Appellant, Donald Hall Reid (Reid) was convicted of murder, assault and battery with intent to kill (ABIK), possession of a stolen vehicle, driving under suspension, and failure to stop for a bluelight. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of *77life, 20 years, 6 months, 5 years and 3 years, respectively. We reverse.
FACTS
The charges in this case arise from a high speed chase along Interstate 20 (1-20) in Columbia. Reid, who was wanted by police on an outstanding warrant, was spotted driving a stolen Honda Prelude by an off duty police officer in West Columbia. The officer notified the highway patrol and followed Reid until additional units arrived on 1-20 west bound toward Florence. Reid had two passengers in the vehicle with him, Loleta Boulware and Rochelle Ashmore.
Reid led police on a chase at speeds up to 119 mph. When he attempted to exit 1-20 at Alpine Road, he lost control of the car and hit a bridge abutment. Reid and Boulware were thrown from the vehicle. Ashmore, who was in the front seat with her seatbelt on, was killed instantly. Boulware suffered numerous injuries.
Reid put up no defense at trial. Over counsel’s objection, the State was permitted to question Officer Rowe whether, after being arrested and advised of his Miranda1 rights at the accident scene, Reid had asked about the condition of his passengers. Officer Rowe responded that Reid “never asked anything about them at all. All he wanted to know that day at the scene was what he was being charged with.” The trial court overruled Reid’s objection, declining to “preclude the [State] from introducing any evidence which may gleam on [the issue of malice],” as it related to the murder and ABIK charges.
ISSUE
Did the court err in allowing testimony that Reid did not inquire as to the status of his passengers after the accident? If so, was the error harmless?
DISCUSSION
It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant’s post-arrest silence since the giving *78of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). See also State v. Arther, 290 S.C. 291, 350 S.E.2d 187 (1986); State v. Smith, 290 S.C. 393, 350 S.E.2d 923 (1986); State v. Hale, 284 S.C. 348, 326 S.E.2d 418 (Ct.App.1985), cert. denied, 286 S.C. 127, 332 S.E.2d 533 (1985). References to a defendant’s lack of remorse are also improper as violative of a defendant’s Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. State v. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. 235, 371 S.E.2d 793 (1988), overruled on other grounds, State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); State v. Cockerham, 294 S.C. 380, 365 S.E.2d 22 (1988); State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 993, 112 S.Ct. 1691, 118 L.Ed.2d 404 (1992) (comments by the prosecution upon an accused’s failure to express remorse invite jury to draw an adverse inference merely because the defendant did not appear penitent); State v. Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982). Here, the State was permitted to inquire both as to Reid’s post-arrest silence and his lack of remorse; this inquiry was therefore clearly improper.
The State contends error in admission of this testimony is harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence of malice in this case. State v. Arther, supra. We disagree.
Reid was tried for the offenses of murder and ABIK. The lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide, involuntary manslaughter, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN) were also submitted to the jury. During deliberations, the jury twice requested clarification as to the differentiation between murder and reckless homicide. The only pertinent distinction between the greater and lesser offenses is the element of malice.2
*79The evidence relied upon by the State to demonstrate malice was 1) the fact that Reid drove at speeds up to 119 mph, 2) he failed to stop when requested to do so by his passengers, and 3) he told police he did not stop as “he didn’t want to go back to jail.” Although the jury may have found this evidence sufficient to demonstrate malice,3 the jury could undoubtedly have found this evidence to support a finding of recklessness as well. Accordingly, we cannot say the jury could reach no other conclusion but to have found Reid acted with malice.
Moreover, the error in admission of this testimony is exacerbated by the fact that the trial court specifically admitted it to prove the crucial issue in the case, i.e. whether or not Reid acted with malice. Clearly, if the trial court erroneously admitted testimony concerning Reid’s lack of remorse to demonstrate malice, the jury may have used it for the same purpose and, in essence, used it to “tip the scales against him.” Accordingly, we cannot say the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, the State contends the trial court’s charge to the jury functioned as a curative instruction sufficient to cure any error. We disagree.
An instruction to disregard incompetent evidence is usually deemed to have cured the error unless on the facts of the particular case it is probable that, notwithstanding the instruction, the accused was prejudiced. State v. Hale, supra. The jury should be specifically instructed to disregard the evidence, and not to consider it for any purpose during deliberations. A mere general remark excluding the evidence does not cure the error. State v. Smith, supra.
*80Here, during the course of his general charge to the jury, the trial judge instructed of Reid’s right not to testify and that it should not be used against him. The court then stated:
Now a person arrested for a crime has a constitutional right to remain silent and not say anything that could be used to incriminate himself. The fact that he does not say anything about any particular issue or fact in this case cannot be used against the defendant in any way or for any purpose.
Under the facts of this case, we find the charge given insufficient to cure the error. The charge was not given until the end of trial and did not specifically advise the jury it could not consider Reid’s lack of remorse against him. Moreover, in context, the charge clearly relates to Reid’s failure to testify rather than his post-arrest silence. These factors, when coupled with the fact that the jury twice requested clarification between the verdicts of murder and reckless homicide, lead to the conclusion that the instruction here did not cure the error. Accordingly, as the jury may have used the comment concerning Reid’s lack of remorse to infer he acted with malice, we reverse the convictions for murder and ABIK and remand for a new trial.4
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
FINNEY, C.J., and MOORE, J., concur. TOAL and BURNETT, JJ., dissenting in separate opinion.. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. The trial court’s charge as to the distinction between malice and recklessness was somewhat ambiguous. The jury was advised that reckless homicide involved the conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others and a reckless disregard for their safety. They were similarly charged that involuntary manslaughter involves criminal negligence which is the reckless disregard for the safely of others. Malice was defined for the jury as, inter alia, “a general malignant recklessness of the lives of others or a condition of the mind which shows a heart without social duly and fatally bent on mischief.”
. We have recognized reckless driving may constitute evidence of malice. State v. Webb, 301 S.C. 66, 389 S.E.2d 664 (1990). Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, this Court, in State v. Mouzon, 231 S.C. 655, 662, 99 S.E.2d 672, 675-676 (1957), did not make a finding of malice. On the contrary, we merely held that “the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict for murder.” (Emphasis supplied). Mouzon, involved solely the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict. It did not hold, as the dissent infers, that the defendant’s, reckless driving constituted malice per se.
. The convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle, driving under suspension, and failure to stop for a bluelight are unchallenged and are, accordingly, affirmed.