concurring specially.
Although I agree that this case must be reversed and concur fully with Divisions 2, 3, 5, and 6 and the judgment, I cannot concur with Division 1 that holds that Tyson was the victim of an illegal arrest, or with Division 4 that holds that Tyson’s claim that the trial court erred in allowing testimony about the contents of a lost videotape was moot based on its holding in Division 1. Although I concur with the reversal, I must note that the result reached by the majority would upon retrial necessarily preclude the introduction of all the evidence seized incident to Tyson’s arrest.
*294In Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 327 (297 SE2d 237) (1982), our Supreme Court abolished the distinction between the federal and state tests in determining whether an arrest was valid.
We find that these dual inquiries, one under federal law and one under state law, serve no useful purpose and result in complicating the law in an area which needs to be readily understood by law enforcement officers. Hence we hold that if an officer, while in the presence or vicinity of the accused, acquires “probable cause” (federal) to arrest the accused outside his or her home, and fails to make such arrest, there is likely to be a failure of justice as a matter of law if the officer is required to delay the arrest until a warrant is obtained. That is to say, we find the state rule to be the same as the federal rule. An arrest and search, legal under federal law, are legal under state law.
Moreover, in Bodiford v. State, 169 Ga. App. 760-761 (315 SE2d 274) (1984), this court reiterated that “ ‘an arrest meeting the constitutional requirements of probable cause is valid whether or not OCGA § 17-4-20 was violated/ ” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Therefore, our inquiry should focus on whether probable cause existed for Tyson’s arrest.
I am satisfied that the officer had probable cause to arrest Tyson. Two witnesses reported to the police officer that they saw a man molesting a young girl and then identified Tyson as the person who molested the child. Further, while the record is not clear what was said, a third witness also reported the incident to the police and apparently identified Tyson. In my opinion, this information was sufficient to give the officer probable cause to arrest Tyson. In effect, three witnesses reported to the police that they had just seen a man molesting a young girl and identified Tyson as the man who did it. What more evidence could be necessary?
An arrest without a warrant is constitutionally valid if the arresting officer knew facts and circumstances, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, that were sufficient for a prudent person to believe that the accused had committed an offense. Wright v. State, 189 Ga. App. 441, 443 (1) (375 SE2d 895) (1988). Additionally, this Court gives reports from concerned citizens a preferred status when testing the credibility of their information. Whitten v. State, 174 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) (331 SE2d 912) (1985). Notwithstanding the weight the majority gives to the officer’s opinion regarding whether he had probable cause to arrest Tyson, neither the trial court nor this Court is bound by the police officer’s conclusions regarding his actions. See Morgan v. State, 195 Ga. App. 732, 734-735 *295(3) (394 SE2d 639) (1990).
Decided December 3, 1999 Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella, George T Smith, for appellant. Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Bruce D. Hornbuckle, Debra H. Bernes, John C. Richter, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.Because there was probable cause to arrest Tyson, all of the evidence seized in the van should not be excluded. As a result, Tyson’s claim that the trial court erred in allowing the police officers to testify about the contents of the lost videotape is not rendered moot. Under Simpson v. State, 271 Ga. 772 (523 SE2d 320) (1999), evidence of sexual paraphernalia found in the defendant’s possession must show his lustful disposition or bent of mind toward engaging in the type of sexual activity with which he is charged before it is admissible. Because the sexually explicit videotape did not relate to child molestation, evidence as to its content is not, therefore, admissible. This does not mean, however, that other evidence, such as the nude photographs of young children, which was legitimately seized incident to a lawful arrest, must be excluded. See id.