concurring specially.
I concur fully in the opinion and analysis of the majority. I write separately, however, to address issues raised by the dissent, which overlooks both precedent and evidentiary requirements to reach what it deems to be the most equitable result.
Neither of the reasons given by the dissent for reversing the trial court is supported by law or fact in this case. The dissent argues that the plaintiff should be relieved of the consequences of not fulfilling her mandatory duty to update her bankruptcy petition because no evidence in the record shows that the plaintiff successfully asserted a position on her personal injury claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. To reach this conclusion, the dissent makes a series of unfounded assumptions. First, the dissent assumes that no evidence was admitted by the trial court during the summary judgment hearing in this case, despite the fact that the appellant failed to provide this Court with a transcript of that hearing. Then, based on this general assumption, the dissent more specifically assumes that the trial court never received evidence relating to the contents of the bankruptcy pleadings, including the confirmation plan. Next, the dissent theorizes what the terms of the confirmation plan, which may or may not have been placed before the trial court, might have been, and, on the basis of this speculated plan, the dissent reverses the decision of the trial court.
This analysis is problematic. As we have long held,
[w]hen an appellant omits evidence necessary for determination of issues on appeal [,] affirmation is required. It is well established that the burden is on the party alleging error to show it by the record and that where the proof necessary for determination of the issues on appeal is omitted from the record, an appellate court must assume that the judgment below was correct and affirm.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Griffin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Ga. App. 665, 666 (497 SE2d 257) (1998).
Under these circumstances, we must rely on the presumption in favor of the regularity of all proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction (Siegal v. Gen. Parts Corp., 165 Ga. App. 339 (301 SE2d 292) (1983)), assume that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling, and affirm the judgment. Acker v. Jenkins, 178 Ga. App. 393, 394 (343 SE2d 160) (1986). See also Thomas v. Bartlett, 183 Ga. App. 412 (359 SE2d 156) (1987). When there is nothing in the record to support the contention of error, there is nothing *636presented to this [C]ourt for review. Brookhaven Assoc. [v. DeKalb County, 187 Ga. App. 749, 750-751 (371 SE2d 231) (1988)].
(Punctuation omitted.) City of Atlanta v. Starke, 192 Ga. App. 267, 268-269 (1) (c) (384 SE2d 419) (1989).
In reaching its opinion, the dissent not only fails to presume the regularity of the proceedings below, but it speculates what the evidence could possibly show and presumes that the trial court acted improperly on the basis of this imagined evidence. The result is that, although the burden on appeal belongs to the appellant, the dissent construes evidentiary omissions in the appellate record to benefit the appellant and hinder the appellee. This result is inapposite to our review of cases on appeal, and, as such, it cannot provide a basis for reversal of the trial court.
To support its position, the dissent cites Seamans v. True, 247 Ga. 721 (279 SE2d 447) (1981). Contrary to the dissent’s position, Seamans is factually distinguishable and does not require a different result in this case. In Seamans, the Supreme Court held:
The trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment states that the grant was based upon the pleadings of the parties and the affidavit of Arthur True. Accordingly, we do not assume that evidence was presented at the motion for summary judgment hearing.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 723. Therefore, in Seamans, the trial court limited its review to specifically enumerated and distinct pieces of evidence. In this case, on the other hand, the trial court’s order states that its findings were based upon “argument and citations of authority.” The dissent argues, therefore, that the trial court did not consider other documents or testimony. Contrary to the dissent’s contentions, the trial court in this case did not state that it was limiting its decision to matters in the record, as implied by the dissent. At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court may have properly considered documents which were never formally introduced into evidence or included in the appellate record, as well as testimony which may have included admissions or stipulations and other such items not before us. That is why the burden lies with the appellant to provide a transcript of the hearing or otherwise establish what occurred at the hearing. The record may also be shown as provided in OCGA § 5-6-41 (i), but appellant has not availed herself of this remedy. Therefore, we must conclude under these facts that the ruling of the trial court was authorized. Therefore, Seamans has no application here, and it does not support the dissent’s erroneous presumption of *637the irregularity of the trial court’s actions.
Alternatively, the dissent concludes that the trial court must be reversed because an issue of fact remains as to whether the plaintiff intentionally asserted a contradictory position in her bankruptcy pleadings. While the dissent correctly indicates that the failure to disclose an accrued cause of action when initially filing for bankruptcy must be treated as a denial that the claim exists, it argues, without citation to any authority, that a different standard should be applied to claims acquired after the initial pleadings are made. In the latter situation, the dissent proposes to apply judicial estoppel to those making affirmative misrepresentations but not to those who passively fail to supplement their bankruptcy petitions. This distinction, however, is not supported by precedent.
In Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith &c., 212 Ga. App. 454, 455-456 (442 SE2d 265) (1994), a case involving a filing under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, this Court discussed the necessity to strictly enforce reporting procedures in bankruptcy cases.
These cases involve primarily the obligation placed upon the debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case to file a list of assets in which it must disclose any litigation which might arise from pre-bankruptcy matters. Compliance with disclosure requirements is essential to maintaining a bankruptcy case. In re Roberts, 117 B.R. 677; In re Hubbard, 96 B.R. 739. In the light of the stringent disclosure requirements under Chapter 11, the failure to disclose such information is viewed as amounting to a denial that such claims exist. This de facto denial triggers the application of several types of issue preclusion to bar subsequent attempts to prosecute such actions. See Oneida Motor Freight v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F2d 414; Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. MCORP Mgmt. Solutions, 157 B.R. 100, 102; In re Standfield, 152 B.R. 528.
Id.
The mere fact that a cause of action accrues after the initial filing of a bankruptcy petition is not a sufficient reason to modify our application of judicial estoppel. Whether the property is acquired before or after the initial filing, the duty imposed on a debtor to disclose it remains the same, and compliance with disclosure requirements after the initial filing remains crucial to the maintenance of a bankruptcy case. Southmark, supra. The dissent provides neither a compelling reason for contravening the historical adherence to disclosure compliance nor any distinctions in federal law relating to such compliance which would support the result it espouses.
*638While I appreciate the motivation behind the dissent’s position, I must point out that this Court is neither a court of equity nor a body with state or federal legislative powers. We are not free to fashion amendments to statutory disclosure requirements to fit our sense of equity. We are bound by the explicit statutory language and precedent laid before us, and, although we may criticize these sources, we must nevertheless follow their guidance, even if we are unsatisfied with the result. The doctrine of judicial estoppel is designed to protect the integrity of the judiciary. Southmark, supra. To retain that integrity in our application of this doctrine, we must be consistent with our analysis of precedent that is clear and unambiguous. If we fail to do so, only then will the result be truly incompatible with justice.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews and Judge Ellington join in this special concurrence.