with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins, specially concurring.
I join in the special concurrence of Justice Thomas for the reasons he has stated. The opinion of the majority, with only a glance, raises a suspicion of infirmity. The opinion of Justice Thomas lays bare its flaws.
I can concur only in the result for other reasons as well. It appears to me that the majority is ducking the only real issue in this case. The impression with which I am left is that such contracts as the one with which we are concerned in this case might be allowable and the only problem is that the particular one for consideration might only be invalid because it continues for an unlimited time. If that is the only defect, and I do not agree it is, it can be readily corrected by a new agreement with an agreed-upon definite termination date but the problem of authority to do so would still remain a mystery. The court literally leaves the parties where it found them for a de minimus reason, even if valid, and thus avoids a confrontation with the larger, only important cause for the action.
The parties want and are entitled to know whether a city is authorized to voluntarily enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with its policemen and have an explanation of the reasons. The question is one of universal interest throughout the State of Wyoming; other political subdivisions and their employees, besides cities, and their employees, are concerned. The Wyoming Education Association has filed an amicus curiae brief in this case in support of the Police Protective Association, indicating the interest of that substantial segment of government employees.
It is true that this court will not generally discuss or pass upon questions not necessary to the disposition of the case before it. That is particularly true in cases of reversal. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1455, pp. 593-627; 5 Am.Jur.2d., Appeal and Error § 760, pp. 201-202. It is not so true where the court affirms, as here. The questions presented for issue before this court fall squarely within the exact terms of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, § 1-1052, W.S.1957, thereof, providing:
“Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, con*1151tract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” (Emphasis added.)
It is the design of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (§§ 1-1049, et seq., W.S. 1957) to erase uncertainties and fully settle cases, such as the one before us. Section 1-1062 is implicit in that regard:
“This act [§§ 1-1049 to 1-1064] is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.”
The parties are being sent away empty-handed, contrary to policy.
Begrudging availability of the Declaratory Judgments Act is inconsistent with the remedial tenor expressed in the Act, directed to the elimination of uncertainty and insecurity and settlement of controversy. Brimmer v. Thomson, Wyo.1974, 521 P.2d 574, quoting favorably from Planned Parenthood Center of Tucson, Inc. v. Marks, 1972, 17 Ariz.App. 308, 497 P.2d 534, 538. When this court fails to grant the real relief requested, it is ignoring the thrust of the Declaratory Judgments Act. The parties will be just as uncertain about the contract as when, in good faith, they approached the court. I would respond to the only significant issue presented. The trial court found in its declaratory judgment that the parties would engage in collective bargaining, if authorized to do so. In my consideration of the issue of the authority of the City to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement, I would also hold, as the trial judge did, that it has no such authority to enter into the type agreement before us. Then, upon that basis, I would affirm. While this opinion could be and would be considerably more comprehensive, if it controlled the disposition made of this case, under the circumstances, I only touch the high points.
I have no argument with the right of public employees to organize into an association for their mutual benefit. Nor do I have, nor is there any objection to that organization, through its spokespeople, presenting its views and pressing its positions to whatever governing body is concerned and requiréd to fix conditions of employment. That is one of the political ways in which our democratic form of representative government functions. I would further not argue that the City, or other government body, may not fix conditions of employment, responsive to discussions with the representatives of its employees. Regardless of what it is called or how it is done, employees are constantly working toward improved conditions for themselves and governing bodies are constantly working toward providing those conditions, leading to employee satisfaction and efficient government as well, but within limited financial means and powers.
The contract received into evidence by stipulation of the parties appears to be a complete collective-bargaining agreement and it so states. A summary of the agreement, article by article, is as follows:
Article 1. Recognition. The Police Protective Association is recognized as the “sole and exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages and fringe benefits for employees of the Casper Police Department who are sworn police officers”. The chief of police is not included within the collective-bargaining agreement because “[t]he Association recognizes that the Chief of Police is a part of management.” The Association recognized that when appointed by the city council, “the City Manager and/or his authorized representatives are the sole and exclusive bargaining agents for the City Council of the City.” The article closes with the following statement, “The Association shall share equally with Management, the responsibility for applying this provision of the Agreement.”
