concurring in result in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the analysis dealing with the application of the drug tax stamp laws. I also agree there is sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of the crimes charged, although I disagree as to the standard of re*169view this Court uses. I shall address that first.
Appellant took the stand and testified as to his version of events. He said he was asleep when Galbreath’s ear was pulled over; he had no control over any items in the ear (Tr. 170); he had about $819 (Tr. 172), which he got from working two jobs, plus money his girlfriend gave him (Tr. 173). It was not drug money (Tr. 174). He also offered an explanation for jewelry he had on him (Tr. 174), as well as an explanation why he ran from the officer (Tr. 178). All this constitutes giving his version of events leading to the charges against him. That being the case, this is not an instance of a trial containing entirely circumstantial evidence, as the opinion states. By testifying, Appellant presented his version of events and ran the risk he would present incriminating evidence on cross-examination; he also presented evidence which, if believed, would have resolved the issue in his favor. Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d 1288, 1301-1303 (Okl.Cr.1994); Lowrey v. State, 87 Okl.Cr. 313, 197 P.2d 637, 644-45 (1948). Therefore, other evidence aside, this case presented both direct and circumstantial evidence, and this Court used the incorrect standard of review determining whether sufficient evidence existed.
Concerning the evidence of the guilty plea: I agree evidence of a guilty plea should not have been introduced. However, I cannot agree with the opinion’s statement the error as to a plea of guilty was introduced by the prosecution. It was not! It was introduced by Appellant’s own counsel.
The prosecutor did introduce State’s Exhibit 8, which was merely an affidavit which stated the Appellant “had in my possession cocaine base in excess of 5.0 grams. I had no tax stamp and I had a gun.” But there is nothing on that statement indicating it was given in connection with a guilty plea. There was only a reference it was filled out in court (Tr. 183-84). The prosecutor then asked: “And, were you telling the truth on that day when you signed that affidavit in this courtroom in front of this Judge, swearing, or you telling the truth today?” (Tr. 190-91). At Tr. 198, the prosecutor asked if Appellant wrote on there he had a gun, and no tax stamp. (Tr. 198-99). In short, there is simply no direct reference to a guilty plea.
Such a reference was subsequently made, but it was done by defense counsel. After referring to the “statement,” (Tr. 213), defense counsel asked: “Marlon, when you signed your statement there on March the 8th, were you aware of what had already happened with your codefendant?” (Tr. 216). He asked a similar question at Tr. 218. There were several objections, based on the fact the questions dealt with the co-defendant, and not Appellant. Then, defense counsel asked the following:
After you pled guilty on that day, why did you decide to change your mind?
(Tr. 220). That is the first direct reference to a guilty plea in the transcript. The prosecutor objected because the question was the “subject of plea negotiations.” (Tr. 220). Then defense counsel asked:
It’s already been testified to that you signed up for a term of fifteen years; is that correct? ... When you were over in jail after you had signed that statement on March the 8th, why did you decide to withdraw your plea, ask the Judge to allow you to withdraw the plea and start over? Why?
(Tr. 221). Appellant responded “Because I didn’t feel it was right, the amount of time I got for my first offense” (Tr. 221). In fact, the first reference the prosecutor made to a guilty plea was on recross, when he asked Appellant: “And, in response to that, you said, no you were not being forced to plead guilty; isn’t that correct?” (Tr. 223).
The record is very clear, the evidence directly related to a guilty plea did not come from the prosecution, but rather the error was invited by defense counsel. It should also be noted during redirect defense counsel sought to introduce the very same form filled out by Galbreath (marked Defendant’s Exhibit # 3). This further shows it was Appellant, not the prosecution, who sought the introduction of improper evidence.
Based on the actual facts of this case, the Court should reconsider footnote 14 of the opinion which uses four jury questions as examples why there was no harmless error. *170Included m this list was a question asking why Appellant waived his preliminary hearing. In light of the record set out above, I question the validity of those examples as support for the proposition that the error was not harmless. This is especially true since that particular bit of information was also brought out first by defense counsel, this time on direct examination (Tr. 181). If that were error, it was not the prosecutor’s fault. To the contrary, it was admitted over the prosecutor’s objection (Tr. 181).
It is for these reasons I must dissent to the reversal of the convictions.