Heaney v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF GARDEN VAL., ETC.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

I regret that I am unable to concur with the majority opinion. As is fairly indicated by the opinion other jurisdictions are split as to the law which should be applied to the facts of the instant case. Admittedly, those authorities are persuasive only. I must come down on the side which postulates the need for expeditious handling and finality of litigation.

This litigation started nearly four years ago on June 25, 1974. The sole question involved is whether the school district wrongfully breached the employment contract when it discharged Heaney on March 18,1974. Regardless of which remedy Heaney may have sought, the legal issue remained as above stated.'

The doctrine of res judicata is designed to prevent litigation which is repetitious or which is inefficient because of needless fragmentation which unnecessarily burdens both the judicial system and the party who must respond. See 2 A. Freeman, A Treatise of the Law of Judgments § 626 (5th rev. ed. 1925); Restatement of Judgments § 62, Comment a (1942). As stated in Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 569 P.2d 358 (1977), “The law of res judicata now reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their ‘entire controversies’ shall in fact do so.” Id. at 556, 569 P.2d at 360, quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).

An action is barred if a valid judgment has been rendered in favor of the same defendant in a previous action on the same claim. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 48 (Tent. Draft No. 1,1973). As stated in Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irr. Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922),

“[T]he former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.” [Emphasis supplied.]

The sameness of the claim in the first as contrasted with the second action is determined by examining the transaction or operative facts underlying the two suits. As stated in Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61 Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973):

“The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff * * *. The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or entity which may not be split.”

What factual grouping constitutes a “transaction” is to be determined pragmatically giving weight to such considerations as to whether the facts are related “in time, space, origin or motivation, and whether, taken together, they form a convenient” *905trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the party’s expectations or business understanding or usage. Comment b to § 61.

In the instant case, although the trial court disposed of the mandamus action on the basis that Heaney was not tenured and thus did not address the contract questions involved in wrongful breach or damages, nevertheless, Heaney had the opportunity to litigate all of these issues within his first action, I.R.C.P. 18(a), and I would hold that he was required to do so or forfeit his contract claim under the doctrine of res judicata.

It is clear to me that Heaney’s claims both for reinstatement and for damages stem from the identical underlying transaction and operational facts. He had a contract with the school district which he alleges the district breached by its wrongful dismissal of him. In my judgment, reinstatement and damages are merely complementary methods for remedying the same alleged wrong.

It is argued that Koseris v. J. R. Simplot Co., 85 Idaho 1, 375 P.2d 130 (1962), militates in favor of Heaney. I disagree. The opinion of the Court in Koseris makes clear that it was dependent upon two factors; the first action remained pending and plaintiff’s right to damages was dependent in part on whether the nuisance was of a temporary nature which would thereby “countenance repeated actions for damages.” Id. at 7, 375 P.2d at 133.

By contrast, when an employer breaches an employment contract by wrongfully discharging the employee, there accrues but one claim for all that is due under the contract including that portion coming due after the action is filed. See D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 12.25 (1973). In my judgment, the facts of the instant matter indicate the existence of only a single “claim” resulting from the alleged wrongful termination of employment. Although such “claim” might give rise to more than one form of remedy, nevertheless, that single claim should be litigated in a single action and in my judgment permitting multiple actions, as here, violates the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata. If separation of the issues became desirable, i. e., because of the necessity of a jury trial on damages, I.R.C.P. 42(b) provides the necessary flexibility.

I would affirm the action of the trial court in entering summary judgment.