McGuire v. McGuire

ROONEY, Justice,

dissenting.

ENTREE

I must dissent from the majority holding in this case inasmuch as it sets the following very bad precedents:

1. It sets as a precedent that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not supersede procedural statutory provisions in conflict therewith.
2. It sets as a precedent the continued viability and use of §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103, W.S.1977, statutes which are unwieldy and inconsistent, statutes of questionable constitutionality, and statutes which were, first, superseded by Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., and, then later, repealed by the legislature.

Since the procedure for condemnation provided in §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 has been superseded by that provided in Rule 71.1, this matter was not processed under the proper procedure. The case should be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of proper proceedings.

To vividly illustrate the foregoing, it is appropriate to consider two background items: (A) the actual history of §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 1, and their historical relationship with other statutes and rules, and (B) the basic errors of the majority opinion.

STATUTORY HISTORY

Sections 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 were originally enacted in 1886 (before statehood) as part of an act which also concerned public roads. In 1895 (after statehood) they were reenacted as part of an act entitled, “An Act to revise, amend and consolidate the Statutes relating to Highways and Bridges.” Ch. 69, Session Laws of Wyoming 1895. The other parts of that act also concerned the location, establishment, altering and vacating of national, state, territorial and county roads, the construction and maintenance of them, and the levying of taxes therefor. These other parts concerned public roads. Sections 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 concern private roads. Thus, the original act and the revised act involved both public roads and private roads. Sections 24-9-101 and 24-9-103 were directly amended in 1901, but the amendments were minor and of no per-tinency to this matter. Such sections now provide:

Section 24-9-101:

“Any person whose land shall be so situated that it has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may make application in writing to the board of county commissioners of his county at a regular session, for a private road leading from his premises to some convenient public road. Said applicant shall give at least thirty (30) days notice in writing to the owner or resident agent or occupant of all lands over which such private road is applied for, of the time of making such application to such board. If the owner of such land be a nonresident, and there be no resident agent upon which personal service can be had, then such notice may be published in some newspaper published in the county for three (3) weeks, the last publication shall be at least thirty (30) days before the hearing of said application, at which time all parties interested may appear and be heared [sic] by said board as to the necessity of said road, and all matters pertaining thereto. Upon the *1292hearing of said application, whether the owner or others interested appear or not, if the said board shall find that the applicant has complied with the law, and that such private road is necessary, said board shall appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county, as viewers and appraisers, and shall cause an order to be issued directing them to meet on a day named in such order on the proposed road, and view and locate a private road according to the application therefor, and to assess damages to be sustained thereby, and if for any reason such viewers and appraisers are unable to meet at the time set by the board to view said proposed road, they may fix some other date, but shall be required to give notice in writing to the owner or resident agent or occupant of said lands over which said road is proposed to be laid of the time and place where such viewers will meet, at least ten (10) days before viewing such road, at which time and place all persons interested may appear and be heard by said viewers. Before entering upon their duties such viewers shall take and subscribe to an oath that they will faithfully and impartially perform their duties under their said appointment as viewers and appraisers. Such viewers shall then proceed to locate and mark out a private road in accordance with said application, not exceeding thirty (30) feet in width from a certain point on the premises of the applicant to some certain point on the public road, so as to do the least possible damage to the lands through which such private road is located, and they shall also at the same time assess the damages sustained by the owner or owners over which such road is to be established and make full and true returns, with a plat of such road to the board of county commissioners.”

Section 24-9-102:

“The viewers and appraisers appointed in accordance with the provisions of the preceding section [§ 24-9-101] shall have power to determine in all cases whether or not gates shall be placed at the proper points on said road, and assess damages in accordance with such determination.”

Section 24-9-103:

“The viewers and appraisers so appointed, or a majority of them, shall make a report to the county commissioners at the next regular session, of the private road so located by them, and also the amount of damages, if any, assessed by them, and the person or persons entitled to such damages, and if the commissioners are satisfied that such report is just, and after payment by the applicant of all cost of locating such road, and the damages assessed by the viewers, the commissioners shall order such report to be confirmed and declare such road to be a private road, and the same shall be recorded as such. Any person aggrieved by the action of the board or as to the amount of damages awarded, may appeal to the district court at any time within thirty (30) days after said road is finally established by said board of county commissioners.”

