Respondents Lee and Burris .brought a declaratory judgment action against South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (Department) challenging the validity of statutes and regulations prohibiting the hunting of “big game” (turkey, deer, and bear) on Sunday in eighteen Upstate counties. The circuit court granted summary judgment to respondents on the issues relating to deer and turkey hunting. We reverse.
FACTS
Respondents Lee and Burris are hunters who want to hunt big game on Sunday on land each owns in Newberry and Fairfield Counties. However, hunting big game on Sunday on privately owned property in eighteen Upstate counties, including Newberry and Fairfield counties, is prohibited.1 See *466S.C.Code Ann. § 50-9-510(9) and (10) (Supp.1998) (describing big game as deer, turkey, and bear); S.C.Code Ann. § 50-11-310(A)(1) and (2) (Supp.1998) (establishing season for taking antlered deer in the eighteen Upstate counties, with Sundays excepted); S.C.Code Ann. § 50-11-530 (Supp.1998) (granting Department authority to prescribe methods and areas in which turkeys may be hunted); 27 S.C.Code Ann.Reg. 123-40(2.8) (prohibiting Sunday hunting of deer, turkey, and bear in the eighteen Upstate counties).2 Hunting of big game is allowed on Sunday on privately owned property in the state’s remaining twenty-eight counties because no statute or regulation prohibits it.
Department contends the circuit court erred in ruling that statutory and regulatory prohibitions on Sunday hunting of big game in the eighteen Upstate counties violate: 1) equal protection and 2) the special laws provision of the state constitution.
ISSUES
1) Did the circuit court err in ruling that the statutory and regulatory prohibitions on Sunday hunting violate equal protection?
2) Did the circuit court err in ruling that the statutory and regulatory prohibitions on the hunting of big game violate the special laws provision of the state constitution?
DISCUSSION
1) Equal protection
The privilege to hunt big game is not a fundamental right or a suspect class requiring strict or intermediate scrutiny of Department’s asserted reasons for the Sunday ban. Therefore, we must give only minimal scrutiny to' the challenged statutes and regulations and decide whether a rational *467basis exists for them. Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, 332 S.C. 45, 52, 504 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1998) (when a case does not involve a suspect or quasi-suspect class, or a fundamental right, the statute or ordinance should be tested under the rational basis standard). The General Assembly may enact different laws in different geographical areas without violating the Equal Protection Clause, provided there is a rational basis for the distinctions. See Moseley v. Welch, 218 S.C. 242, 250, 62 S.E.2d 313, 317 (1950) (equal protection clause does not require statute to apply equally to all areas of the state).
To satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, a classification must (1) bear a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be achieved, (2) members of the class must be treated alike under similar circumstances, and (3) the classification must rest on some rational basis. D.W. Flowe & Sons, Inc. v. Christopher Constr. Co., 326 S.C. 17, 23, 482 S.E.2d 558, 562 (1997) (citing Jenkins v. Meares, 302 S.C. 142, 394 S.E.2d 317 (1990)). A legislative enactment will be sustained against constitutional attack if there is “any reasonable hypothesis” to support it. Id. (citing Thomas v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 100 S.C. 478, 85 S.E. 50 (1915)).
We must give great deference to the General Assembly’s classification decisions because it presumably debated and weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the legislation at issue. Further, “[t]he classification does not need to completely accomplish the legislative purpose with delicate precision in order to survive a constitutional challenge.” Foster v. South Carolina Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 306 S.C. 519, 526, 413 S.E.2d 31, 36 (1992).
The Department offers several reasons in support of the Sunday hunting ban in the Upstate.
(a) Difficulty of Enforcement
Department contends it would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the statewide ban on Sunday hunting on Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) lands in the eighteen Upstate counties if hunting is allowed on adjacent private properties. We agree.
*468WMA lands in the Upstate counties typically are numerous small areas scattered among private parcels. The average size of the 1,275 WMA tracts in the Piedmont is 259 acres. In contrast, WMA lands in Pee Dee and Lowcountry counties are substantially larger and less scattered among private parcels. The average size of the 82 WMA tracts in the Pee Dee is 1,412 acres, while the average size of the 258 WMA tracts in the Lowcountry is 1,934 acres. Thus, it is easier to enforce the Sunday hunting ban on WMA lands in the Lowcountry and Pee Dee counties, while still allowing Sunday hunting on private property, because the contiguous WMA lands are more readily identifiable. While some Pee Dee or Lowcountry WMA parcels may be non-contiguous, Department’s conclusions about the general nature of the hunting grounds across the state and difficulty of enforcement in the Upstate are valid and rational.
Furthermore, the Sunday hunting ban bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose of the enforcement of big game hunting laws. While Department must enforce the Sunday ban on WMA lands against small-game hunters, the addition of big-game hunters would exponentially increase the difficulty of that job in the Upstate.
(b) Preservation of Finite Wildlife Resources
Department contends the Sunday ban in the Upstate counties is necessary to preserve finite wildlife resources and the continuation of quality hunting experiences.
Department’s figures show that 39 percent of the, deer taken in the state in 1996 were taken in the eighteen Upstate counties, even though those counties contain less than half the land area of the remaining twenty-eight counties. In addition, the number of deer taken in the Upstate counties increased a “dramatic” 46 percent from 1990 to 1996, while the nmnber of deer taken in the remaining counties was relatively stable from 1990 to 1995.
