concurring.
For the reasons given in the majority opinion, I am constrained to agree with the majority’s holding that the trial court erred in conducting the dual jury trial without the consent of all the parties. I write separately, first, to commend the trial court for its sensible and practical attempt to streamline the trial process and, second, to urge the General Assembly to remove the requirement from OCGA § 9-11-*23342 (a) that parties must consent to action like that taken by the trial court in this case. Handling complex litigation imposes formidable problems for trial judges and litigants alike, and often requires trial judges to possess and employ keen and innovative organizational skills. Effective procedures for handling such cases will not spring forth fully born, like Athena from Zeus’s head, but will only evolve through the efforts and resourcefulness of trial courts and other participants in the litigation process. I therefore urge trial courts, where appropriate, to experiment with new, and hopefully effective, methods for litigating complex cases.
Decided October 7, 1996 Reconsideration denied October 31, 1996. Murphy, Murphy & Garner, Thomas B. Murphy, Walker, Hulbert, Gray & Byrd, Lawrence C. Walker, Jr., Charles W. Byrd, Smolar, Roseman, Brantley & Seifter, Yehuda Smolar, Barry L. Roseman, G. Grant Brantley, James I. Seifter, Thomas A. Rice, William B. Herndon, Calvin S. Graves, Gambrell & Stolz, Irwin W. Stolz, Jr., Seaton D. Purdom, for appellants. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Michael E. Hobbs, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Alston & Byrd, G. Conley Ingram, Cynthia L. Counts, R. Wayne Thorpe, Love & Willingham, Daryll Love, Allen S. Willingham, Clark S. Gillespy, John A. Gilleland, Robert P. Monyak, Johnson, Kane & Penna, Stephen R. Kane, for appellees. David W. Boone, Craig T. Jones, James O. Wilson, Jr., William R. Waldrop, Lawrence J. Pond, Raymond J. Doumar, James D. Hollingsworth, amici curiae.