These statutes have been referred to as an “eminent domain proceeding” which “had its roots in §§ 32 and 33, Art. I, Wyoming Constitution.” Snell v. Ruppert, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1042, 1045-1046 (1975).

Art. 1, § 32, Wyoming Constitution provides:

“Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes, nor in any case without due compensation.”

Art. 1, § 33, Wyoming Constitution provides:

“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation.”

In 1953, the procedure outlined in § 24-9-101 was indirectly amended and materially changed by the legislative enactment of Ch. 181, § 2, Session Laws of Wyoming 1953 (now § 24-l-105(b), W.S.1977), which provides:

*1293“(b). Any land owner or interested party desiring to raise any question with respect to the necessity of the taking of the land for road purposes under the provisions of Chapter 48, Article 3, Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, shall do so by filing, within thirty (30) days after the last publication of notice of the proposed location of such road, a petition in the District Court of the county in which the land or any part thereof is located. The District Court shall within ten (10) days, if possible, from and after the filing of said petition hear and determine the question of necessity. Provided that when said petition is filed, the burden of showing necessity shall be sustained by the county or the State Highway Department. If no petition, to raise the question of necessity, is filed within the said thirty (30) day period, the necessity shall be presumed and the question cannot later be raised.”

Chapter 48, Article 3, Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, referred to therein, includes the statutes with which we are here concerned (now §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103, W.S.1977). Thus, the determination of the necessity for the taking was transferred from the board of county commissioners to the district court. However, the unwieldy and inconsistent nature of the procedure was not cured. It remained complex, time consuming and impractical.

Similar complexity and impracticability existed in the statutory procedures for condemnation for other purposes.2 Furthermore, the several procedures were anything but uniform and consistent. To remedy such, Rule 71.1 was added to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, effective March 21, 1966. It provides in part:

“(a) * * * The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedure for the condemnation of real and personal property under the power of eminent domain, except as otherwise provided in this rule.”

There is no exception in the rule which would remove the proceeding in this case from application of the rule.

Rule 1, W.R.C.P. provides in pertinent part:

“These rules govern procedure in all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all actions, suits or proceedings of a civil nature, in all special statutory proceedings * * *. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” (Emphasis supplied.)3
Rule 87(c), W.R.C.P. provides in part: “(c) * * * The sections of Wyoming Statutes, 1957, as amended, hereinafter enumerated, shall be superseded, and such statutes and all other laws in conflict with Rule 71.1 shall be of no further force or effect * * (Emphasis supplied.)

The statutes here involved were not enumerated in Rule 87(c), but they are included within “all other laws in conflict with Rule 71.1.” The procedure set forth in Rule 71.1 is completely incompatible with that set forth in the statutes here involved.

Under Rule 71.1, the action is commenced as in other actions, i. e., by filing a complaint and serving a summons. An answer is required only if the defendant desires to contest the right to take the property or the necessity therefor. Whether or not an answer is filed, the court holds an expedited *1294hearing to determine preliminary or first phase matters, such as the necessity for the taking, its purpose, etc. Appraisers are appointed to determine the just compensation to be paid as a result of the taking. If a party is not satisfied with the appraisal award, he may have a jury determination of the issue of just compensation. All in all, the procedure is more simple, more direct, more rapid and more equitable than that provided by the statutes here involved. Certainly, the two procedures are in conflict, one with the other.

Although there are some material differences between Rule 71.1, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 71.1 is modeled after and is similar to Rule 71A. Prior to adoption of Rule 71A, the procedures for eminent domain in the federal area were also many and varied. The “system is atrocious” and the rule was necessary to “rescue the government from this morass.” Supplementary Report of the Advisory Committee, 11 F.R.D. 222, 224, 226 (1952).

