concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority that the trial was without prejudicial error but respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court could properly consider as an aggravating factor its finding that “the offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.”
The loathsome nature of the defendant’s misconduct is without dispute but in light of our Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E. 2d 689 (1983), and State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E. 2d 783 (1983), I am constrained to say that the conduct of the defendant, while repulsive, brutal, painful and injurious to the victim, was nevertheless not “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” for purposes of the Fair Sentencing Act. The majority seems to disregard the Blackwelder requirement that “the focus should be on whether the facts of the case disclose excessive brutality, or physical pain, psychological suffering, or dehumanizing aspects not normally present in that offense." (Emphasis theirs.) — N.C. at —, 306 S.E. 2d at 786. *73While an assault culminating in forced non-consensual anal intercourse under the facts here is undoubtedly physically painful, psychologically damaging and dehumanizing, there is no evidence in this record to show that the misconduct here was any worse than “normally present in that offense.” I would vote to remand for resentencing.