Article 2. Strikes, grievances and liaison. There shall be no strikes or lockouts. Establishes grievance procedure, with a griev-*1152anee committee made up of members of the Association. A grievance, alleging violation of the contract by the City by any patrol officer, a member of the Association, governed by the “Collective Labor Agreement” may be. submitted to the committee. A formal procedure is provided, “If the decision of the City Manager is not considered satisfactory, the Association may inform the City of its desire to exercise its right to arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act.” Reciprocal provisions are available for grievances by the City before the same committee with a right to the same arbitration. The procedures are conditions precedent to court action. At the discretion of the Association, the grievance and liaison committee may be, in whole or in part, of joint membership.
Article 3. Board of review. Establishes review procedures for disciplinary action. Made up of the chief of police, the city manager and various officers of the police department. It is empowered to call the alleged offender and material witnesses. The recommendation of the board is advisory-
Article 4. Fixes monthly base rate, longevity pay rate, education pay rate and additional pay for a corporal and investigator.
Article 5. Requires the City to budget $240.00 annually for a maximum of four police officers for combat pistol matches.
Article 6. Clothing allowance. Provides for an annual clothing allowance of $200.00 for each uniformed officer and a $500.00 fund for uniform damage.
Article 7. Legal protection. Legal defense to be at City cost for civil suits against police officers as a result of actions taken in the course of their employment.
Article 8. Annual leaves. Provides for annual leave accrual, based on years of service.
Article 9. Sick leave. Provides for sick leave at the rate of one and one-half days per month, with pay.
Article 10. Life insurance and dependent health insurance. The City is to maintain $13,000.00 per individual, with double indemnity benefits, in the event of accidental death. The City pays one-fourth of monthly dependent health insurance premium in the sum of $4.86 per month.
Article 11. Training. Each officer is required to take 20 hours per year in uncompensated off-duty training.
Article 12. Overtime. Establishes when overtime shall be paid at time and one-half.
Article 13. Court appearances. Provides for compensation for court appearances on officers’ days off.
Article 14. Dues checkoff and indemnification. Requires City to make a dues payroll deduction for payment to the Association treasurer, upon request of the officer.
Article 15. Civil Service. The police department is required to adopt Civil Service regulations filed with the secretary of state. No officer may be suspended for over 30 days.
Article 16. Personnel ordinance. The police department shall adopt the personnel ordinance not in conflict with the agreement.
Article 17. Renewal clause. Provides for notification if either party desires to amend the agreement and until satisfactory conclusion is reached in the matter of such amendments, the original provisions shall remain in full force and effect.
Article 18. Embodiment of agreement. Constitutes sole and complete agreement between the parties “governing Management and the Association”, arrived at pursuant to collective bargaining.
Article 19. Duration of agreement. This agreement shall, become effective on the 1st day of July, 1975, and shall remain in full force and effect until June 30, 1976, and thereafter from year to year until altered or modified by collective bargaining, or by mediation, conciliation or fact finding.
The agreement is signed and acknowledged by the mayor and the city manager, for the City, and by four of its members, *1153for the police association. It has all the language and characteristics of a collective-bargaining agreement in a private industry. Section 27-239, W.S.1957, C. 1967, sets out as a matter of state policy a recognition of the right of labor to bargain collectively. It was made clear in Retail Clerks Local 187 AFL-CIO v. University of Wyoming, Wyo. 1975, 531 P.2d 884, that statutes governing labor relations between employers and employees apply only to private industry.
Only one segment of municipal employees have been authorized to engage in collective bargaining. Sections 27-265 through 27-273, W.S.1957, C. 1967, authorize paid firefighters of a city, town or county fire department to bargain collectively. In State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local Number 946, I.A.F.F. v. City of Laramie, Wyo.1968, 437 P.2d 295, the constitutionality was upheld by a judgment decision of this court. Of the four-member court, only one concurred in the published opinion; the other two concurred in the result. While the prece-dential value of the opinion is questionable, the opinion author did note that in the absence of the special legislation for firefighters just mentioned:
“ * * * [W]e might nevertheless find it necessary to join what the city calls the weight of authority, which in essence is simply a rule of statutory construction, and hold public employees do not have a right to bargain collectively. Indeed, that may even now be the situation for all public employees, except city firemen. ⅜ * * 71
Justice McIntyre specifically stated that the opinion should not be construed to reach that point but the prevailing rule was recognized.