“The purpose of Rule 71A was to make uniform and to simplify condemnation proceedings. * * * ” United States v. 3,065.94 Acres of Land, County of Tulare, California, U.S.D.C.S.D.Cal., 187 F.Supp. 728, 732 (1960).

It is incongruous that the majority holding here rejects the court’s own rule and refuses to apply it in this case toward the purposes for which it was adopted.

In 1977, the legislature recognized both the wisdom of the rule and the authority of the court in promulgating it by enacting legislation specifically repealing all other statutory proceedings for eminent domain:

“Any action or proceeding to acquire title to or any interest in real or personal property of another by condemnation, for any purpose whatsoever, shall be commenced and conducted in accordance with Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 1-26-405, W.S.1977.

The legislation, itself, may not be determinative in this case inasmuch as this case was started a few months before enactment of § 1-26-405, but it is a ratification and confirmation of the effect of Rule 71.1 — one of the rules referred to in the legislation.

The history of §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 reflects their demise and the replacement of them by Rule 71.1.

BASIC ERRORS IN MAJORITY OPINION

The following are errors which are basic to the majority holding:

1. The majority opinion fails to recognize the effect of the 1953 amendment on the statutes in question. The 1953 amendment (now § 24-l-105(b)) transferred from the board of county commissioners to the district court the duty to determine the necessity for the taking. In the long run this error should be immaterial inasmuch as the entire procedure was superseded by Rule 71.1.4 But insofar as the rationale of the majority opinion relative to the viability of §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 is concerned, its failure to recognize and apply the provisions of § 24-l-105(b) is fatal. It is fatal to the contention that later Rule 71.1 and § 1-26-405 are inapplicable to §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103. It is fatal to the contention that the procedure was legislatively directed to be administrative rather than judicial. It is fatal to the contention that the judicial interest in eminent domain is “substantive rather than procedural.” There is no ambiguity in § 24-1-105(b) and, as the majority opinion points out, the legislative intention must be gathered from the act itself and a meaning shall not be given to it which will nullify its operation if an interpretation can be given which will support such operation.

*12952. The majority opinion attempts to avoid the plain and simple language of § 1-26 — 405 and resorts to a form of obtuse and contrived “reasoning” to contend that such statute did not repeal §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103. The language of § 1-26-405 is direct, concise, unambiguous and positive. It would be hard to imagine language that is more so. Section 1-26-405 clearly and definitely states that:

“Any * * * proceeding to acquire * * * any interest in the real * * * property of another by condemnation, for any purpose whatsoever, shall be commenced and conducted in accordance with Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The majority opinion attempts to rationalize that the words “for any purpose whatsoever” do not mean what they say by noting provisions relative to other eminent domain proceedings in the enactment containing § 1-26-405. The title to the enactment refutes such rationalization. It is also plain and unambiguous in indicating an intention to straighten out and make uniform all eminent domain procedures. The title reads in part:

“AN ACT * * * to eliminate obsolete or fully executed statutes, to conform conflicting statutes, to eliminate duplicitous or archaic language; * * * providing for the procedures for prosecuting all forms of civil actions and conforming such procedures to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure * * *.” Ch. 188, Session Laws of Wyoming 1977.

As the rule is often stated:

“Where language of a statute is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of construction. * * * ” Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Emerson, Wyo., 578 P.2d 1351, 1357 (1978).

And the same can be said of the language in Rule 71.1. It is simple, plain, direct, and unambiguous. It states that it “govern[s] the procedure for the condemnation * * under the power of eminent domain.” There is no limitation or ambiguity in the language of Rule 87(c) which directs certain enumerated statutes “and all other laws in conflict with Rule 71.1 shall be of no further force or effect.” The enumerated statutes are the ones to which the majority opinion would limit the application of the rule. If such were so, the words, “and all other laws in conflict with Rule 71.1,” would be surplusage. Legislatures and courts are not presumed to do useless things. DeHerrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479 (1977); and see Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979) cited in majority opinion.

