dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority opinion’s statement that liability for child support may be based on promissory estoppel in a case where there is no statutory obligation or express contract, I first note that this issue was not brought by either of the parties. Further, there is a critical element that must be shown for promissory estoppel to apply. In addition to making a showing of expectation and reasonable reliance, a person asserting liability on the theory of promissory estoppel must show that she relied on the promise to her detriment. Nickell v. IAG Fed. Credit Union, 213 Ga. App. 516 (445 SE2d 335) (1994); Lake Tightsqueeze, Inc. v. Chrysler First Fin. Svcs. Corp., 210 Ga. App. 178 (435 SE2d 486) (1993). The majority states that Newman and her son incurred detriment by refraining from identifying and seeking support from the child’s natural father. However, the record is completely bereft of any evidence that Newman met her burden of proof as to promissory estoppel, and the majority fails to state how she is prevented from now instituting a child support action against the natural father. Newman has not alleged, nor does the record reveal, that she does not know the identity of the natural father, nor does she show that the natural father is dead or unable to be found. Consequently, Newman has not shown that she is now unable to do what she would have had to do ten years ago — seek support from the natural father.
In fact, Wright contends, and Newman does not refute, that Newman severed the relationship and all ties with Wright when the child was approximately three years old. For approximately the next five years, until the child was eight, Newman and Wright did not communicate. Only for the past two years has Wright visited with the child. Importantly, Wright contends that during the past seven years he did not support the child. Thus, taking Wright’s undisputed con*524tentions as true, any prejudice incurred by Newman because of the passage of ten years in time is not due to Wright’s actions, since, at least for the past seven years, Newman has been in the same situation — receiving no support payments from Wright. Thus, although Wright may be morally obligated to support the ten-year-old child, he is not legally obligated to do so because Newman has failed to show that she or the child incurred any detriment by Wright’s failure to fulfill his promise made ten years ago.
Decided March 4, 1996 — Reconsideration denied March 29, 1996. R. Scott Cunningham, for appellant. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Kevin M. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Dianne Cook, for appellees.For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.