The most cited authority is the comprehensive annotation, “Union organization and activities of public employees,” 31 A.L.R.2d 1142, 1170, which states, in summary, that:
“Public employers cannot abdicate or bargain away their continuing legislative discretion and are therefore not authorized to enter into collective bargaining agreements with public employee labor unions. Constitutional and statutory provisions granting the right of private industry to bargain collectively do not confer such right on public employers and employees.”
In Board of Education of Scottsdale High School District No. 212 v. Scottsdale Education Association, 1973, 109 Ariz. 342, 509 P.2d 612, it was held that in the absence of a public law requiring the school district to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement, such an agreement is unenforceable. The supreme court of Arizona thus set aside and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals of Arizona, under review, 1974, 17 Ariz.App. 504, 498 P.2d 578, which held that the school board had authority to enter into collective bargaining; but rather inconsistently concluded such a bargaining agreement was not binding.
The cases, with few exceptions, consistently hold that in the absence of legislative authority, a governmental body may not enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with its employees. Examples of such cases are: State Board of Regents v. United Packing House Food and Allied Workers, Local No. 1258, Iowa 1970, 175 N.W.2d 110; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 821 (AFL-CIO) v. Water Works Board of City of Birmingham, 1964, 276 Ala. 462, 163 So.2d 619; Internationa] Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO v. Georgia Ports Authority, 1962, 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733, cert. den. 370 U.S. 922, 82 S.Ct. 1561, 8 L.Ed.2d 503. A grant to public employees of full collective-bargaining rights must be deliberately expressed and is not to be implied. State Board of Regents v. United Packing House Food and Allied Workers, Local No. 1258, supra; Delaware River and Bay Authority v. International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 1965, 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789. See also the multitude of cases cited within the above cases, used to support the conclusions there reached.
Within those cases, we see the reason frequently referred to for such a holding to be that the employer-employee relationship in government is a legislative matter, which *1154may not be delegated. Such contracts, if permitted to stand, would take away from the municipality its legislative control and exert it in an unelected and uncontrolled private organization. The whole matter of qualifications, tenure and working conditions for public service involves the exercise of legislative powers, delegated to the governing body and none of those responsibilities may be bargained away. Such bargaining would usurp those legislative powers, which cannot be contracted away. By way of example is the provision of the agreement here, requiring submission to arbitration, which would take from the city council its right to completely control its employees by permitting others to settle differences.
Quite a number of states have specific legislation permitting collective bargaining between governing bodies and employees. Such legislation must carefully spell out the rules and limitations of the bargaining obligations. See the scope of legislation enacted in other states with respect to collective bargaining, State and Local Employees, 181 Business Organizations, Kheel, Labor Law, Chapter 54, p. 54-1, where all legislation throughout the United States is carefully cataloged. Uniformity of treatment of all employees, not only those represented by a union, budget considerations and their timeliness, limits on the extent to which an agreement may go, retention of the political prerogatives of elected officials, assurances of continued government operation and many other factors must be covered in the government-employee relationship. Such authority must also be squared with Wyoming’s right-to-work law, §§ 27-245.1 through 27-245.8, W.S.1957, C. 1967. For us to approve collective bargaining would be to legislate.
The last statement becomes particularly pertinent when we see that the legislature has already spoken with respect to the bargaining rights of firemen. Municipalities and other political subdivisions are creatures of the State and they only have such powers as are bestowed by the State. Schoeller v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Park, Wyo.1977, 568 P.2d 869. The simple application of well-known principles of statutory construction points to this being a legislative, not a judicial problem.
By the legislature’s authorizing collective bargaining for firemen, it has excluded collective bargaining by other classifications of municipal and county employees. The rule is that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of Equalization, 1958, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700. That rule serves to discover the intent of the legislature. Ramsay Motor Company v. Wilson, 1934, 47 Wyo. 54, 30 P.2d 482, 91 A.L.R. 908. Its intent is, therefore, not to allow collective bargaining except as specifically authorized.
I would face up to the genuine issue in this case and hold that the City has no authority to enter into collective bargaining with any employees except firemen. Such a contract is void ab initio and there is no need to examine its term or any other particular provision.