Sections 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 were intentionally and directly superseded by Rule 71.1. The same was later confirmed and ratified by § 1-26-405.

3. The majority opinion seeks to avoid the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 71.1 and § 1-26-405 by suggesting that § 24-9-101 creates a substantive right and a “jurisdictional right” and that therefore the Court Rules cannot apply to it. One quick but complete answer to this suggestion is that if such is so, then all other condemnation procedures which have been superseded by the rules are in the same boat. And even the majority opinion does not so contend. The proceeding under §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 is an “eminent domain proceeding” which “had its roots” in §§ 32 and 33, Art. 1, Wyoming Constitution, Snell v. Ruppert, supra, 541 P.2d at 1045, 1046 (1975). These are the same constitutional provisions in which all other condemnation proceedings in the state of Wyoming have their roots.

Section 24-9-101 does not set the measure of damages to be paid upon condemnation, nor does it give the authority to condemn. Such is contained in §§ 32 and 33, Art. 1, Wyoming Constitution. These two things are the only substantive matters in condemnation.

«* * * ‘Courts generally agree in defining the terms “substantive” and “adjective” that “substantive” law creates, defines, and regulates rights as opposed to “adjective” or “procedural” law which provides the method of enforcing and protecting such duties, rights, and *1296obligations as are created by substantive laws. * * * ’ ” State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District In and For County of Big Horn, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583, 585 (1965).

That which was said for the federal court system in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965), can be said of our courts:

«* * * For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either. * * * ”

The substantive aspects of eminent domain, at least insofar as the taking is for public use is concerned, is a sovereign right. It exists independently of constitutional and legislative provisions. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 2 (1965). With reference to a taking for a public purpose,

“* * * constitutional provisions relating to the exercise of the right or power of eminent domain are but limitations on a power which would otherwise be absolute or without limit.” 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 3, p. 171 (1965).

Art. 1, § 32, Wyoming Constitution, sets this limitation — certainly with reference to a taking for public purpose, and insofar as such can be done with reference to a taking for a private purpose.5

Before they were superseded, §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 provided the procedure, and only the procedure, for exercising a substantive right established by the constitution.

4. The majority opinion seeks to avoid the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 71.1 and § 1-26-405 by suggesting that the procedures set forth in §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 have to do with “administrative” condemnations and are therefore not subject to judicial action. Again it can be noted that the legislature put the judiciary right smack in the middle of the procedure by enactment of § l-26-405(b). The majority opinion has no hesitancy in “judicially” deciding that necessity existed for the road6 — contrary to the “administrative” decision of the Board of County Commissioners. And from the time of the initial enactment of §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103, a judicial review and control were anticipated. In any event, that which has already been said relative to the specific legislative ratification of the use of the procedure in Rule 71.1 in condemnations, “for any purpose whatsoever,” as set forth in § 1-26-405, reflects the legislative intent to have this type of condemnation be by the judicial method.

5. The majority opinion bases its conclusion that the BLM trail “is a public road within the terms of” § 24-9-101 on the contention that such section “does not define [a] public road” and that it “does not require connection with a public road that is state or county controlled.” Attention is directed to the fact that § 24-9-101 was only a part of the original 1886 enactment (before statehood) and that such enactment was revised and amended in 1895 (after statehood) to include a definition of public roads:

“All roads within this state shall be public highways which have been or may be declared by law to be national, state, territorial or county roads. All roads that have been designated or marked as highways on government maps or plats in *1297the record of any land office of the United States within this state, and which have been publicly used as traveled highways, and which have not been closed or vacated by order of the Board of the County Commissioners of the county wherein the same are located, are declared to be public highways until the same are closed or vacated by order of the Board of County Commissioners of the county wherein the same are located, and the board or officer charged by law with such duty shall keep the same open and in repair the same as in the case of roads regularly laid out and opened by order of the Board of the County Commissioners.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ch. 69, § 1, Session Laws of Wyoming 1895.

Since this definition accompanied § 24-9-101 in the 1953 revision of the enactment, it is obviously the definition of public roads referred to therein.

