dissenting.
The U. S. Supreme Court remanded this case to this Court in order that we might articulate the standard of review we apply to a trial court’s findings when a venireperson is dismissed for cause due to juror bias. Greene v. Georgia, 519 U. S._(117 SC 578, 136 LE2d 507) (1996). In an attempt to comply with the Supreme Court man*55date, the majority holds that we have always deferred to the findings made by the trial court and that when a prospective juror offers conflicting testimony concerning the juror’s ability to vote for imposition of the death penalty, that deference requires this Court to uphold whatever the trial court decided regarding that juror’s continued participation in the trial. Such a standard has never been applied by this Court, for it completely negates this Court’s ability to reverse a death sentence on this ground, and we have reversed death sentences on this ground in the past. See Jarrell v. State, 261 Ga. 880 (413 SE2d 710) (1992). Rather, the sweeping “deference” accorded trial courts by the majority is a complete relinquishment of this Court’s duties and responsibilities as an appellate court and as the court of last resort in Georgia. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (88 SC 1770, 20 LE2d 776) (1968), the U. S. Supreme Court held that a death sentence could not be carried out if the jury which imposed it or recommended its imposition was chosen by excluding venirepersons because they voiced general objections or conscientious or religious scruples against the death penalty. The court pointed out that
the most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried out. . . .”
Id., 391 U. S. at 522, n. 21. The standard of utter and complete deference to the trial court’s determination enunciated today by the majority permits the exclusion of any venireperson who voiced concerns about the imposition of the death penalty so long as the venireperson also expressed an ability to consider the death penalty as a punishment. In effect, by stating equivocal positions, i.e., that he/she could consider imposition of the death penalty despite having concerns about the imposition of a death sentence, the trial court’s decision as to whether that juror is excused for cause or remains on the panel is the final word on the matter. Should, as here, the trial court dismiss the venirepersons for cause, there is a good chance that the jury which imposed the death penalty was selected by excluding those who voiced religious, conscientious, or general objections to imposition of the death penalty, in direct violation of the holding in Wither-spoon, supra. We are also faced with the possibility of conflicting *56results statewide as each trial judge makes an unregulated, unstandardized decision about “equivocal” venirepersons.
The majority opines that each of the prospective jurors at issue in this appeal “offered equivocal and contradictory testimony which authorized the trial court to find that [the juror’s] view on capital punishment was such as to prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties.” Majority opinion, p. 54. The fact that a juror expresses a variety of opinions regarding the death penalty is not an unusual situation. As former Chief Justice Weltner observed on behalf of the court in Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 197, n. 3 (319 SE2d 420) (1984):
[W]e offer this parenthetical comment upon the general problems involved in Witherspoon questions. First, it should be noted that prospective jurors rarely come into court with precisely defined opinions relative to the death penalty. Instead, most carry with them contradictions arising from a deep-seated human need to avenge outrageous cruelty, a quasi-religious tendency toward forgiveness, and a sense of the worth of every human life. Few have been called upon to formulate and express their thoughts with any degree of clarity or precision. In reality, then, voir dire becomes an exercise in the shaping of opinions, more so than their expression. Again and again, the record in death cases will contain answers which are ambiguous, equivocal, and contradictory. That is not because the juror is attempting to dissimulate, but because he never before has been required to formulate and express, with solemnity and finality, a viewpoint on one of the most controversial issues in modem American culture. The fact that a juror may arrive at a posture which varies from his initial expressions should be understood as exactly what it is — a final distillation, after substantial questioning by contending counsel and often by the judge, of theretofore unarticulated, amorphous, and casual thoughts upon capital punishment.
Excusal for cause is appropriate when a venireperson states “unambiguously and unequivocally that he or she would vote against the death penalty regardless of what evidence might be presented at trial.” Id. at 193. In the case at bar, in direct conflict with Spivey, the majority upholds the trial court’s excusáis for cause of jurors who were ambiguous and equivocal in their voir dire responses. In Witherspoon, supra, 391 U. S. at 516, n. 9, the court stated, “Unless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the *57trial might reveal, it simple cannot be assumed that that is his position.” In the case at bar, the majority endorses by affirmation the trial court’s excusal for cause of a juror who “appears to have been unable to articulate her true feelings” about the death penalty because she gave conflicting and equivocal answers (Majority opinion at 50), a juror who gave “conflicting and equivocal” responses and “had some difficulty expressing her true feelings regarding the death sentence (Majority opinion at 51), a juror who “harbored a strongly held religious aversion to the death penalty” (Majority opinion at 52), a juror who “held a strong personal aversion to the death penalty and was uncertain as to whether she could actually vote to impose that sentence” (Majority opinion at 52), and a juror who “could not affirm that she was unbiased against the death penalty. . . Majority opinion at 53. None of these venirewomen “state[d] unambiguously that she would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal. . . .” Id. Rather, the trial court, and now the majority, assumed that was each woman’s position, in direct conflict with the directive given by the Supreme Court in Witherspoon.
Decided May 5, 1997 — Reconsideration denied May 30, 1997. William L. Kirby II, Charlotta Norby, Stephen B. Bright, Herbert L. Wells, for appellant. J. Gray Conger, District Attorney, Lori L. Canfield, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.Each of the venirewomen stated there were circumstances under which they could impose the death penalty. See Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 454-456 (Benham, C. J., dissenting in part). The trial court wrongfully dismissed them for cause, and the majority errs in affirming that action.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears join in this dissent.