Department asserts that turkeys are hunted during their breeding season because that is when they are the most active and most likely to respond to hunters’ calls. However, the smaller land ownership patterns and large number of hunters in the Upstate result in substantial disturbances of the turkey *469population. To combat those disturbances, Department contends banning hunting one day a week during the season will increase the chances of successful breeding and continued propagation of the species — a goal shared by Department and most hunters.
The Sunday ban bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose of preserving finite wildlife resources and quality hunting experiences. Upstate counties have had to be restocked in years past, often with wildlife from the Lowcountry. The popularity of deer hunting in the Upstate has outpaced the rest of the state, resulting in greater pressure on finite resources.
Contrary to respondents’ assertion, numerous studies by Department’s experts and others have shown that increased human activity adversely affects turkey behavior, including nesting activities.3 Limiting human activity and the hunting of big game, even if only for a day, is likely to further these proper goals.
(c) Other Recreational Users
Department contends the Sunday ban gives other recreational users — hikers, bird watchers, photographers, and other non-hunters — a chance to enjoy the outdoors without hearing the large-caliber gunshots of a big game hunter or being accidentally shot by a big game hunter. Department contends Sunday is the logical choice because it follows Saturday, the busiest hunting day, and is also a day of the week when many people do not work and would be most likely to take advantage of the outdoors.
The Sunday ban bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose of the creation of more opportunities for non-hunters to enjoy the outdoors in relative peace. Cf. Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Comm’n, 254 S.C. 378, 393, 175 S.E.2d 805, 812 (1970) (stating in appeal of condemnation proceeding that “[plublic health, recreation and enjoyment are recognized public uses” under law of eminent domain). While *470other users may be bothered by small-game hunters or target practice, the addition of a substantial number of big-game hunters carrying larger guns would increase the disturbance and likelihood of accidents.
In sum, we find reasons discussed above bear a reasonable relationship to the legislative purposes, and the Sunday ban rests on several rational bases.4 Respondents have failed to prove an equal protection violation, given the minimal level of scrutiny we must use in reviewing Department’s reasons for the Sunday ban.
As to whether members of the designated class are treated equally, we believe they are. Members of the designated class in this case, those who wish to hunt in the Upstate counties, are treated alike under similar circumstances. See Eli Witt Co. v. City of West Columbia, 309 S.C. 555, 425 S.E.2d 16 (1992). Accordingly, we hold the circuit court erred in finding an equal protection violation.
2) Special laws
Department contends the circuit court erred in ruling that statutory and regulatory prohibitions on the hunting of *471big game in the eighteen Upstate counties violate Article III, Section 34, of the state constitution. We agree.
The circuit court misapplied Martin v. Condon, 324 S.C. 183, 478 S.E.2d 272 (1996). In that case, no constitutional provision allowed individual counties to decide whether playing video poker would be criminal. Section 34 prohibits special laws on the protection of game — except that special laws may be enacted within each game zone. Thus, Section 34 allows different regulations within the various zones. We have said as much in the rehearing order in Martin, stating that “[i]t is axiomatic that the prohibition against special laws found in article III, § 34(IX), of our constitution does not apply where another constitutional provision specifically authorizes a special law.” Martin, 324 S.C. at 197, 478 S.E.2d at 279.
Based upon the above discussion, we believe the ban is rationally related to the protection of game. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court.
REVERSED.
FINNEY, C.J., and BURNETT, J., concur. WALLER, J., and Acting Associate Justice THOMAS E. HUFF dissenting in a separate opinion.. The state is divided into eleven game'zones. The region at issue in this case, which we refer to as the “eighteen Upstate counties,” is comprised of Game Zones 1, 2, and 4. Game Zone 1 (Mountain Hunt Unit) consists of Greenville, Oconee, and Pickens counties north of the Norfolk-Southern railroad. Game Zone 2 (Western Piedmont Hunt Unit) consists of Abbeville, Anderson, Edgefield, Greenwood, Laurens, Newberry, McCormick, and Saluda counties, south of Norfolk-Southern railroad. Game Zone 4 (Central Piedmont Hunt Unit) consists of Cherokee, Chester, Fairfield, Lancaster, Spartanburg, Union, and York counties.
. The General Assembly amended § 50-11-310 in 1997 to explicitly ban Sunday hunting of antlered deer in the eighteen Upstate counties after respondents filed their lawsuit. 1997 S.C.Act Nos. 33 and 57. The amendments gave Department explicit authority to "promulgate regulations ... to establish methods for hunting and taking of deer and for other restrictions for hunting and taking deer” in the eighteen Upstate counties. S.C.Code Ann. § 50-ll-310(D) (Supp.1998).
. The dissent misses the point of this argument. It is not necessary that turkeys be capable of acknowledging the days of the week. Turkeys need only be aware that there is less activity and gunshots which would encourage propagation and advance the Department’s goal.
. Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, in determining whether there is a legitimate government purpose, tire actual motivations of tire enacting governmental body are entirely irrelevant. Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, supra. Those attacking the validity of the legislation have the burden to negate every conceivable basis which might support it. Federal Communications Comm’n v. Beach Communications Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2102, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). Moreover, because we do not require the legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. Id. "In fact, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.” Id. (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510, 57 S.Ct. 868, 872, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937)). “The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979)).