It may be difficult to bring the BLM “trail” within the “convenient public road” requirement of § 24-9-101. Additionally the determination of the status of the BLM “trail” should probably not be made without the presence of the United States — as indicated by the majority opinion before it proceeded to do so.

With reference to this statute, the Tenth Circuit Court said on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming:

“ * * * The law is well settled that waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, and it is plain that Congress did not give its consent to suits against it by private individuals seeking private roads.” Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 10th Cir. 1975, 515 F.2d 926, 930.

EPILOGUE

The foregoing illustrates the propriety of dismissing this action for failure to follow the proper procedure, i. e., Rule 71.1, and it illustrates the bad precedent set by the majority holding to the effect that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not supersede procedural statutory provisions in conflict therewith.

The precedent set by the majority opinion in giving continued viability to §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 is also bad.

The procedure contained therein is unwieldy and inconsistent. This case has been in progress for over a year. Before amendment by § 24-l-105(b) in 1957, the procedure required a written application to the county commissioners “at a regular session.” But before doing so, the applicant had to give 30 days’ prior notice in writing to the “owner or * * * occupant” of the lands over which the road is to pass. But if the owner is a nonresident, publication for 3 weeks of a notice may be had, with the last publication to be at least 30 days “before the hearing” on the application.

Already the inconsistencies and potential problems are manifest. If the owner lives in New York, only publication is necessary — even if the occupant, one of owner’s relatives or lessees — is resident on the land. But such occupant need not be notified. The notice must be given 30 days before filing the application if given other than by publication. If given by publication the 30 days are measured against the date of the “hearing.” Will the hearing be on the date of the application? It was not in this case.

At the hearing, the board determines the necessity, and if it finds such it appoints the “viewers and appraisers” and sets a time for them to meet for the purpose of assessing damages and to “view and locate a private road according to the application therefor.” If they change the date of the meeting, notice must be given to the owner or occupant 10 days before the .new date set for the meeting. Note that the owner may be vitally interested and the occupant, a lessee for example, may not care. Yet a notice to the occupant will suffice. There may be a question as to whether the viewers “locate” the road by ascertaining where the application says it will be and “marking” it on a plat, i. e., locating it “according to the application therefor” or whether they can “locate” it at some other place.

*1298Then there is the additional problem of just what is a “convenient public road.” There may be instances where the applicant only needs a way of necessity to the private road of someone else who has given him permission to use it. The wording of this statute does not accommodate such as do the provisions of Rule 71.1.

After the viewers and appraisers report to the county commissioners “of the private road so located by them, and also the amount of damages, if any, assessed by them, and the person or persons entitled to such damages,” the commissioners confirm the report if they are “satisfied that such report is just.” An appeal is provided to the district court.

The 1953 amendment places the onus on “any land owner or interested party” to petition the district court within 30 days after publication of the notice for a determination of necessity. What does this do if written notice was given without publication? In any event, the court determines the necessity, not the board of county commissioners. But, after the court determines the necessity, do the commissioners then have an opportunity to reverse the court by finding that the report is not “just” (as provided in § 24-9-103)?

Note that there is no provision for assessment of damages by a jury should any party so desire — as is provided in Rule 71.1.

Sections 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 are cumbersome, unwieldy and inconsistent. Undoubtedly such is part of the reason the legislature and court saw fit to repeal and supersede them.

Since I would dispose of this case on the basis that the proper procedure was not followed, I would not address a constitutional problem. However, it is proper to note that any taking for a private purpose is of questionable constitutionality. This general proposition is summarized in 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain §§ 25 and 26,-pp. 668-671 (1966):

Section 25:

“The general rule is that in the exercise of the right of eminent domain private property can be taken only for a public purpose or use. In other words, it is settled generally that private property cannot be taken for other than a public use under any circumstances. * * * Condemnation for a nonpublic use is held to be a denial of due process, even though accompanied by full compensation to the owner.
“In certain instances, however, the constitutions of some of the states authorize the taking of private property for private uses — as, for example, ways of necessity, reservoirs, drains, flumes, or ditches for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic, or sanitary purposes — or any other use necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the state or the preservation of the health of its inhabitants.[7]! But these provisions, and the statutes enacted thereunder, have ordinarily been construed as not intending to authorize a taking of private property without some public necessity or advantage.”

