dissenting.
I must dissent from the Court’s pronouncement that the insured, Gary B. Frank (appellant), is not entitled to aggregate (“stack”) medical payment insurance coverage limits of an automobile liability policy insuring more than one automobile where the policy terms preclude stacking.
Although this Court has not addressed itself before today to stacking in the context of medical payments coverage, my view is in accord with many other jurisdictions. E.g., Alabama Farm Bur. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Presley, 384 So.2d 122 (Ala.Civ.App.1980); Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Epperson, 234 Ark. 1100, 356 S.W.2d 613 (1962); Central Surety and Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963); Southwestern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Civ.App.1961). See also, 21 A.L.R.3d 900.
I am persuaded that this Court’s strong and clear declaration of public policy concerning stacking of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage should extend to medical payments coverage of the same automobile policy. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wendt, 708 P.2d 581 (Okla.1985); Lake v. Wright, 657 P.2d 648 (Okla.1982); Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 594 (Okla.1980); Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 153 (Okla.1976). If multiple premiums have been paid, then multiple coverage exists for the named insured notwithstanding a disclaimer in the policy. In the instant case, the insured has paid two premiums for medical payments coverage. Such coverage is not attributed to the car causing the damage or which car described in the policy that was occupied by the named insureds. He is not receiving a windfall as he has paid the insurer for this protection. The denial of medical coverage for each separate premium would indeed be a violation of our public policy.
There is no fundamental distinction between uninsured motorist benefits and medical pay benefits. Basic fair play and *582due process dictate that when a person pays a separate premium twice, then the insurer is obligated to honor the commitment of double coverage. Public policy will not let the insurer escape that for which it has charged and for which the insured has paid. If the insurer wants to limit medical pay coverage to one policy, then it should only require the payment of one premium.
I would, therefore, hold that where the insured has paid multiple premiums for medical payments coverage contained in a single policy covering multiple automobiles, the extent of medical payments coverage is the aggregate limit of coverage corresponding to the number of separate premiums paid by the insured regardless of express terms in the policy to the contrary. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for the insured.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SIMMS, Justice ALMA WILSON and Justice YVONNE KAUGER concur in the views expressed herein.