dissenting.
*791I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.
*790Although I fully agree with Division 1 that the trial court erroneously excluded from consideration plaintiff’s timely filed affidavits, I *791respectfully dissent from affirmance of summary judgment in favor of the employer-defendant, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, in employee-plaintiff John Bell’s Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) action for inadequate medical treatment. In my judgment, the majority has tacitly applied the contradictory testimony rule of Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 (343 SE2d 680), to hold that plaintiff should be bound by his feeble protestations to a supervisor that he needed no immediate medical attention. But that rule is inapplicable to the case sub judice because other circumstances, established by the affidavit evidence erroneously excluded by the trial court, indicate that plaintiff Bell was not competent to make an accurate assessment of his potential need for additional medical treatment. According to the majority’s recitation, eyewitnesses other than the foreman described plaintiff as “disoriented, dizzy, weak, and pale.” (Majority opinion, ante, p. 790). Where the plaintiff’s purported contradictory statements are not the only evidence which would authorize his recovery, the general rule applies, namely that the credibility of all witnesses — including the parties — should be determined by the jury. Barentine v. Kroger Co., 264 Ga. 224 (443 SE2d 485); Bynes v. Stafford, 106 Ga. App. 406, 407 (2) (127 SE2d 159). See also Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382 (2), 386 (162 SE2d 375). In the case sub judice, the evidence does not establish, as a matter of law, the absence of an immediate danger of loss of life or of great bodily injury. Accordingly, the jury should determine whether the employer demonstrated any negligence, however slight, in blithely accepting the word of a dazed and embarrassed worker, where the objective evidence would authorize a finding that plaintiff was not fit to make an accurate assessment of his immediate medical needs.
Decided August 23, 1996 Reconsideration denied September 18, 1996 Hicks & Massey, Frederick V. Massey, for appellant. Hall, Bloch, Garland & Meyer, John S. Stewart, for appellee.