The question in this case is whether the Great Writ is available where a prisoner is unlawfully confined beyond the term of his sentence. We hold that it is.
Charles Lillard petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that he is being detained by the State even though he has fully served his sentence. The State argued at the habeas hearing that Lillard’s claim was not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. The habeas court agreed and dismissed Lillard’s petition.1 Lillard seeks a certificate of probable cause.
In Manville v. Hampton, 266 Ga. 857 (471 SE2d 872) (1996), we held that habeas corpus relief is available where a prisoner is confined under a sentence that is longer than that permitted by state statute. In so holding, we observed that such confinement constitutes a denial of liberty without due process of law.
We see no fundamental difference between confinement under a sentence that is longer than that permitted by state law and confinement beyond the term of a lawful sentence. In each instance, the confinement constitutes a denial of liberty without due process of law.
Unlike Forbes v. Ricketts, 234 Ga. 316 (216 SE2d 82) (1975), this *292case does not involve the computation of a “good time” allowance. Lillard simply alleges that his sentence is “over, finishled], complete[d].” Under these circumstances, the habeas court is bound to inquire into the legality of Lillard’s detention.
The habeas court erred in dismissing the petition and failing to inquire into the merits of Lillard’s claim.
Judgment reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
All the Justices concur, except Carley and Hines, JJ., who dissent.The habeas court believed that Lillard should be released, but that he chose the wrong remedy. In the words of the habeas court: “I do think that you should be released, but I can’t give you much help.”