(dissenting).
In my view the decisive question is not whether the employer gave “actual” or verbal notice to his employer in lieu of the written notice required by 85 O.S.1961, § 24 and whether this verbal notice sufficiently advised the employer of the facts of the claimant’s injury, but whether the finding by the State Industrial Court that the employer was not prejudiced because the claimant failed to give the written statutory notice to his employer was supported by any competent evidence. If it was, then, as I see it, our duty is to affirm that decision, regardless of the fact that under the evidence we might have reached a different conclusion.
From reviewing the record I find that the claimant told Dr. F. (the company doctor to whom he was sent for a physical examination before the company would allow him to return to work) about the November 21 job-connected back injury and the doctor in turn advised the company by a letter dated the following February 7. The claimant file.4 his claim with the Industrial Court on February 22 and the matter was heard on March 4. The order under review was entered March 19, 1968. The employer’s answer denied the back injury was chargeable against it contending that any disability to the back was caused, or originated with the military service leg injury claimant suffered several years before going to work for the employer. This was largely a question for the medical experts. This question of fact was resolved by the Industrial Court in favor of the claimant.
There is nothing to indicate that the respondent was prejudiced by the failure of the claimant to give the notice required by the above statute. The Industrial Court, I think, was justified in concluding that the employer was not prejudiced. The employer was not prevented or — so far as this record reveals — in any way hindered from making as thorough an investigation into the circumstances as it could have done if it had received the formal written notice the day following its occurrence. Certainly the employer was not prevented from furnishing competent medical attention to the claimant and from thereby minimizing its possible loss. As noted, the employer denied that it was liable for the injury even if the notice question was out of it.
My conclusions are based on the following cases: Skelly Oil Co. v. Grimm et al. (1945), 196 Okl. 122, 163 P.2d 234; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., et al. v. Welch et al. (1945), 195 Okl. 636, 159 P.2d 1017; Jones et al. v. Oliver et al., 204 Okl. 164, 228 P.2d 173; and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kincannon, et al. (1950), 203 Okl. 95, 218 P.2d 625, wherein this court said:
“The purpose of the statute (now 85 O.S.1961 § 24) * * * is to furnish prompt information to the employer in order that he may make a proper and *512timely investigation of the accident in order to determine the cause, nature and extent of the injury and in order that he might furnish prompt medical treatment to prevent or minimize resulting disability.”
For the above reasons I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice HODGES concurs with the views herein-above expressed.