dissenting.
1. Although I agree that the written notice in appellants’ letter of November 11 was unreasonable as a matter of law and that the grant of summary judgment on the counterclaim was unwarranted for the reasons stated by the majority, I must respectfully dissent because I also believe that summary judgment was granted properly to Southeast Bedding because appellants failed to show they gave oral notice sufficient to invoke OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a).
This opinion allows appellants to retain mattresses, allegedly *55knowing them to be defective, sell them for their own profit, and yet refuse to pay for them. Such a result is inconsistent with the Commercial Code of this state and contrary to accepted business practices. The majority opinion, even if arguably correct, is morally wrong.
2. Both the letter from appellants’ attorney on November 11 and Atwood’s affidavit state that when they notified Southeast of the defective merchandise, Southeast took action to rectify the problems either through accepting return of the items and adjusting Atwood’s account or replacing the item with other merchandise. The letter states that Southeast agreed to issue credit for all returned merchandise and to issue an additional credit of five percent on all purchases from July 1, 1993 to October 13, 1993; it also states that Southeast agreed to give credit for all returned defective goods. Therefore, appellants’ complaints about the quality of the bedding were directed toward defects that have already been adjusted to appellants’ satisfaction, and appellants have not shown that any other complaints were made that were sufficient to constitute notice of defective goods.
3. More importantly, however, neither the letter from appellants’ attorney nor Atwood’s affidavit states that Southeast was notified that some items, though accepted, were so defective that Southeast was in breach. In fact, the letter acknowledges that appellants never attempted to bill Southeast for the losses they incurred because of the promises to get quality under control; it also states that it was a business decision to return only the most defective goods, and appellants admit they were given credit for these returns. All of these statements and the tone of the letter generally are inconsistent with any idea that notice was ever given to Southeast that appellants had deemed Southeast to be in breach and gave notice of that under OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a). Further, the first paragraph of the letter shows that this letter was intended to be the notice under OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a). Atwood’s affidavit states: “I told them over and over again that the received goods did not conform to the original specifications and that the acceptance of these non-conforming goods was based upon the reasonable assumption that the non-conformities would be seasonably cured in the normal course of doing business.” And, although Atwood describes the number of items returned, nowhere does he indicate the number of items on which notice was given under OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a) and that the items would be subject to sale under OCGA § 11-2-714. Appellants’ intent in selling this merchandise is shown in Atwood’s affidavit where he said the merchandise was sold at a “discount so that we could pay what we could.” That statement is inconsistent with giving notice under OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a) or a sale under OCGA § 11-2-714. Consequently, I cannot agree that OCGA § 11-2-714 is of any benefit to *56appellants. To be entitled to the benefits of this Code section, appellants must have given proper notice to Southeast of the defects in the goods under OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a) that would have allowed Southeast the opportunity to cure the defect. The evidence of appellants’ conduct as shown in the attorney’s letter and Atwood’s affidavit is inconsistent with any such notice having been given which would have given Southeast this opportunity.
4. Although I agree the evidence shows that appellants complained to Southeast about its workmanship, merely complaining “over and over again” even “on a regular basis,” as Atwood says, does not necessarily equal notice under OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a). The notice must be such to inform “ ‘ “the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach.” ’ ” (Citation omitted.) Oden & Sims Used Cars v. Thurman, 165 Ga. App. 500, 501 (301 SE2d 673). “The purpose of the rule, as stated in the comment to the UCC, is to defeat commercial bad faith. If the seller is notified of a breach within a reasonable time he has [the] opportunity to ascertain for himself the nature and extent of the breach by taking advantage of [OCGA § 11-2-515] which gives either party upon reasonable notification to the other, the right to inspect, test, and sample the goods ... for the purpose of ascertaining facts and preserving evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Intl. Multifoods Corp. v. Nat. Egg Products &c., 202 Ga. App. 263, 266 (4) (414 SE2d 253). This record does not remotely suggest that Southeast was given notice that appellants claimed a breach on the items they retained. Appellants did not point to even one time in which an adequate notice was given. If the type of complaints to which Atwood testified are allowed to constitute the required notice, any disparaging comments about the condition of the goods will leave open the possibility of a subsequent action like this. That is not the law. Although it is true that as the non-moving party appellants are entitled to the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions therefrom in their favor (Moore v. Goldome Credit Corp., 187 Ga. App. 594, 595-596 (370 SE2d 843)), it is also true that this is an issue on which they would have the burden of proof at trial. Therefore, Southeast was not required to disprove affirmatively or negate this aspect of appellants’ case. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474). Consequently, appellants failed to show that the proper notice was given. All appellants showed was that they complained a lot about the quality of the merchandise, but nevertheless retained and sold the merchandise to their customers. The notice that appellants gave together with their conduct showed that the transaction was completed, not that the transaction bore watching. Appellants never attempted to reconcile any of these transactions until after Southeast attempted to collect the amounts appellants owed. This *57was too little and too late.
Decided March 14, 1997 Reconsideration denied April 4, 1997. Before Judge Gault. Robert P. McFarland, for appellants. Banks, Stubbs & Neville, John R. Neville, for appellee.5. Moreover, OCGA § 11-2-601 does not authorize a buyer to use the procedures appellants rely on in this case. Appellants’ efforts to reject the goods were untimely as a matter of law (OCGA § 11-2-602 (1)), and the affidavit and the letter show that appellants sold the goods and kept the proceeds for themselves. These actions negate any rejection of the goods, because OCGA § 11-2-603 (1) allows sale of rejected goods, but requires the proceeds, less some charges, to be held for the seller’s account.
6. Accordingly, I believe that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Southeast and, although I agree that summary judgment on appellants’ counterclaim was not appropriate under the reasons stated by the trial court, summary judgment was properly granted on the counterclaim because appellants failed to give proper notice.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.