2001, just as the petitioner in the AbdurRahman line of cases did. See Abdur'Rahman I, 392 F.3d at 178 (noting that Abdur’Rahman filed a Rule 60(b) motion relying upon Rule 39 on November 1, 2001, challenging the district court’s refusal to consider his prosecutorial *453misconduct claims as procedurally defaulted).
To be sure, in 2001, Thompson’s Rule 60(b) motion would have been treated as a second or successive habeas petition based upon Circuit precedent in McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1305 (6th Cir.1996), overruled by Abdur’Rahman I, 392 F.3d 174, which held that Rule 60(b) motions were the “practical equivalent” of successive habeas corpus petitions. However, it must be remembered that the diligence of Thompson’s contemporary, Abdur’Rahman (who was also sentenced to death in Tennessee), who filed a Rule 60(b) motion in 2001 despite McQueen, was what led to the overturning of McQueen and cleared the path for habeas petitioners to file Rule 60(b) motions in this context without threat of defaulting. In fact, we rejected a similar argument in Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d at 422. In Cooey, we considered a plaintiffs argument that the statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim did not begin to run until a Supreme Court decision, Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004), made a § 1983 action a possible remedy, where circuit precedent explicitly precluded a death-row inmate from challenging his method of execution via § 1983. Cooey, 479 F.3d at 422. We rejected the argument, stating that “[s]o long as there remains the possibility of en banc reconsideration and Supreme Court review, circuit law does not completely foreclose all avenues of relief.” Cooey, 479 F.3d at 422.
After Abdur’Rahman’s successful Rule 60(b) challenge, this en banc Court, on December 13, 2004, overturned McQueen. See Abdur’Rahman I, 392 F.3d at 182. At that time, the threat of Thompson’s 60(b) motion being treated as a second or successive habeas petition vanished, and he should have — at the latest — filed his motion within a “reasonable” time thereafter. Instead, Thompson waited another 13 months, and the record and briefs provide no explanation for his delay.
The majority opinion acknowledges that Thompson could have filed his Rule 60(b) motion immediately after Abdur’Rahman I was published, but dismisses it as “theoretical” because Thompson’s appeal was still pending and the district court would not have had jurisdiction. This is no excuse. While it is true that the district court would not have had jurisdiction to hear Thompson’s Rule 60(b) motion while Thompson’s habeas petition was before this Court, Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir.1993) (noting that a district court did not have jurisdiction to rule on a 60(b) motion once the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal), this Court has held that the proper procedure for seeking relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) is to file that Rule 60(b) motion in district court even if an appeal is pending. See Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir.2002). The district court would then indicate whether it would grant the motion, thus allowing the party to move this Court for a remand of the case. Id. Therefore, contrary to the Court’s reasoning, there was no jurisdictional hurdle for Thompson to overcome before filing his Rule 60(b) motion.
Finally, we must remember that this Court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion only for abuse of discretion and affirms the district court’s ruling “unless this court is left with a ‘definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.’ ” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Byers, 151 F.3d 574, 578-79 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Logan v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir. 1989)). In other words, “Under the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may overturn a lower court’s ruling only if it finds that the ruling was arbitrary, unjustifiable, or clearly unreasonable.” *454Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1148 (6th Cir.1986). The district court applied the appropriate law and conducted a thorough analysis of the record. Though the district court ultimately held that Rule 39 was not an “extraordinary circumstance” entitling Thompson to Rule 60(b)(6) relief, the district court held that denial was also appropriate because Thompson failed to raise his 60(b) motion within a reasonable time as required under Rule 60(b):
Rule 39 was enacted on June 28, 2001, and the Sixth Circuit initially issued its opinion on or about January 13, 2003, and certiorari was denied on or about December 1, 2003. However, on or about June 28, 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated its judgment and remanded the case to this Court. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision on August 29, 2005, and denied Thompson’s petition for rehearing on September 19, 2005. Nevertheless, Thompson waited more than four and a half years after the enactment of Rule 39 and four months from the denial of certiorari before filing his Rule 60(b)(6) motion on January 20, 2006. Thompson has not provided any explanation for the delay. Thompson’s filing of his motion more than one year after the enactment of Rule 39 demonstrates a lack of due diligence. Such a delay, without excuse, will ordinarily result in the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion.
