concurring specially.
Because the record shows that a reasonable person in Sewell’s position would have perceived himself to be in custody when he made *563his incriminating statement to the police, I disagree with Division 2 of the majority opinion in which the Court concludes that Sewell was not in custody when he was interviewed at the homicide office and that the statement he made to the police was therefore admissible at trial. I also conclude, however, that the admission of Sewell’s statement was harmless error, and I thus concur in the affirmance of Sewell’s conviction.
In reviewing the trial court’s denial of Sewell’s motion to suppress, we will defer to the trial court’s findings of disputed facts but will review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.7 Further, in determining whether a suspect is in custody, a court must consider “the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and then ascertain whether, under those circumstances, “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”8 In addition, “[w]hether a custodial situation exists does not depend upon ‘the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.’ ”9 Instead, “ ‘[t]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable [person] in the suspect’s position would have understood his [or her] situation.’ ”10
In the present case, Sewell’s step-grandfather testified at the Jackson-Denno11 hearing that Sewell’s mother called him on the night of the crime and told her that Sewell said that he had shot someone. The step-grandfather testified that he was like a father figure to Sewell, who was 15 at the time of the crime, and that the next morning, he and Sewell’s grandmother went to Sewell’s mother’s house. According to the step-grandfather, he and the rest of Sewell’s family encouraged Sewell to turn himself in, and Sewell’s mother called the police and asked them to come to her house.
Officer James Clements testified that he was the second officer to arrive at the house and that, when he arrived, the first officer (Officer Sands), Sewell, and Sewell’s grandmother and step-grandfather were sitting in a room together. Officer Clements stated Officer Sands asked him to step out of the room and that, when he did so, Officer Sands told him that Sewell’s step-grandfather had told him that Sewell had shot and killed someone. Officer Clements went back to *564the room where Sewell was sitting with his grandmother and step-grandfather and asked to speak to the step-grandfather. Clements added that the step-grandfather then told him that Sewell had told him that he had shot and killed someone the night before. Clements and the step-grandfather then went back into the room in which Officer Sands, Sewell, and Sewell’s grandmother were sitting. Clements did not have a conversation with Sewell at the house. According to Officer Clements, he then called the homicide office and told them what the step-grandfather had told him, and he stated that the homicide office told him to bring Sewell and the step-grandfather to the station to make a statement. After speaking with the homicide office, Officer Clements informed Sewell and his step-grandfather that they both would have to go to the homicide office to make statements. Neither Officer Sands nor Officer Clements nor the officer who conducted Sewell’s interview at the homicide office told Sewell that he was not under arrest and was free to leave.
Sewell’s step-grandfather also testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing. He testified that, when he arrived at Sewell’s mother’s house, Sewell told him that he had shot the victim. The step-grandfather added that, when Officer Sands and Officer Clements arrived at the house, he told both officers that Sewell had told him that he had shot and killed the victim. After the step-grandfather spoke with Officer Clements, the step-grandfather testified that he, Officer Clements, and Officer Sands went back into the room in which Sewell was sitting with his grandmother. The step-grandfather stated that the officers briefly questioned Sewell and that Officer Clements then told Sewell and the step-grandfather that they would need to go to the homicide office to make statements. According to the step-grandfather, Officer Clements told Sewell that he would have to ride with Officer Clements to the homicide office.
Subsequently, Officer Sands and Officer Clements required Sewell to ride to the homicide office in Officer Clements’s police vehicle, as it had a security screen between the officer and the back seat and Officer Sands’s vehicle did not. Officer Clements also patted down Sewell before he entered the police vehicle. Sewell’s mother rode with Officer Sands to the homicide office, and his grandmother and step-grandfather drove their own vehicle.
Under the foregoing circumstances, I conclude that a reasonable person in Sewell’s position would not have felt free to terminate his interview with police officers and to walk out of the police station. First, based on the facts that Sewell had told his family that he had shot and killed the victim; that his family called the police to come to his house; that his step-grandfather had encouraged Sewell to turn himself in; that Sewell saw his step-grandfather have conversations with two police officers; that, shortly after those conversations, *565Sewell and his step-grandfather were told they had to go to the homicide office to make statements; and that Sewell was patted down and transported in a secure police vehicle while his relatives were permitted to take their own private transportation if they so desired,12 a reasonable person in Sewell’s position would conclude that his step-grandfather told the officers that Sewell had confessed to the shooting. The majority errs in concluding to the contrary.13 Moreover, based on the foregoing factors, as well as on the fact that no police officer ever told Sewell that he was not under arrest and was free to leave,14 a reasonable person in Sewell’s position also would conclude that the officers intended to question him about his role in the shooting and that the officers would not permit him to stop the interview and leave the police station.
Although the majority relies on the subjective intent of the police officers to the effect that Sewell was not under arrest and was free to leave, the question whether a custodial situation existed does not turn on the officers’ subjective views, but instead depends upon how a reasonable person in Sewell’s position would have perceived his situation.15 The majority also relies on the presence of the defendant’s family during the interview as a factor favoring the conclusion that Sewell would have felt free to leave the homicide office. Although the presence of close relatives during a police interview might generally support the majority’s position, it does not do so in this case. Instead, as Sewell’s relatives had encouraged Sewell to turn himself in, as Sewell had confessed to them, and as shortly after his confession to them, he was transported to a homicide office in a secure police vehicle, I cannot conclude that their presence would have led Sewell to feel that he was free to leave the homicide office.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that a reasonable person in Sewell’s position would not have thought that he was free to leave the homicide office and that he was thus in custody for purposes of Miranda.16 Because Sewell did not receive the warnings required by Miranda before he made his statement, the trial court erred in *566admitting his statement into evidence. Accordingly, I disagree with Division 2 of the majority opinion in which the Court affirms the trial court’s decision to admit the statement.
Decided June 2, 2008. Carl P. Greenberg, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker, Bet-tieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Mary N. Kimmey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.However, because I also conclude that there was overwhelming evidence of Sewell’s guilt, including Sewell’s admission of guilt to his step-grandfather, with whom Sewell was very close, I would affirm his conviction.17
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Carley join in this special concurrence.Petty v. State, 283 Ga. 268,269 (658 SE2d 599) (2008); State v. Nash, 279 Ga. 646,648 (619 SE2d 684) (2005).
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U. S. 99, 112 (116 SC 457, 133 LE2d 383) (1995). Accord Petty, 283 Ga. at 269.
Hightower v. State, 272 Ga. 42,43 (526 SE2d 836) (2000), quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318, 323 (II) (114 SC 1526, 128 LE2d 293) (1994).
Hightower, 272 Ga. at 43, quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 442 (III) (104 SC 3138, 82 LE2d 317) (1984).
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 664 (124 SC 2140,158 LE2d 938) (2004) (the fact that the police did not transport a defendant to the station or require him to appear is a factor that weighs in favor of a finding that the defendant was not in custody).
Majority opinion at p. 562.
Gabriel v. State, 280 Ga. 237, 237-238 (626 SE2d 491) (2006) (if an officer tells a suspect that he is not under arrest or is free to leave before he makes a statement, it is a factor supporting the conclusion that the defendant was not in custody); Yarborough, 541 U. S. at 665 (if an officer does not tell a suspect that he is free to leave, this factor “weights] in favor of the view that [the suspect] was in custody.”).
Cook v. State, 274 Ga. 891, 894-895 (561 SE2d 407) (2002); Hightower, 272 Ga. at 43; Stansbury, 511 U. S. at 323-324; Berkemer, 468 U. S. at 441-442.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
Frazier v. State, 278 Ga. 297, 298 (602 SE2d 588) (2004).