dissenting.
Although this Court on occasion has determined that a sanction of less than disbarment is appropriate for lawyers convicted of felonies, this case does not warrant such an outcome. In this case, Waldrop has made no direct showing of remorse nor has he sought to explain his criminal behavior. Waldrop did not testify during the hearing before the special master, declined to offer the guilty plea hearing transcript into evidence, and submitted a cursory affidavit acknowledging his guilty plea and declaring, without factual support, that no client or third party was harmed by his behavior. Although he offered other witnesses on his behalf, his failure to directly take responsibility for his actions and offer any explanation for his behavior is extremely troubling.
As this Court has held previously,
“[t]he appearance of a convicted attorney continuing to practice does more to disrupt public confidence in the legal profession than any other disciplinary problem. Members of the Bar must maintain a high standard of conduct. If the law is to be respected, the public must be able to respect the individuals who administer it. . . .” [Cit.]
In the Matter of Stoner, 246 Ga. 581, 582 (272 SE2d 313) (1980). See also In the Matter of Horn, 269 Ga. 826 (505 SE2d 21) (1998); In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865 (621 SE2d 750) (2005). The failure of Waldrop to express remorse or offer any explanation for his behavior distinguishes this case from those such as In the Matter of Lewis, 282 Ga. 649 (651 SE2d 729) (2007).
For the above reasons, I would find that disbarment is the appropriate sanction herein, and, thus, I respectfully dissent.
*83Decided January 28, 2008. William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia. Bruce S. Harvey, for Waldrop.I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.