Thompson v. Bell, No. 4:98-CV-00006, at 8 (E.D.Tenn. Mar. 27, 2006).
In reaching its ruling, the district court properly cataloged the procedural posture of the case and implied relevant points where Thompson could have raised the motion. Accordingly, I believe there is no way that an appellate court can fairly deem the district court’s ruling as “arbitrary, unjustifiable, or clearly unreasonable.” Plain Dealer, 794 F.2d at 1148.
In sum, the instrument for attacking the district court’s judgment was available as early as June 28, 2001, when Rule 39 was promulgated. Thompson’s filing of a “notice” before this Court in August 2001 demonstrates that he knew about this avenue of attacking the judgment. Finding no compelling justification to excuse Thompson’s failure to raise his motion within a reasonable time, I would hold that even though the promulgation of Rule 39 is an “extraordinary circumstance,” Thompson’s delay in filing his Rule 60(b) motion until 2006 is not reasonable, and the district court properly denied relief on Thompson’s motion.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority’s decision to remand the issue of Thompson’s present competency to be executed to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. If the state courts find Thompson meets the Ford standard for competency, then the state should be allowed to proceed forthwith with Thompson’s execution. Further, Thompson’s underlying state court judgment and conviction should not be revisited under the guise of a very untimely Rule 60(b) motion.
. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the government has an essential interest in carrying out a lawfully imposed sentence. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (recognizing “society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law”). Further, " ‘a State retains a significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely fashion.’ " Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 419 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004)). That interest "is at its greatest in the narrow class of capital murder cases in which aggravating factors justify imposition of the death penalty,” Singleton v. Noiris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1025 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc), and accordingly must also be keenly weighed against an inmate's interest in avoiding involuntary medication.
. However, because Riggins was involuntarily medicated without "any determination of the need for [antipsychotic medication] or any findings about reasonable alternatives,” the Court found a due process violation in that case. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 136, 112 S.Ct. 1810.
. Of course, as correctly noted by the majority, Thompson has not presented facts that he is being involuntarily medicated by the state.
. Contrary to the majority's characterization in footnote 3 supra, I do not contend that the factual predicate necessary to ripen Thompson's claim has not yet occurred. Nor do I suggest that Thompson's claim would have been ripe “at the time of his conviction and sentence'' in 1985. Quite to the contrary, the facts necessary to ripen Thompson's chemical competency claim arose in 1995, the year Thompson claims that the state involuntarily medicated him.
The fact that Thompson failed to state a claim that he is presently being involuntarily medicated does nothing to change the fact that Thompson was under a sentence of death and claims to have been involuntarily medicated back in 1995.
I also do not suggest that because Thompson's chemical competency claim presents a question of law, it was ripe even before the state ever medicated him. To be clear, I agree with the dissenting view in Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1028, that ripening a chemical competency claim requires only that a death-row prisoner is, or is likely to be, under an order of involuntary medication. Unlike a Ford claim, the chemical competency claim does not require that an execution date be “imminent.” Therefore, the necessary factual predicate had already occurred at the time Thompson presented his initial petition for habeas relief. As such, even though Thompson fails to state a claim that he is presently being involuntarily medicated, the chemical competency claim was nonetheless ripe in 1995.
. Our discussion here of AEDPA’s limitation on second or successive habeas petitions is distinct from the lead opinion’s discussion of the applicability of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions. See Section II, B supra. The lead opinion’s analysis is confined to consideration of whether Thompson’s chemical competency claim, as found in his March 17, 2006 amended habeas petition, was raised within one year of the state court’s final judgment.
. On June 20, 2007, this Court expanded Thompson’s Certificate of Appealability ("COA”) to address "whether the district court properly dismissed his claim that it is unconstitutional to execute an individual who is rendered competent through forced medication.” Our decision to expand Thompson's COA does not waive AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244.