concurring specially.
While concurring fully with what is said in all four divisions of the majority opinion, in regard to Division 2, appellant as the holder to a deed to secure debt is not treated as the taxpayer under OCGA § 48-5-9, because appellant was not in possession of the property although it must see that the taxes are paid to protect its interest in the property. Anderson v. Alexander, 179 Ga. 511, 512-513 (1) (176 SE 367) (1934); Real Estate Loan Co. v. Union City, 177 Ga. 55, 56 (2) (169 SE 301) (1933); Decatur County Bldg. &c. Assn. v. Thigpen, 173 Ga. 363, 364-366 (2)-(6) (160 SE 387) (1931). “While the public may treat property as belonging to one to whom it has been conveyed to secure a debt, yet the debtor in possession and receiving the use and benefit of the property is liable for the tax. This is the logical intent of [OCGA § 48-5-9].” Carroll v. Richards, 50 Ga. App. 272, 273 (1) (178 SE 178) (1934). Thus, under the existing statutory scheme appellant is not the taxpayer entitled to notice under OCGA § 48-5-306 or entitled to appeal under OCGA § 48-5-311, notwithstanding the consequences of taxes being assessed and levied upon the property.
The fallacy in appellant’s argument regarding notice and lack of remedy is that appellant under usual powers granted in the real estate note and the deed to secure debt could require that all taxes be escrowed and that the holder of the deed to secure debt make the return of property value in its own name under OCGA §§ 48-5-10 and 48-5-15 (a) and pay the taxes, which would entitle it as the taxpayer to receive the notice under OCGA § 48-5-306 and to appeal under OCGA § 48-5-311. Thus, appellant by its own action could protect its interest by receiving notice and acting accordingly; failure to act waives such rights.