dissenting.
I dissent. Even if the court is correct that SCODDOT definitions must be applied strictly, this does not address the question of whether a particular job falls within a SCOD-DOT job title. As Konecky’s job in particular, hoistman, evidently does not fall under any existing SCODDOT title, I would hold that his case is beyond the scope of SCOD-DOT, and that therefore SCODDOT should not be used in determining whether he is eligible for vocational re-employment benefits under AS 23.30.041(e). Also, I do not think that AS 23.30.041(e) requires this court to apply particular SCODDOT definitions strictly in every case.
In the case at bar, the SCODDOT description of the job is not the job as performed by Konecky. In fact, as Konecky and the court both point out, not only does the SCODDOT job description fail to describe Konecky’s work, but “no other hoist operator positions in Alaska, Canada, or the lower 48 could be found that fit the ‘medium’ category.”1
*284A similarity in job titles, and a substantial overlap in duties, should not obscure the fact that Konecky’s job is not the job described in SCODDOT. In fact, the job described in SCODDOT apparently does not exist. The fact that a job similar to Konecky’s is described by SCODDOT does not mean that Konecky was performing that job.
Even the court’s strict application of SCODDOT definitions should not require that a job which is not included in SCODDOT be forced to fit into a SCODDOT job title. Konecky’s job involved substantially different demands from the job of “hoist operator,” which is found in SCODDOT. In fact, no one’s job fits the description of “hoist operator” as described in SCODDOT. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, I would hold that Konecky was not a “hoist operator” as defined by SCODDOT, that Konecky’s job does not appear in SCODDOT, and that therefore SCODDOT should not have been used to measure the physical demands of his job. For this reason, I would reverse the decisions of the superior court and the Board.
Furthermore, even if Konecky is in fact a “hoist operator” as defined in SCODDOT, the proper application of SCODDOT allows for variability in the physical requirements of jobs. As the court notes, the SCODDOT itself contains a disclaimer which states: “Occupational definitions described in the [SCODDOT ] ... may not coincide with a specific job as actually performed in a particular establishment or in a given industry.” SCODDOT at v (1981). It also warns that “[a]n occupation found to have certain characteristics in job situations observed by the Employment Service does not necessarily preclude the same occupation from having different characteristics in other job situations.” Id. Thus, SCODDOT itself recognizes that its definitions are not exhaustive descriptions of jobs as they actually exist.
Therefore, the requirement of AS 23.30.041(e) that the employee’s physical capacities be compared to “the physical demands of the employee’s job as described in the [SCODDOT ] for ... the employee’s job at the time of injury ...” must be understood to encompass SCODDOT ⅛ own provision that the definitions should be read to include a degree of variability in the physical requirements of actual jobs. In effect, a truly strict application of SCODDOT definitions requires allowance for the variability of the physical demands of jobs.2
Konecky’s job required greater physical capacity than the description of “hoist operator” in SCODDOT. This variation was anticipated by SCODDOT, and should be acknowledged. For this reason, too, I would reverse the decisions of the superior court and the Board.
. SCODDOT defines a hoist operator job to require only medium physical capacity. Because Konecky was able to perform at that level, he was held to be ineligible under AS 23.30.041(e) for re-employment benefits.
In its decision the Board stated in part: Unfortunately, this is another case in which the law requires us to use the SCODDOT's job description, and it does not match reality. We find Employee's actual job at the time of injury and other jobs in the labor market as a hoist operator require lifting over 50 pounds. They are clearly not medium capacity jobs as defined in the SCODDOT.
(Citations omitted).
. Konecky’s reliance on relevant legislative history is also of significance. As the majority notes, the 1988 amendments to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act regarding re-employment benefits were intended to “redefined an employee’s eligibility for rehabilitation benefits as the inability to return to the job held at time of injury or other jobs held or trained for within 10 years prior to injury or following injury.” House Judi-ciaiy Comm. Substitute S.B. 322, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. § 10.4 (Comm. Print 1988). Given this history, I think there is considerable merit in Konecky’s argument that strict application of the SCODDOT definition of “hoist operator” frustrates the legislature’s intention of awarding benefits to employees who are unable to return to the job held at the time of injury.