Section 26:

“It has already been explained that a taking of property for private use cannot be authorized by Congress without violating the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that such a taking, when authorized by a state, is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Occasionally it happens that a decision of a state court that a taking is for a public use, involving only the constitutionality of a state statute under the usual constitutional provisions, is brought before the Supreme Court of the United States under the due process clause. Such questions more frequently arise, however, under special constitutional provisions found in several of the states declaring certain *1299uses as public which are generally not considered such. Such provisions are binding on the state courts so far as the constitutions of the states are concerned, but they cannot override the Fourteenth Amendment; and a state statute which provides for the taking of property for a private use, though specifically authorized by the constitution of the state, can be overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States, or even by the highest court of the state itself, since the Federal Constitution is binding on the courts of every state notwithstanding any provision in its own constitution. Especially is this the case when the state constitution does not declare a certain use to be public, but merely provides that property may be taken for that use, even if it is private.” (Emphasis supplied.)

See 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 4.7 at p. 4-29.

Finally, I note that the fact that this court has applied §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 in disposing of other cases in the past and after such sections were superseded by Rule 71.1 is not a proper reason for refusing to acknowledge such supersedure. Courts often correct their own errors. In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), supp. opin. 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), the Court struck down the previously approved doctrine of “separate but equal.” In Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310 (1980), this court refused to approve the method of school financing, having acted previously on many cases relative thereto without such disapproval.

It is time to acknowledge that the unwieldy and conflicting §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 were superseded by Rule 71.1. I would remand the case with direction to vacate both the order appealed from and the decision of the Board of County Commissioners without prejudice to institute proper proceedings under Rule 71.1 for the purpose of obtaining an alleged private way of necessity to and from the 80-acre tract of land.

McCLlNTOCK, J., concurs in the disposition of the appeal suggested in the dissenting opinion of ROONEY, J.

. These statutes are pivotal to the majority holding. Such holding is premised upon them, and they are upheld and applied in such holding.

. Separate condemnation procedures existed for actions by school districts, cities, towns, railroad companies, counties for roads, cities for public utilities, state for highways, rights-of-way for telegraph, telephone, and petroleum or other pipeline companies, etc.

. Ch. 53, § 1, Session Laws of Wyoming 1947 (§ 1-116, W.C.S.1945, 1957 Cum.Supp.) provides:

“The Supreme Court of Wyoming may from time to time adopt, modify and repeal general rules and forms governing pleading, practice and procedure, in all courts of this State, for the purpose of promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits.”

Beyond this, the court has an inherent power to make rules for the efficient and expeditious disposition of its official business. Southern Pacific Lumber Company v. Reynolds, Miss., 206 So.2d 334 (1968), citing several treatises.

. I do not disagree with the majority contention that the condemnor must set forth a proper description in his complaint or petition. My agreement with this position was emphatically set forth in my dissent in Coronado Oil Company v. Grieves, Wyo., 603 P.2d 406 (1979). I do disagree that such description can be in a petition filed under superseded statutes rather than in a complaint filed under superseding Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P.

. The constitutionality of a taking for a private purpose is referred to infra.

. The majority opinion may also be erroneous in holding that the necessity exists for a road from the fact that the land is landlocked. The constitutional provision is for a private way of necessity. Such is not necessarily a road. The use of the property, the topography, etc. may dictate the type of way for which there is a necessity. For example, the use and terrain may be, as here, for hunting and fishing, with a horse trail being sufficient — or even a pack trail in a wilderness area. In other instances, the existence of an airstrip may negate the necessity for other means of access.

. Perhaps a taking for a private way of necessity can be justified for one of these reasons, but the justification must be rational.